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these needs.   The systems engineering team, seeking solutions that provide improved 
Carrier Strike Group defense from undersea threats, generated 14 alternative architectures 
for analysis.  The alternatives that passed feasibility screening underwent performance 
and cost modeling, reliability screening, and risk analysis to help provide a basis for 
comparison.  The analysis demonstrated that a distributed barrier of active sensors placed 
and maintained by a Littoral Combat Ship provided an effective detection and 
engagement solution.  The team further concluded that coupling the barrier with 
development of advanced capability improvements to the platform-based active sonar 
provided an effective layered defense approach.  This rigorous process demonstrated the 
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With the proliferation of advanced submarine technology, the preservation of the 
capability for our naval forces to operate freely across the globe remains paramount.  The 
need for this capability is documented in the Chief of Naval Operations document “A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.”  As a means to provide the capability, 
the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) Technical Director announced the NUWC 
Grand Challenge, a working vision for NUWC analysis centered on Next Generation 
Undersea Warfare.  This vision focused on the theater-level warfare-from-under-the-sea 
capabilities that effectively support and enable networked Joint forces to be 
expeditionary, adaptable, and responsive, allowing them to perform a broad set of 
missions and tasks in support of the nation’s defense strategy.  This Capstone project 
assesses what potential improvements can be provided in the near–term (by 2013) to 
increase the protection given to a carrier strike group during operations. 
Using an initial problem statement of “Improved Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Effectiveness”, the project team worked with key stakeholders to establish the operational 
needs required by the Carrier Strike Group for successful completion of the assigned 
operations.  Following receipt of the requirements from the stakeholders, a needs analysis 
was performed to pull out the salient characteristics required of the system.  Techniques, 
such as Affinity diagramming, were utilized to identify 21 goals with 63 derived 
requirements for the system development.  Based on a Pareto Analysis across the goals 
and requirements, six critical needs were identified as the key stakeholder Anti-
Submarine Warfare system objectives in the areas of Detection, Precision Engagement, 
Tracking, Self Protect, Counter Quiet Threat, and Avoiding Force on Force 
Engagements. 
Using these six critical needs as the  basis for the systems requirements, 
functional and objective hierarchies were developed to define the system capabilities and  
the measures of performance that would be utilized to assess the overall effectiveness of 
the yet to be formulated system alternatives.  These hierarchies in concert with the 
analysis results from concept of operations, system input-output diagrams and external 
 xiv
systems diagrams were used to set the boundaries of the system to be developed.  The 
results of this effort when combined with the stakeholder’s analysis resulted in the 
following effective need statement: 
“An improved Anti-Submarine Warfare system is needed to protect carrier strike 
groups from enemy attack through effective, timely, and precise engagement by 
providing tactically significant detection, localization, tracking, and classification of quiet 
acoustic threat submarines in challenging environments.” 
Following the identification of the effective need, the project team commenced an 
alternatives generation process to explore solutions capable of satisfying the effective 
need.  Using a Zwicky’s Morphological Box analysis, a total of 13 alternatives were 
developed as potential systems to meet the effective need.  These alternatives considered 
both materiel and non-materiel solutions, in addition to assessing the use of both 
commercial and military platforms and sensors to meet the desired needs.  The 
alternatives analysis also included a ‘do-nothing’ baseline alternative based upon the 
current legacy systems projected to the 2013 timeframe.  Applying feasibility criteria 
developed through a combination of the stakeholder requirements and the team’s 
experience, three alternatives in addition to the do-nothing baseline alternative were 
selected for further investigation utilizing modeling and simulation. 
Excel-based modeling was developed to assess the effectiveness of each of the 
alternatives based on the top-level objective of “Increasing the Carrier Strike Group 
Probability of Survival.”  This modeling was developed to accurately model the physics-
based SONAR aspects of the system while providing transparent insight into the 
underlying model detection and classification performance needed to fully characterize 
each alternative’s performance.  Additional modeling was done to support Reliability, 
Maintainability, and Availability analysis of each alternative in addition to a Life Cycle 
Cost Analysis to facilitate comparison among the system alternatives. 
The output of the modeling results was used in the Decision Making process to 
provide a ranking across the alternatives.  Sensitivity analysis was conducted to measure 
the impact on value scoring results based on changes in global weighting.  Parameter 
 xv
weighting was generated from stakeholder inputs relative to the objectives hierarchies.  
Additionally, another inferred alternative was generated by combining two of the 
alternatives that passed feasibility screening.  This alternative was also evaluated and 
included in the decision making process.  A risk analysis was also conducted for each 
system alternative that passed feasibility screening. 
As a result of the decision making process, our group recommends an alternative 
that maximizes performance within the cost constraint identified.  This alternative is the 
addition of an LCS-deployed barrier of buoys in concert with funding advanced 
capability improvements to the platform based active sonar, which provided a significant 
increase in performance over the baseline system.  The barrier alternative combined with 
accelerated development alternative provides a carrier survivability improvement of 
~38% as compared to the baseline.  The estimated cost in today's dollars is ~$809M per 





























The protection of our nation’s ability to operate military forces freely and safely 
across the world’s oceans remains a paramount goal of our nation’s Navy.  The need for 
this capability is summarized in the Chief of Naval Operations document “A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” [Ref 1, ADM Roughhead, Gen Conway, ADM 
Allen, 2007].  This combined Navy, Marine Corp and Coast Guard policy statement 
highlights the importance of the world’s oceans through the following statement: 
 
“Because the maritime domain—the world’s oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, 
islands, coastal areas, littorals, and the airspace above them—supports 
90% of the world’s trade, it carries the lifeblood of a global system that 
links every country on earth.“ 
 
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the importance of the ocean environment to world 
wide commerce.  The vital nature of these Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) requires 
that the United States possess the capability to ensure that these routes will not be 
interrupted by the actions of another nation or group. 
 
Figure 1 - World Wide Shipping Lanes [Ref 79, National Geographic, 2008] 
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The reference document “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” 
provides the initial statement of need for our problem definition and further identifies a 
military capability need related to control of the seas.  The following paragraph 
exemplifies the urgency of providing an improved capability to execute Anti Submarine 
Warfare operations in support of overarching military strategies. 
 
“The ability to operate freely at sea is one of the most important enablers 
of joint and interagency operations, and sea control requires capabilities 
in all aspects of the maritime domain, including space and cyberspace. 
There are many challenges to our ability to exercise sea control, perhaps 
none as significant as the growing number of nations operating 
submarines, both advanced diesel-electric and nuclear propelled. We will 
continue to hone the tactics, training and technologies needed to 
neutralize this threat. We will not permit conditions under which our 
maritime forces would be impeded from freedom of maneuver and freedom 
of access, nor will we permit an adversary to disrupt the global supply 
chain by attempting to block vital sea-lines of communication and 
commerce. We will be able to impose local sea control wherever 
necessary, ideally in concert with friends and allies, but by ourselves if we 
must.” [Ref 1, ADM Roughhead, Gen Conway, ADM Allen, 2007] 
 
 
Figure 2 - Modern Carrier Strike Group Underway [Ref 84, Strategypage.com, 
2008] 
 
Additional details regarding high level goals, challenges and the future 
environment for 21st Century Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) operations were 
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documented in the “Chief of Naval Operations’ Task Force ASW “Anti-Submarine 
Warfare Concept of Operations for the 21st Century.” [Ref 2, Task Force ASW, 2007].  
Here it was stated that the near term goal for the Navy is to, “maximize our undersea 
advantage anywhere in the world by leveraging advances in acoustic processing, data 
collection and sharing, communications, collaborative real-time planning, reach-back 
support, rapid maneuver, and precision engagement”.   In the long term the key goal is 
to, “build on these advances to fully leverage an integrated network of sensors coupled to 
stand-off weapons, thereby maximizing our advantages in persistence, speed, and 
precision as the conceptual framework for our future”. 
In response to the shifting strategic environment brought about by this concept, 
the Technical Director of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) announced a 
working vision for NUWC centered on Next Generation Undersea Warfare.  This vision 
focused on the theater-level warfare-from-under-the-sea capabilities that effectively 
support and enable networked Joint forces to be expeditionary, adaptable, and responsive, 
allowing them to perform a broad set of missions and tasks in support of the nation’s 
defense strategy. [Ref 3, McCormack, 2007]  Central to this vision was a call for the 
development of an Undersea Distributed Networked System (UDNS) to meet the ASW 
demands of the vast ocean environment. 
This document details the culmination of an assessment of Improved Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW) Effectiveness by the Newport Cohort of the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Master of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) Capstone 
Project.  The team has applied a formal Systems Engineering Design Process (SEDP), 
depicted in Figure 3 to evaluate the current needs, identify potential capability gaps, 
develop requirements and assess alternatives in accordance with an approved Project 
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What should be?
 
Figure 3 - Systems Engineering Design Process [Ref 5, Paulo, 2006] 
 
1.2 OBJECTIVE 
The objective of the Improved ASW Effectiveness project is to address the 
overarching need to improve ASW effectiveness in tomorrow’s battlespace including 
operations near-land, with the need to establish area control in a congested, chaotic 
environment, while facing adversaries with advancing levels of technological 
sophistication.  One of the primary missions for a United States Navy ASW system is to 
protect a Carrier Strike Group (CSG).  The combat range of the carrier air wing usually 
necessitates strike group operations well within the operating range of hostile submarine 
forces.  The effectiveness of existing ASW systems makes this a high risk scenario.  [Ref 
4, Grace Jean, 2008] 
 
1.3 CAPSTONE PROJECT 
The Capstone group, starting in June of 2007, implemented the SEDP and the 
associated principles to refine the problem statement, to synthesize potential solutions, to 
evaluate them based on Measures of Effectiveness and Performance using analytic and 
simulation based tools, and to establish the requirements necessary to produce a design 
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baseline.  The scope of the project involved completion of the first three phases identified 
in the SEDP, to include needs analysis, analysis of alternatives, and provision of a 
feasible solution. 
 
1.3.1 Project Organization 
The Newport cohort was organized into Working Integrated Product Teams 
(WIPTs), headed by a WIPT lead.  Each WIPT lead was a member of the Overarching-
Level Integrated Product Team (OIPT) headed by the Project Manager (PM).  This 
philosophy is expressed pictorially in Figure 4.  The team-members who make up the 
capstone team with their biographical information are identified in Appendix B.   
WIPTs were established as necessary to meet project objectives within each 
project phase.  As a WIPT completed their assigned tasking the WIPT lead reported out 
to the OIPT and members were reassigned as necessary to support other tasking.  The 
OIPT was responsible for identifying the WIPT requirements throughout each project 
phase.  The breakdown of the WIPTs and their assigned team members along with the 




Simulation Needs Analysis Alternatives Cost





Figure 4 - WIPT Structure 
 
1.3.2 System Engineering Process 
A tailored SEDP was utilized in the performance of this NPS Capstone Project.  
The process used was founded on the SEDP frame work outlined in the NPS System 
Engineering Curriculum as pictured in Figure 3.  [Ref 5, Paulo, 2006]  At a fundamental 
level, the rationale for using a System Engineering process is founded on the idea that it 
can provide an organized approach to creativity.  According to the Sage and Armstrong 
text, Introduction to System Engineering: [Ref 6, Sage and Armstrong, 2000: 14] 
 
“The basic activities of systems engineering are usually concentrated on 
the evolution of an appropriate process to enable the definition, 
development, and deployment of a system or the formulation, analysis and 
interpretation of issues associated with one of these phases.” 
 
This concept of the Formulation, Analysis, and Interpretation engineering steps, 
served as the underlying outline of the project analysis within the SEDP and closely 
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relates to the overall structure of this capstone project report.  The focus of this project 
addressed the first three phases of the SEDP; Problem Definition, Design and Analysis, 
and Decision Making.  These SEDP phases are well supported by the Sage and 
Armstrong basic system engineering steps, depicted in Figure 5.  Formulation of the 
problem maps to the SEDP Problem Definition phase, Analysis relates to the SEDP 
Design and Analysis phase, and finally the Interpretation step supports the Decision 
Making phase.  A key aspect of the engineering steps depicted in Figure 3 is the 
secondary information flow.  This feedback iteration path is a significant engineering 
process applied in this project.  As efforts progressed on subsequent SEDP phases, 
iterative adjustments and refinement were made to earlier phase artifacts. 




Secondary Data Flow  
Figure 5 – Systems Engineering Steps [Ref 6, Sage and Armstrong, 2000] 
 
From the perspective of product life cycles as described by Blanchard and 
Fabrycky, Figure 6, [Ref 7, Blanchard and Fabrycky 2006: 27]  the SEDP was 
appropriate for our use since the project focused on performing early acquisition phase 
conceptual definition and the supporting functional analysis of an improved ASW 
system.  The SEDP Problem Definition, Design and Analysis, and Decision Making 
phases provided an excellent framework suitable for the project engineering efforts. 
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Disposal







Figure 6 - Product Life Cycle [Ref 7, Blanchard and Fabrycky 2006: 27] 
 
In performing the SEDP, as applied to the early acquisition lifecycle phase, the 
team started with a primitive need statement and conducted research, stakeholder 
questionnaires, and various techniques for defining the problem and creating a value 
system design.  A depiction of the relationships of the problem definition efforts is shown 
in Figure 7.  Details of this phase will be addressed in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 7 - Problem Definition 
 
 In the Design and Analysis phase, possible alternative solutions to the defined 
problem were generated and screened, resulting in a set of feasible alternatives suitable 
for modeling analysis.  The final SEDP phase is Decision Making, where each 
alternative’s modeled MOE’s, RMA, Cost, and Risk were compiled and analyzed for the 
purposes of weighing and comparing the relative value scores. 
In Chapter 1 of this document the system engineering team has identified a key 
Navy concern and need to form the basis of their integrating project.  The team applied 
knowledge and skills gained through the Masters of Science in System Engineering 
curriculum to analyze this problem area in a formal, disciplined manner in accordance 
with the SEDP.  Further, the team established an organizational structure and process 
which is documented in the Project Management Plan to embark on and execute the 
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necessary system engineering steps towards quantifying viable solutions to this Navy 
need.  In Chapter 2 of this report, the execution of the Needs Analysis Phase of this 
process will be described in detail, including the key stakeholders, reference documents, 
concept of operations, and system engineering tools including affinity diagrams, Pareto 
analysis, input/output models, functional and objective hierarchies, and results that lead 
to the formation of the Effective Needs Statement and associated quantifiable objectives. 
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2 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
2.1 NEEDS ANALYSIS 
In June 2007 the Newport cohort considered application of the SEDP process to a 
Primitive Need Statement expressed by the NUWC Technical Director’s grand 
challenge: [Ref 3, McCormack, 2007] 
“Create a next generation undersea warfare capability through the 
implementation of an Undersea Distributed Networked System” 
This initial problem statement was socialized with key stakeholders from the 
ASW community (refer to Section 2.1.1) during project inception, after which the team 
reached consensus that this was a worthy topic.   The team performed a Needs Analysis 
as a means to refine this initial problem statement into an effective need that would most 
effectively capture the group stakeholder needs.  This Analysis was conducted to 
establish an Effective Needs Statement for the project, utilizing many of the following 
SEDP techniques: 
Stakeholder Analysis – This approach is used to identify the relevant 
stakeholders, develop a list of questions and/or desired information sought from the 
stakeholders, conduct interviews and research, and consolidate the information that is 
gained.  Our design team collated a significant amount of interview data and applied an 
Affinity Diagramming Process to organize this language information and identify system 
goals & constraints (refer to Section 2.1.1).  
Needs and Constraints Analysis – This analysis is used to ascertain those goals 
and constraints of greatest concern/desire by key stakeholders.  Pareto Analysis was 
applied to the Affinity Diagramming results to capture the relative significance, from a 
stakeholder perspective, among the various stakeholder needs. This analysis provided a 
traceable method for translation of stakeholder feedback into a succinct statement of 
effective needs. 
Input-Output Model Analysis – This graphical technique is used to scope and 
bound the problem by defining the boundaries of the system and boundary conditions 
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(e.g., analyze inputs and focus outputs).  Our design team generated an Input-Output 
Model diagram addressing the stakeholder primitive need and conducted an iterative 
review and refinement with key clients.  Our analysis established various elements 
necessary to accomplish undersea warfare, acknowledging a System-of-Systems 
aggregation for effective ASW.  Section 2.1.3 discusses these elements in further detail. 
External Systems Diagram – This graphical model defines the interactions among 
external systems and shows the interdependencies between those systems and the system 
under development. 
Concept of Operations – The Concept of Operations defines a stakeholder vision 
for what the system is, a statement of mission requirements, and a description of how the 
system will be used.  Our focus was placed upon operational use requirements related to 
ASW conduct. 
Functional Analysis – This analysis approach is used to determine ‘what’ the 
system must do, not ‘how’ the system will function.  The analysis provides a basis for 
developing innovative alternatives in follow-on phases.  This analysis not only looked at 
system functional composition, but also flows among system functional components. 
All of these approaches and techniques were conducted in an iterative manner, 
resulting in concurrent activities being coordinated by the team to ensure a cohesive 
process.  Details of the Needs Analysis techniques are provided in the following sections, 
and these techniques bound the problem space with results that support the agreed-to 
Effective Needs Statement reached with the stakeholders at the second In-Process 
Review held 7 March 2008: 
Effective Needs Statement 
“An improved ASW system is needed to protect carrier strike groups from 
enemy attack through effective, timely, and precise engagement by 
providing tactically significant detection, localization, tracking, and 





2.1.1 Stakeholder Analysis 
Our design team began the problem definition process by conducting a 
Stakeholder Analysis to identify the relevant stakeholders for the problem.  Typical 
stakeholders can be owners, users, customers, clients, managers, maintainers, 
administrators, and regulators of the system [Ref 6, Sage and Armstrong, 2000: 90] to be 
brought into being, where each stakeholder may have a significantly different perspective 
of the system and the system’s requirements. [Ref 8, Buede, 2000: 122] Of the various 
stakeholders engaged as part of system problem definition, the following is a 
representative sample of the relevant stakeholder organizations that participated in the 
needs analysis, where specific inputs are denoted in Section 2.1.2: 
Sponsors, Clients, Decision-Makers: 
• Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) – This naval laboratory provides full 
spectrum research, development, test and evaluation, engineering and fleet support 
for submarines, autonomous underwater systems, and offensive and defensive 
weapons systems associated with undersea warfare.  NUWC is also the home of 
the directors for Naval Undersea Warfare and Undersea Distributed Networked 
Systems (i.e., commissioned USW Grand Challenge, established as the project 
Primitive Need). 
• Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), Submarine Warfare Division, 
N87 – This office is the warfare resource sponsor responsible for Submarine 
program assessment and budgetary process controls on behalf of the Deputy-CNO 
for Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments (N8).  The CNO ASW 
Cross Functional Board (CFB) includes a team of ASW professionals, led by 
OPNAV N874, establishing requirements for coordinated ASW across air, surface 
and subsurface elements. 
• Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Capstone Advisors – These individuals provide 
guidance regarding SEDP execution and alignment with NPS Masters of Science 




• U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT) – This organization supports the U.S. Pacific 
Command’s theater strategy, providing interoperable, trained and combat-ready 
naval forces to U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and other U.S. Unified 
Commanders.  As such, the U.S. Pacific Fleet is a “force provider” to unified 
commanders in various regions around the world.  On any given day, ships and 
squadrons from the U.S. Pacific Fleet are on deployment, which can include an 
aircraft carrier strike group configuration incorporating ASW assets. 
• Surface Warfare Development Group (SWDG) – This group acts as the center for 
the development and improvement of Fleet tactics and doctrine in surface, air, 
undersea, electronic, and amphibious warfare. 
• Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command (NMAWC) – This 
organization is the primary command through which issues related to Mine 
Warfare (MIW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) are coordinated with tactical 
development agencies and commands.  NMAWC focuses efforts across numerous 
resource sponsors, systems commands, research laboratories, training 
organizations, and operational commands to ensure Navy-wide competency in the 
MIW and ASW mission areas. 
• Military Detachment (MILDET) Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) – 
These personnel act as fleet representatives who provide systems operation and 
maintenance perspective during NUWC conduct of systems engineering, inclusive 
of all Program Stages or Lifecycles (i.e. Planning, RDT&E and Acquisition). 
Analysts: 
• Naval Undersea Warfare Center – This group of representatives provide full-
spectrum Planning, RDT&E and Acquisition systems engineering and 
management for submarines, autonomous systems, and offensive and defensive 
weapons systems associated with undersea warfare, inclusive of Chief Warfare-
Discipline Engineers and Navy Technical Warrant Holders. 
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• Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM) – Delivers and operates a 
reliable, secure and battle-ready global network for the Fleet, inclusive of 
FORCEnet enterprise alignment and integration initiatives.  NETWARCOM leads 
the development, integration and execution of Information Operations effect for 
the Fleet. 
• Commander Naval Submarine Forces, head of Undersea Enterprise (CSF-USE) – 
Sets the strategy, priorities, requirements, and overarching direction for suppliers, 
resource sponsors, and producers to ensure a quality product for the enterprise 
customers (stakeholders and resources supporting or operating SSNs, SSGNs, 
SSBNs, fixed surveillance, or mobile surveillance forces). 
 
Our design team developed a stakeholder questionnaire in order to establish a 
standard set of interview elements for each stakeholder.  The questionnaire was 
composed of questions that characterize the stakeholder needs, while encouraging 
stakeholder creativity.  Appendix C identifies the resulting stakeholder questionnaire that 
was employed. 
Interviews with relevant stakeholders were conducted to collect their expressed 
system needs, wants and desires.  Interviews conducted with stakeholders were most 
often done on a one-to-one basis, with no observed opportunities for conduct of group 
interviews en-mass.  The latter would have afforded an opportunity for various 
stakeholders to engage in group brain-storming techniques; however, stakeholder 
commitments did not permit this to occur. 
In addition to stakeholder interviews, the design team also conducted significant 
research to better characterize the problem space and facilitate stakeholder needs 
concurrence.  Various source materials were consulted as part of this research, including 
those references suggested by stakeholders as germane subject-matter. 
All of the resulting Needs Analysis language information from both stakeholder 
interviews and materials research was captured in an electronic worksheet format to 
ensure the information was suitably recorded and documented for traceability.  Appendix 
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D denotes the worksheet format that was utilized to record both stakeholder feedback and 
research data. 
An Affinity Diagramming Process was used to organize the varied language 
information collated from the stakeholder interviews and materials research.  A total of 
207 original needs were analyzed by the team and organized into groups perceived to be 
of common goals or constraints.  The Affinity Diagramming process helped identify 
twenty-one (21) common system goals & constraints shared among the stakeholders and 
research data.  The aggregate results of this analysis are depicted in Figure 8; however, 
the 21 categories did not provide sufficient granularity in terms of needs characteristics.  
Therefore the analysis team revisited the original needs and derived an intermediary level 
of 63 interpreted needs.  Figure 9 provides an example of Affinity Categories derived for 
ASW system “Detection” and “Doctrine” that were translated into more granular 
interpreted need categories.  The additional granularity of 63 interpreted need categories 
was deemed necessary to illuminate needs/constraints not revealed by the original 21 
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Figure 9 - Mapping Needs Elements into Affinity Categories 
 
2.1.2 Needs and Constraints Analysis 
Once the stakeholder inputs were gathered and organized as part of the 
stakeholder analysis the next task was to garner stakeholder perspective of the ‘needs’ in 
the context of current conditions, future environment, resources to bring to bear, etc.  The 
end state of the needs analysis is the effective need or the revised problem statement.  
[Ref 5, Paulo 2006] The effective need is formulated by translating the stakeholder needs 
into a statement of the system’s objectives which, if met, will bring the greatest degree of 
satisfaction to the user and critical stakeholders. [Ref 5, Paulo 2006] The process of 
translating stakeholder needs into the objectives that comprise the effective need is shown 





























Figure 10 - Needs Analysis Process 
 
As a product of the stakeholder analysis as described in Section 2.1.1 the 
stakeholder inputs were categorically organized in the affinity diagram shown in Figure 
8.  The next step in the process was to prioritize the stakeholder inputs.  The tool chosen 
to perform the prioritization was a Pareto chart.  Once the most critical stakeholder needs 
were identified in the Pareto Chart the task of translating the needs into system objectives 
was applied.  The resulting prioritized list of system objectives was manipulated to 
organize the objectives into a cohesive and comprehensive effective needs statement.   
Each step of this process, its output, and product of the overall process, the effective 
needs statement, will be described in detail in the following sections. 
 
2.1.2.1 Pareto Analysis 
Utilizing the Pareto chart to prioritize the stakeholder inputs was a natural 
fit.  The Pareto chart is designed to utilize the data, not perception, to separate the few 
critical problems or issues from a multitude of possible problems or issues by graphically 
arranging the data according to frequency of occurrence. [Ref 5, Paulo 2006] The 
stakeholder analysis generated 207 individual stakeholder inputs – clearly a multitude of 
data elements.  The individual inputs were subsequently categorized into 67 interpreted 
results and the occurrences of stakeholder inputs assigned to each interpreted result were 
tallied.  The interpreted need results shown in Figure 9 were sorted and plotted according 
 20
to which results have the highest occurrences of stakeholder inputs.  The interpreted 
results that contain the top 20% of the total number of stakeholder inputs were identified 
as the critical stakeholder needs. [Ref 9, John F. Reh]  The resulting Pareto Chart is 

























































These 20% of the issues, if addressed, will 
satisfy 80% of the stakeholders’ needs
Pareto Chart


























































































Figure 11 - Pareto Chart 
 
The critical issues that were identified are prioritized below where the text 
is the verbatim description from the affinity diagram and the parenthetical is the Pareto 
chart reference: 
1. The system should provide high probability of detection (Pd) and low 
probability of false alarm (Pfa) with tactical significance (Detection).  This 
interpreted need was based upon the following original needs: 
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1. OPNAV N87 cited “any technology that will support active or passive 
detection at tactically significant ranges” as a current need for “more 
effectively keeping an SSK from impeding US Aircraft Carrier 
operations”.  In terms of “important features of a system devised to protect 
US Aircraft Carriers from SSK” threats, it was expressed “high probability 
of detection (Pd) and low probability of false-alarm (Pfa) at tactically 
significant ranges” are necessary.  It was articulated a “vision of a 
‘perfect’ ASW system” without any consideration of current limitations 
(technologies, political, cost, etc) would “detect everything automatically 
with 100% Pd and 0% Pfa.” [Ref 10, ASW Cross Functional Board 
Survey Response Oct 2007] 
2. CNO ASW Task Force cited the “need to maximize enemy detections, 
tracking, and engagement opportunities” as the key underpinnings to 
enable the ‘persistent detection & cueing’ deemed necessary to bring 21st 
century ASW to fruition. [Ref 2, CNO ASW CONOPS, 2007: 5] 
3. COMPACFLT cited the “challenges of SSK quieting” as a key challenge 
to an ASW ability to “detect, identify and defeat SSK.”  It was clarified 
“automated detection and localization” would be “important features of a 
system devised to protect US Aircraft Carriers from SSK”.  It was further 
stated “automation for acoustic operator detection and localization” could 
bring improvements to the ASW “decision making process”.  [Ref 11, 
COMPACFLT Survey Response, Oct 2007] 
4. NUWC stakeholders expressed the ASW system must exhibit “zero false 
alarms” in order to meet observed Fleet needs [Ref 12, Monti, 2007: 14], 
whereby the “prosecution of false targets” is one of the “major limitations 
the US Navy is currently facing in defeating SSK.”  [Ref 13, NUWC 
Chief Technology Officer Survey Response, Oct 2007]  The advent of 
“threat advances in quieting and endurance” was cited as a fundamental 
“challenge to ASW abilities to detect, identify and defeat SSK”.  [Ref 14, 
NUWC USW Combat System Department Survey Response, Nov 2007] 
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2. The system needs to protect its assets from enemy attack (Self Protect).  This 
interpreted need was based upon the following original needs: 
1. OPNAV N87 defined the advent of “no or minimum blue losses” as one of 
the major characteristics associated with a successful ASW mission.  [Ref 
10, ASW Cross Functional Board Survey Response Oct 2007] 
2. CNO ASW Task Force cited the “need to provide improved levels of force 
protection” as the key goal of ASW defense-in-depth.  [Ref 2, CNO ASW 
Task Force: 5] 
3. COMPACFLT cited “no loss of blue CVN [Aircraft Carrier]” as the 
principle definition of a successful ASW mission.  [Ref 11, COMPACFLT 
Survey Response, Oct 2007]  The Fleet Forces Command identified 
“establishment of [threat] submarine warning and exclusion zones as an 
important enabler of success” for Aircraft Carrier ASW.  [Ref 15, 
Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Command, 2006: 25] 
4. NUWC MILDET personnel defined a successful ASW mission where 
“ship and crew safety was never compromised” and “the ship was never 
detected.”  It was expressed “acoustic masking or noise attenuation 
designed for [Aircraft] Carrier use” would be an important feature for 
protecting US Aircraft Carriers from SSK threats.  [Ref 16, NUWC 
MILDET Survey Response, Nov 2007] 
5. NUWC stakeholders expressed the ASW system “needs to reduce risk to 
[friendly] forces” [Ref 12, Monti, 2007: 3] while acknowledging ASW 
force “tactical utility is based on balance of combat power and 
survivability” (i.e. dominance of either trait can prove detrimental to the 
ASW force).  [Ref 17, Christian, 2007: 5] and [Ref 18, Huges, 2000]  It 
was conveyed effective ASW must identify “force vulnerability and risk 
assessment” for “determination of the level of risk (via analysis tools and 
decision aids) at a given point, considering mission, tasks, rules of 
engagement, objectives, and other appropriate factors.”   
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3. The system must demonstrate precision engagement with on demand 
responsiveness (Precision Engagement).  This interpreted need was based upon 
the following original needs: 
1. CNO ASW Task Force expressed the “need to maximize our undersea 
advantage anywhere in the world by leveraging advances in collaborative 
real-time planning, reach-back support, rapid maneuver, and precision 
engagement.”  [Ref 2, CNO Task Force ASW, 2007: 1] 
2. COMPACFLT stated the ability to “address torpedo threats and anti-ship 
cruise missile threats” are important features for protecting U.S. Aircraft 
Carriers from threat SSK, where “the ability to neutralize any and all 
threat submarines whenever necessary” represents the ‘perfect’ vision for 
a successful ASW mission.  [Ref 11, COMPACFLT Survey Response, 
Oct 2007] 
3. NUWC stakeholders expressed the “ability to defeat [threat] command 
and control” remains a formidable challenge in confronting SSK, and 
“tools to assess risk and exploit situational awareness” are necessary to 
improve the ASW decision making process.  [Ref 19, NUWC Chief 
Engineer Survey Response, Oct 2007]  It was also clarified the strategy for 
shaping adversary behavior may likely “include a family of lethal and 
non-lethal weapons” while broadening the ways and means in which the 
weapons are brought to bear.  [Ref 17, Christian, 2007: 24]  The ASW 
solution should optimally combine sensors, command and control, and 
influencer components to “increase engagement effectiveness 
(probability)” against threat SSK.  [Ref 12, Monti, 2007: 3] 
4. The System needs to counter a quiet threat in highly congested environment 
where acoustic performance is affected by excessive noise density and poor 
propagation (Counter Quiet Threat).  This interpreted need was based upon the 
following original needs: 
1. COMPACFLT stated a “diversity in acoustic environment” combined with 
a “quiet threat, with many in quantity” as the greatest challenges in 
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modern ASW.  [Ref 11, COMPACFLT Survey Response, Oct 2007]  The 
Fleet Forces Command further acknowledged the ASW environment often 
poses “a cluttered Radio Frequency spectrum from surface vessel traffic 
and land sources.”  [Ref 15, Commander U.S. Fleet Forces Command, 
2006: 22] 
2. CNO ASW Task Force foresees a maritime environment of increasing 
challenges, earmarked by “difficult sound propagation profiles and dense 
surface traffic” resulting in a “cluttered and chaotic operating 
environment” where “defeating stealthy enemies will be an exceptional 
challenge.”  [Ref 2, Task Force ASW, 2007: 1] 
3. NUWC stakeholders articulated the ASW system should “work in any 
environment to accurately provide time sensitive targeting data directly to 
a firing platform.” [Ref 12 Monti, 2007: 14]  The ASW system must 
provide the “capability to conduct operations in highly contested areas, in 
the presence of [threat] forces” [Ref 17, Christian, 2007: 7] and under 
challenging “ambient noise levels and reverberation” for potential mission 
areas.  [Ref 11, COMPACFLT Survey Response, Oct 2007] 
5. The system should avoid force on force engagements (Avoid Force On 
Force).  This interpreted need was based upon the following original needs: 
1. CNO ASW Task Force foresees “limitations in current weapons reach and 
sensor integration drives many of today’s ASW operations toward ‘force 
on force’ engagements that place our forces at risk.” [Ref 2, Task Force 
ASW, 2007: 4] 
2. NUWC MILDET personnel expressed SSK are relatively “cheap to make, 
and there are already quite a few of them,” whereby their quantity poses a 
major limitation upon ASW.  Combined with a “continuous challenge in 
upgrading an aging fleet”, and the “challenge in maintaining ASW 
superiority with a reduction in [U.S. Navy] submarines,” these force ratios 
were seen as the greatest trial for modern ASW. [Ref 16, NUWC 
MILDET Survey Response, Nov 2007] 
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3. NUWC stakeholders likewise perceived “threat numbers as a key 
challenge facing our ability to detect, identify and defeat SSK.” [Ref 14, 
NUWC USW Combat System Department Survey Response, Nov 2007]   
The theme to “replace force-on-force engagement with distributed force 
and massed effects” was reconfirmed as a key precept for theater ASW 
risk management. [Ref 17, Christian, 2007: 7] A “perfect ASW system” 
was articulated as one “that would allow killing a threat remotely while 
not exposing ones own ship to risk” [Ref 14, NUWC USW Combat 
System Department Survey Response, Nov 2007] 
6. The System needs to detect and hold targets with low acoustic target strength 
(Tracking).  This interpreted need was based upon the following original needs: 
1. OPNAV N87 perceived “the low source level or quiet condition of the 
SSK” as the principle challenge upon the ability to detect, identify and 
defeat SSK.  It was expressed “an acoustic advantage over the threat 
systems” is an important feature for any system devised to protect U.S. 
Aircraft carriers from SSK.  In this context, it was articulated the greatest 
challenge in modern ASW is “to the greatest extent possible, make the 
ocean transparent” as necessary to detect, track and hold an adversary 
SSK. [Ref 10, ASW Cross Functional Board Survey Response Oct 2007] 
2. NUWC stakeholders likewise expressed “full undersea transparency” as a 
vision for a perfect ASW system. [Ref 20, NUWC Engineering, and 
Analysis Department Survey Response 11/5/2007]   A perceived challenge 
in modern ASW is establishment of threat SSK information that enables 
an “ability to exploit at a distance in a timely manner.” [Ref 19, NUWC 
Chief Engineer Survey Response, Oct 2007]  It was regarded the types of 
technologies currently needed to more effectively keep an SSK from 
impeding U.S. Aircraft Carrier operations must enable a “capability to 
operate in a transparent ocean – optically, magnetically, electrically and 
acoustically” [Ref 13, NUWC Chief Technology Officer Survey 
Response, Oct 2007] which may require “longer range sensors” [[Ref 14, 
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NUWC USW Combat System Department Survey Response, Nov 2007] 
or distributed sensors to improve detection and tracking while avoiding 
force-on-force engagements.  It was further conceded the “hold time in 
tracking systems” is another challenge facing the detect and hold of quiet 
SSK at any significant distance. [Ref 13, NUWC Chief Technology 
Officer Survey Response,  Oct 2007] 
 
These six interpreted needs represent the most critical stakeholder needs, 
per Pareto prioritization, and represent the candidates for translation into system 
objectives.  
 
2.1.2.2 Critical Needs to System Objectives Translation 
The next step required to arrive at the effective needs statement was to 
translate the critical stakeholder needs into system objectives.  The translation process 
included grouping similar needs and rearranging the need statement into concise 
objective statements.   The critical needs identified above became the system objectives 
listed below: 
• Shall protect a carrier strike group from enemy attack through timely and 
precise engagement.   
This objective was derived from the following stakeholder needs: 
– The system needs to protect its assets from enemy attack 
– The system must demonstrate precision engagement with on demand 
responsiveness 
• Shall provide tactically significant detection, tracking, and classification of 
quiet acoustic threat submarines in a challenging environment 
This objective was derived from the following stakeholder needs: 
– The system should provide high Pd and low Pfa with tactical 
significance 
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– Needs to counter a quiet threat in highly congested environment 
where acoustic performance is affected by excessive noise density 
and poor propagation 
– Need to detect and hold targets with low acoustic target strength 
• Shall avoid force on force engagements 
This objective was derived from the following stakeholder need: 
– The system should avoid force on force engagements 
The three system objectives listed above formed the basis for formulating 
the effective needs statement. 
 
2.1.2.3 Effective Needs Statement Formulation 
The system objectives derived from the critical needs were utilized to 
formulate the effective needs statement.  The system objective statements in original 
format did not create a cohesive effective needs statement.  Therefore, the objectives 
were edited and manipulated to form the cohesive effective needs statement.  Great care 
was taken to ensure that no changes were made to the intent of any individual objective 
statement.  The resultant effective needs statement is in quotations. 
 
“An improved ASW system is needed to protect carrier strike groups from 
enemy attack through effective, timely, and precise engagement by 
providing tactically significant detection, tracking, and classification of 
quiet acoustic threat submarines in challenging environments.” 
 
2.1.3 Input-Output Model Analysis 
The Input-Output model is a tool that enables the design team to bound and define 
the expected inputs and outputs of the system being designed.  It characterizes both the 





2.1.3.1 Model Development Process 
To develop a useful Input-Output model all of the system’s inputs and 
outputs must be identified, properly defined and addressed within the context of the 
system.  The inputs can be divided into two broad categories, controlled and 
uncontrolled.  Controlled inputs are those things that are intended to be put into the 
system.  These are inputs the system needs to accomplish its mission.  Uncontrolled 
inputs are artifacts of the operational environment or other unintended inputs that are not 
desired.  These are the inputs we must deal with even though we have little or no control 
of them and they are often a disadvantage, not an aid, to the system in accomplishing its 
mission. 
The outputs can likewise be separated into two major categories, intended 
and unintended.  Intended outputs are the results we want the system to achieve in the 
environment in which it is operating in.  Unintended outputs are the byproducts of the 
system that have no added value in the system’s operation and are often detrimental to its 
effectiveness.  Occasionally unintended outputs have a positive effect on the system, but 
often times more than not, they have a negative affect. 
Delineating and assessing each of these inputs and outputs ensures that 
most of the affects the outside world has on the system (inputs) are addressed and 
attention is focused on the system outputs.  By doing this we can assure that all of the 
requirements are met (desired outputs) and minimize undesired byproducts. 
 
2.1.3.2 Anti-Submarine Warfare System Model 
 The top level Input Output model of the improved ASW system is 
shown in Figure 12.  This figure shows the high level inputs and outputs of the system.  




Figure 12 - Top Level Input Output Model 
 
 
2.1.3.2.1 Controlled Inputs 
Sensor Types/Quantities:  One of the primary functional requirements of any 
defensive system is the ability to detect threats.  This function is provided by the systems 
sensors in conjunction with inboard processing and operator interaction.  The primary 
detection mechanisms in the ASW arena are the acoustic sensors.  This is a controllable 
input since selection of the sensor types and quantities are a conscious decision made 
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Platform Types/Quantities:  Any ASW system developed will need to interact 
with and be supported by existing capitol platforms.   Platform selection will have a 
direct affect on the size, weight and other infrastructure requirements of the system 
developed.  While the baseline capability of these platforms is already established, the 
development team has control over which platforms the system will be designed to work 
with. 
Weapons Types/Quantities:  In order to influence the threat the ASW system must 
either have its own weapons or be able to provide targeting data to existing weapons 
systems on other platforms.  This input is potentially controllable at two levels; at the 
design level where the designers select the weapons available to the system and at the 
tactical level if the system has the option to select different weapon configurations based 
on the operational situations.  The weapons could be both hard-kill such as torpedoes and 
missiles or soft kill systems like decoys and countermeasures. 
Communications Protocols:  Communication protocols, along with the data rates, 
will dictate the type and amount of data that can be transferred among the system’s 
components and with external systems.  They will be controlled by system design choices 
and the interface requirements of the external systems. 
Data Rates:  The data rates, along with the communications protocols, will dictate 
the type and amount of data that can be transferred among the system’s components and 
with external systems.  They will be controlled by system design choices and the 
interface requirements of the external systems. 
System/Platform Stealth:  Covert operation provides a significant tactical 
advantage.  It increases the likelihood that the system will detect a threat prior to being 
counter detected by the treat.  It also creates more uncertainty into the threats assessment 
of the tactical situation.  Sufficient uncertainty can in itself be a deterrent.  Alternative 
design selections and operational employment guidelines, such as use of active sensor 
modes vice passive, and propulsion choices, will be some controlling factors in system 
stealth.  Other factors, such as noise monitoring systems and shock/vibration isolation 
mounts will also influence platform stealth. 
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System Persistence:  System Persistence, the ability to maintain consistent tactical 
information for a significant period of time, will factor strongly in the operational use of 
the system.  Highly persistent systems can be placed into the operational mission much 
earlier and require less support, e.g. replacement or refueling, during use. The systems 
power use and power source decisions will control its ability to persist in the field for 
extended periods of time. 
System Survivability:  The system’s ability to survive in an operational 
environment is critical to effective use.  A system that is easily damaged or destroyed 
during normal usage is of little value in a combat situation. System survivability is 
influenced by system stealth, ability to avoid detection, ruggedness and ability to survive 
attack if detected and fired upon.  All of these factors are reasonably controlled by design 
decisions. 
Operational Area:  The Operational Area (OA) where the system will be 
employed is both a controlled and an uncontrolled input.  Part of determination of where 
the system will be used is by friendly force tactical decisions and part is influenced by the 
enemy’s operational decisions.  We initially determine in what situations we wish to 
deploy the system but cannot always influence where the enemy chooses to operate. 
Performance Prediction:  The system’s predicted performance significantly 
influences the user’s operation employment and the tactical decisions made during the 
mission.  The system’s inherent performance characteristics as well as the accuracy of the 
models used to predict its performance are determined during the design and 
manufacturing processes. 
 
2.1.3.2.2 Uncontrolled Inputs 
Environment:  Many factors influencing key performance parameters such as: 
background noise both natural and man-made; sea state (can system be deployed in bad 
weather) and friendly fire concerns are directly influenced by environmental factors we 
have no control over.  Weather, other naval and civilian traffic and the physics of the 
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ocean environment are factors we must live with and try to account for in the design 
process. 
Existing Capitol Platforms:  The system must interact with and/or be deployed 
from or with existing capitol platforms and it is impractical to affect significant tactical 
deployment modifications to existing submarines, carriers etc. 
Enemy Capabilities:  The capability of the enemy platforms and advanced 
weapons are critical design considerations in the development of the ASW system that 
we have no control over and in many cases limited knowledge of. 
Enemy Tactics:  Enemy tactical decisions will significantly affect the 
performance of the ASW system and predictions of anticipated tactics will be critical in 
developing accurate measures of performance.  Although enemy tactics are not directly 
controllable, proper design and employment of our ASW system may have an impact on 
how enemy platforms react in certain situations 
System Stealth, Persistence and Survivability:  Ultimately system stealth, 
persistence and survivability will all be limited by the state of the available technology 
and the resources available for system development and production 
Operational Area (Enemy tactical decisions):  The Operational Area (OA) of the 
system is both a controlled and an uncontrolled input.  Part of determination of where the 
system will be used is by friendly force operational decisions and part is in the enemy’s 
control.  We decide in what situations we wish to deploy the system but cannot always 
influence where the enemy chooses to operate. 
Joint Operations Requirements:  Joint operations are a fact of modern naval 
combat and the interoperability requirements are controlled at a higher level and must be 
complied with by the ASW system. 
Enemy Force Size:  Like their tactical decisions, the enemy force size will 
significantly affect the performance of the ASW system and predictions of anticipated 
force composition will be critical in developing accurate measures of performance. 
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Civilian Activities (i.e. Merchant traffic):  Like joint operations, civilian activities 
occurring in close proximity to the operation area are a part of modern naval combat 
operations and must be taken into account during the ASW system design and operation 
employment. 
 
2.1.3.2.3 Intended Outputs 
Friendly Alertment:  Alerting friendly forces to the presence of a threat is a key 
capability of the ASW system.  This will be a factor of both the system’s detection 
capability and its ability to communicate efficiently with other battlegroup assets.  
Effective Alertment allows friendly forces to flee from or engage the threat. 
Enemy Deterrence and Force Protection:  Enemy deterrence and friendly force 
protection are the primary functions of any ASW system. Effective deterrence equals a 
successful mission. Deterrence can be accomplished by destroying the enemy with either 
the ASW system’s own weapons or by calling in attacks from other friendly forces.  The 
enemy can also be deterred by diversion, either deceiving him into thinking friendly 
forces are elsewhere, overwhelming his sensors with multiple false targets or by 
providing such a known effective system that he dares not operate where it is present. 
Coverage Area:  Maximizing coverage area considerably increases the 
effectiveness of the system.  System capabilities, such as search rate, detection range and 
operational employment guidelines help influence the amount of area a system can cover 
in a given timeframe. 
 
2.1.3.2.4 Unintended Outputs 
Self Noise:  A byproduct of any operational system is self noise.  Noise radiated 
out into the environment will adversely affect system stealth. Internalized self noise will 
negatively impact the effectiveness of the systems own sensors. Efficient designs 
minimize but cannot eliminate self noise. 
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Increased logistics support requirements:  Fielding of any new system brings with 
it increased logistics requirements such as spares, consumables and maintainers/operators 
to support its operation.  Maximizing commonality with existing systems and minimizing 
maintenance requirements can help reduce this byproduct. 
 
2.1.4 External Systems Diagram 
In working to develop the boundaries of the system, an external systems diagram, 
or “Super System” diagram was developed, as shown in Figure 13, to analyze the 
input/output relationships between our system, the ASW suite, and the relevant systems it 
would interact with.  This method describes the system being designed as a subsystem of 
a larger group of systems. The systems are described in the diagram by their functional 
need.   
 
 
Figure 13 - ASW External Systems Diagram 
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Below is a description of each of the subsystems that have an interaction with the 
ASW mission package: 
• User Subsystem – Request ASW Services 
o Inputs to this subsystem include:  National Defense tasking, Fleet tasking, 
training inputs, and situational awareness data from the ASW subsystem. 
o Outputs from this subsystem include:  Mission profiles, threat characteristics, 
and tasking inputs to the system. 
• Threat Subsystem – Threat 
o Inputs to this subsystem include:  interrogation data (sensor data), and 
prosecution from the ASW suite. 
o Outputs from this subsystem include:  Sensor data back to the ASW suite, and 
mitigation of the threat. 
• Ship – Provide Support Services 
o Inputs to this subsystem include:  Sensor transportation requests, data to be 
sent off-board. 
o Outputs from this subsystem include:  power, cooling, and other support 
services to the ASW suite, incoming data communications, status of the ship, 
and material to be used in threat mitigation.   
• Support – Maintain Capability 
o Inputs to this subsystem include:  Maintenance personnel, spares, 
configuration requests and diagnostics from the ASW suite, and external 
status of the host platform systems. 
o Outputs from this subsystem include:  System control and repair/replace 
recommendations.  
 As a result of this analysis our user needs were translated into a functional 
description of the desired ASW mission package system.       
 
2.1.5 Concept of Operations 
The operational concept is a vision for what the system is, a statement of mission 
requirements, and a description of how it will be used. [Ref 8, Buede, 2000: 42, 139] 
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Development of a realistic operational concept is vital to put the problem into context.  
The Systems Engineering Design Team must understand how the user interacts with the 
system to bound the problem and define the solution spaces.  In the case of the Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW) system this project team is investigating, a multi-layered 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) must be assessed to consider both the full spectrum of 
Carrier Strike Group (CSG) operations and the specific focus of ASW missions in 
support of the CSG. 
This CONOPS addresses the operational use lifecycle for CSG operations in the 
2013 timeframe, with an emphasis upon ASW conduct: this CONOPS does not 
specifically address other lifecycles for CSG/ASW systems (e.g. lifecycle periods for 
system development, pre-initial operational capability, retirement, etc) although the 
design team considered contributions and influences from these lifecycles during 
Alternatives Generation.  Carrier Strike Group ASW represents a complex system of 
systems approach leveraging capabilities of all Carrier Strike Group components and 
their support elements: this CONOPS attempts to frame the CSG/ASW environment in a 
descriptive context, inclusive of relevant operational use requirements. 
 
2.1.5.1 Carrier Strike Group CONOPS 
A comprehensive CSG CONOPS is very complex and multifaceted.  It 
would take into account various CSG operations and options, many of which are not 
necessarily relevant to the improved ASW efforts of this project.  In order to maintain 
focus, a limited CONOPS was developed to concentrate upon the CSG ASW perspective.  
Virtually all of the CSG’s varied missions require it to establish itself in an Operating 
Area (OA) that is reasonably secured from assault by a threat.  Safe CSG operation 
within an OA represents the principle concern chosen for the ASW analysis. 
This focus on the ASW portion of the overall CSG operations is the result 
of the needs analysis conducted by the project team.  This needs analysis is described in 
detail in section 2 of this report.  Starting from the NUWC Technical Director’s grand 
challenge to “Create a next generation undersea warfare capability through the 
implementation of an Undersea Distributed Networked System”, [Ref 3, McCormack, 
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2007] and the Chief of Naval Operations’ Anti-Submarine Warfare Concept of 
Operations for the 21st Century, the team worked with input from numerous stakeholders 
to identify their needs and bound the problem space.   The salient concern common to all 
of these sources was the need to improve protection of the CSG from advanced 
submarine threats.  This refinement process is illustrated in Figure 14, which proved 
complementary with the other applied needs analysis techniques, particularly the Section 
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Figure 14 - ASW Problem Focus Process 
 
It is vital that the improvement to the ASW capability not be made at the 
expense of other CSG mission capabilities.  The strike mission is the whole purpose for 
the CSG presence in OA, so the ASW system cannot impact the CSG ability to conduct 
flight operations.  In addition to the submarine torpedo threat there are numerous airborne 
threats that must be countered.  No reduction in this critical CSG air defense capability 
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can be justified to improve ASW operations.  In order to maintain on station endurance, 
underway replenishment must also continue regardless of the ASW threat.  As support 
vessels have no significant contribution to the ASW mission there is little chance that 
improved ASW capability will adversely impact this operational requirement. 
For any tactically significant operation of a CSG, an appropriate OA is 
selected and a CSG transit route to the OA is established.  The CSG transits to the OA 
and establishes itself on station.  Both the CSG transit route and OA must be scouted to 
determine the threat level and cleared of unacceptable threats by the ASW system.  Once 
on station in the initial OA the CSG conducts the ordered mission for a nominal 14-day 
period of time, potentially moving among various OA as operations may dictate.  In order 
to ensure safe strike operations the ASW system must continue to scout for and influence 
submarine threats during CSG transit and OA evolutions. 
This CONOPS does not specifically address CSG ASW for transit to/from 
an OA.  For the purposes of this study, CSG transit presents ASW challenges similar to 
those a CSG would confront in an OA, with the exceptions greatly attributable to 
geographic features (e.g. variation in physical environment for transit lanes versus OA; 
variation in operations and rules of engagement upon approaching OA; etc). 
This CONOPS does not specifically address ASW associated with friendly 
assets clearing a prospective OA in advance to CSG arrival: this specific ASW evolution 
is coordinated at the theater command level.  For the purposes of this study, the theater 
command direction of ASW ‘area clearing’ is allocated to in-theater assets not directly 
attached to the CSG formation.  In this context, the advance area clearing of a perspective 
OA does not impact the immediate CSG ASW assets operating within the ‘current’ OA 
(e.g. CSG surface combatants; maritime patrol aircraft assigned to the CSG; etc). 
Operational requirements for CSG Torpedo Defense are not specifically 
addressed, as early stakeholder feedback indicated CSG ASW must forestall/deny any 
threat of a ‘launch first’ opportunity of significant CSG susceptibility (i.e. CSG torpedo 
defense was deemed beyond the scope of this project, and to be treated as invariable).  
For all of our assessments it was deemed necessary to destroy the threat submarine before 
it is capable of launching a torpedo at the CSG.  Any successful torpedo launch by the 
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hostile SSK is deemed a mission failure. Finally, all CSG operational discussions are 
documented herein in a manner so as to remain unclassified. 
 
2.1.5.2 CSG ASW System CONOPS (circa 2013) 
It is important to note there really is no single definition of a CSG, as 
strike groups are formed and disestablished on an as-needed basis, and the composition of 
one CSG may be different from another.  [Ref 21, USN, 2007] A “standard” CSG 
composition is defined in terms of the capabilities required to accomplish all tasks in a 
notional threat environment against a notional threat, thereby the means to provide an 
initial crisis response mission from a rotationally deployed forward posture. [Ref 22, 
Pike, 2007] For the purposes of this study, a calendar year 2013 notional CSG 
composition is defined as follows: 
The centerpiece of the CSG is the Aircraft Carrier (CV/CVN) and its 
associated Carrier Air Wing (CAW).  The primary purpose of the carrier is to forward 
deploy naval airpower in the form of its attached air wing.  The Nimitz Class carrier 
[Figure 15] has multiple advanced search and fire control radar systems as well as hull 
mounted sonar.  The focus of the radar capability is supporting air wing flight operations 
and ownship air defense and is of limited use in the ASW role.  The carrier’s self defense 
armament consists of Sea Sparrow missiles and Phalanx close in weapon system.  The 
Sea Sparrow theater defense missile provides anti-aircraft defense out to 24 nautical 
miles.  The Phalanx system, with its self-contained radar system, provides defense 
against anti-ship missiles and hostile aircraft out to approximately 3 nautical miles.  [Ref 
23, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2008] 
 
Figure 15 - Nimitz Class Carrier (CVN) [Ref 23, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2008] 
 
 40
The air wing is comprised of up to 85 aircraft, including F-14s; F/A-18s; 
EA-6Bs; E-2Cs; S-3A/Bs; SH-60Fs, HH-60Hs. [Ref 24, USN Fact File, 2008] Most of 
these assets support the carriers primary strike role or provide air defense.  Only the S-3 
Viking aircraft, Figure 16, and SH-60 helicopters, Figure 17, provide any significant 
ASW capability. The S-3 Vikings drop sonobuoys for undersea sensing.  The S-3 Viking 
is capable of carrying multiple weapons, but utilizes lightweight torpedoes in the ASW 
role. [Ref 25, USN Fact File, 2008] Given their limited sonobuoy inventory, the S-3 
Vikings are typically called upon to localize and attack submarine threats initially 
detected by other platforms. 
The SH-60B helicopters utilize sonobuoys and the AN/ASQ-81 Magnetic 
Anomaly Detection (MAD) System. [Ref 26, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2008] [Ref 27, 
Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2008] The SH-60F variant replaces the sonobuoys with the 
AN/AQS-13 dipping sonar with ranges up to 20 nm. Both SH-60 aircraft use lightweight 
torpedoes and depth bombs as ASW weapons.  The S-3’s have been by and large phased 
out of the ASW role, whereby the SH-60 helicopters dominate the CSG ASW role of 
aircraft engagement of an SSK. 
 




Figure 17 - SH-60 [Ref 26, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2008] 
 
The CSG will typically include four surface combatants.  These 
combatants will include, at a minimum, three Cruiser/Destroyers (CG/DDG) with AEGIS 
air warfare capability and one CG/DDG with the Multi-Function Towed Array (MFTA) 
sonar upgrade to its existing AN/SQS-53 active-passive sonar system. [Ref 28, Jane’s 
Fighting Ships, 2008] 
The Ticonderoga (AEGIS) Class (CG) Cruisers, Figure 18, are designed to 
provide a highly capable air warfare platform. [Ref 29, USN Reserve Intelligence 
Program, 2007] The CG Class is equipped with the state-of-the-art SPY-1 phased array 
radar system that forms the backbone of the AEGIS Anti-Air Warfare (AW) weapon 
system.  The SPY-1 is a high powered radar capable of acquiring and tracking over 100 
targets at extended ranges.  The CG Class carries an extensive array of weapons 
including surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, anti-submarine missiles, 
Tomahawk missiles and guns. [Ref 30, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2008] These Cruisers also 
carry SH-60 helicopters.   The helicopters and Anti-Submarine Rocket (ASROC) missiles 
are their primary ASW offensive tools.  [Ref 31, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2008] 
 
Figure 18 - Ticonderoga Class Cruiser (CG) [Ref 30, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2008] 
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The Arleigh Burke Class destroyer, Figure 19 is a high speed multi-
mission guided missile destroyer (DDG). [Ref 32, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2008] Like the 
larger cruisers the DDG Class it is built around the AEGIS weapons system. [Ref 34,  
USN Reserve Intelligence Program, 2007] While the DDG is a capable strike and anti-air 
warfare platform, the destroyer is one of the CSGs primary anti-submarine assets.  At 
least one of the DDG destroyers assigned to the CSG will be equipped with the Multi-
Function Towed Array.  This upgrade to the DDG Class standard Towed Array sonar 
system offers improved ASW acoustics tracking and detection.  These vessels use their 
embarked SH-60 helicopters and ASROC missiles as their primary ASW weapons. 
 
Figure 19 - Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer (DDG) [Ref 32, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 
2008] 
  
The CSG will also include one Fast Combat Support Ship (AOE), Figure 
20. [Ref 33, USNR, 2007] These vessels carry the vast amounts of fuel and ammunition 
stores needed to resupply the forward deployed CSG.  The presence of these ships 
provides key logistics capability for the forward endurance of the CSG.  These AEO 
vessels have limited sensor capabilities and only defensive weapons.  From an ASW 
perspective the AEO are potential targets that pose no threat to the hostile submarine. 
 
Figure 20 - Sacramento Class AOE [Ref 33, USNR, 2007] 
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The CSG will be supported by at least one Fast Attack Submarine.  The 
submarine will typically patrol just outside of the CSG’s OA to prevent interfering with 
the group’s ASW efforts and minimizing the potential for friendly fire incidents.  The 
Los Angeles Class submarine (SSN) [Ref 34, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2008], Figure 21, is 
the backbone of the fast attack submarine fleet, far more numerous than the Seawolf [Ref 
35, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2008] or Virginia [Ref 36, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2008] 
Classes.  All United States Navy fast attack submarines are advanced ASW platforms 
with sophisticated hull mounted and towed sonar systems and heavyweight torpedoes.  
While the specific capabilities are highly classified, it is well known these SSN are 
capable of detecting, prosecuting and destroying virtually any vessel above or below the 
sea.  
 
Figure 21 - Los Angeles Class Submarine (SSN) [Ref 34, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 
2008] 
 
The CSG will have the support of one P-3 Orion Maritime Patrol aircraft, 
Figure 22.  These shore based aircraft will be rotationally deployed in-theater to provide 
ASW support.  Originally developed as a long range ASW platform the P-3’s role has 
expanded to include surveillance of the battlespace over land as well as at sea.  The 
Orion’s sensors include a large array of sonobuoys, radar and a Magnetic Anomaly 
Detector.  Offensive ASW capabilities are afforded by depth bombs, lightweight 




Figure 22 - P-3 Orion [Ref 38, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2008] 
 
 For the purposes of this study, a calendar year 2013 notional ASW Threat 
to the CSG is defined as a Conventional Submarine (SSK).  The wide proliferation of 
these advanced, quiet, diesel-electric submarines highlights their role as the primary 
threat of concern.  Two examples of threats of concern are the Russian KILO class SSK, 
due to its widespread use, and the Chinese SONG class SSK. 
The Russian Kilo class SSK is currently in use by the Russian, Indian, 
Chinese, Iranian, Polish and Romanian navies. [Ref 39, Jane’s Underwater Warfare 
Systems, 2008] Its advanced MGK-400EM Sonar is capable of detecting surface ships at 
ranges greater than 40 miles and submarines at ranges beyond 10 miles.  Their TEST-71 
torpedoes carry a 205 kg warhead and have a 20 nautical mile range. 
The Chinese SONG class SSK is an indigenously produced submarine 
incorporating German diesel and French sonar technology. [Ref 40, Jane’s Underwater 
Warfare Systems, 2008] The French TSM 2225 Sonar provides advanced search and 
targeting capabilities.  Its Russian design Yu-3/4 torpedoes are capable of running to 8 
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nautical miles and carry a 100kg warhead. [Ref 41, Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems, 
2008] 
The focus of the CSG is the Aircraft Carrier; all other platforms are 
included to support its operation.  The typical CSG OA is defined by a 30 x 30 nautical 
mile area that offers the most advantageous operational environment: assumed in this 
report to be an open ocean environment having acoustically isotropic bathymetry 
characteristics.  The Aircraft Carrier maintains a constant forward motion of roughly 15 
knots, changing heading to remain within the OA, while launching and recovering 
aircraft.  When compared to the SSK, the CSGs higher speed will limit the primary threat 
area to a forward cone projected in front of the CSG, bounded by limiting lines of 
approach.  Few threat submarines can close on the strike group from a chasing approach; 
thus, ASW defense in close proximity to the CSG formation is greatly characterized by 
the forward area projected between the limiting lines of approach.  Figure 23 provides a 
plan view geographic depiction of the CSG formation, friendly SSN, and a threat SSK 





Figure 23 - Carrier Strike Group Notional Configuration 
 
With its extended range and loitering capability the P-3 MPA has the 
capacity to remain on station over the CSG OA for prolonged periods, providing wide 
area protection for the CSG while it is on station.  Longer term coverage will require 
rotating in-theater MPA assets so as to support the CSG over the nominal 14-day period.  
The P-3 provides significant ASW sensor capabilities with its large sonar buoy inventory, 
radar and magnetic anomaly detector.  It can also deter or destroy submarine threats with 
its lightweight torpedoes and mines. 
The fast attack SSNs primary advantage is stealth.  Its advanced sensors 
and heavyweight torpedoes are capable of detecting and destroying all known submarine 
threats.  It provides forward scouting and clearing capability, including advance clearing 
of a prospective OA in advance to CSG arrival, as well as maintaining a defensive 
posture once on station outside of the current CSG OA. 
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The guided missile destroyers (DDG) will normally spread out in a picket 
line covering the forward arc between the limiting lines of approach, at a range of 15Kyd 
away from the Carrier.  The DDG normally provide broad area coverage with their 
onboard sensors and their embarked Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) 
equipped SH-60 ASW helicopters to prosecute contacts of interest.  In the 2013 
timeframe approximately 1 DDG will have the Multi-Function Towed Array (MFTA) 
upgrade, offering improved ASW acoustics detection and tracking: this MFTA-equipped 
DDG will typically take the picket position directly forward of the Carrier.  The DDG can 
directly influence threats with their onboard lightweight torpedoes, but these are 
primarily utilized for self defense or when the pursuit duration exceeds the helicopters 
capabilities.  The embarked ASW helicopters are very effective influencers with their 
high closing speed, accurate dipping sonar (i.e. for SSK re-acquire) and onboard 
weaponry.  The primary ASW helicopter limitations are their relatively short loitering 
capability and wide variety of non-ASW demands on their time: thus, the ASW 
helicopters are primarily employed in an ASW ‘pounce/engage’ role, vice an ASW 
‘search & detect’ role.  The DDG have Vertical Launch System (VLS) capability with 
Anti-Submarine Rockets (ASROC) for engaging SSK.  The DDG are fast, maneuverable 
vessels that will break formation and directly pursue a threat if required.  
In the CSG context, the guided missile cruiser (CG) is primarily an air 
defense platform and as such operates in relatively close proximity to the carrier, at a 
range of 15Kyd directly behind the Carrier.  This platform possesses a significant ASW 
capability.  It has advanced onboard sensors and ASW weaponry including VLS ASROC 
strike capability, as well as embarked LAMPS equipped SH-60 helicopters.  The CG will 
typically perform rear guard ASW coverage and will prosecute targets that penetrate the 
destroyer’s picket line. 
Of the 4 DDG/CG surface combatants, at least 3 will have AEGIS air 
warfare capability with SPY phased array radar fire control systems, enabling effective 
surface-to-air missile defense. 
As a final line of defense the carrier itself has sensors, LAMPS equipped 
SH-60 helicopters and lightweight torpedoes.  As a practical matter, a threat submarine’s 
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effective attack range is outside the carrier’s defensive radius given the greater range, 
speed and lethality of the threat SSK launched torpedoes. 
 
2.1.6 Functional Analysis 
The purpose of the functional analysis was to decompose the top-level effective 
need into a series of functions that describe what functions/capabilities must be 
performed by the system to meet the overall stakeholder need.  It is necessary when 
developing the functional hierarchy, that it shows the “what to do” of the system and not 
the “how to do it” which would lead to constraining the actual development of the 
system. 
The functional hierarchy and functional flow analysis were conducted using the 
CSG ASW CONOPS to establish an operational context while seeking the functional 
definition necessary to meet the “Improve ASW to protect the CSG” effective need.  This 
capability, reflected by the results of our stake holder analysis, requires that four key 
supporting functions be provided if we are to realize this goal.  As shown in Figure 24, 
these key functions are Detect, Track/Localize, Classify, and Engage. The following 















































Figure 24 - ASW Functional Hierarchy 
 
2.1.6.1 Detect 
The Detect function covers all aspects of the system required to find the 
threat.  As shown in Figure 24, the detection function can be further decomposed into 
three sub-functions:  Planning the mission; Searching for the threat; and identifying 
potential threat signatures.  Descriptions of these sub-functions are shown in the 
paragraphs below. 
 
2.1.6.1.1 Plan Mission.  The ASW operational capability 
package that this Systems Engineering Development process is defining is likely to be a 
complex system that incorporates both sensing and influence capability that will be 
implemented in a squadron of vessels.  Based on stakeholder interviews, a mission 
planning capability will be needed to improve the quality of employment plans developed 
by the crew in response to higher level tasking.  These plans will likely include optimal 
sensor placement and settings to improve the likelihood of contact detection, the ability to 
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dynamically adjust these plans due to changes in the perceived threat’s tactics or the 
ASW equipment status and the ability to rapidly determine ‘influence plans’ that will 
increase the probability of mission success.  
This function occurs during preparations for the mission and 
continues on a regular basis during the mission.  The Plan Mission function involves 
laying out the ASW search plan to adequately provide search coverage across the entire 
OA.  The function generates the search plan utilizing the available sensors/assets in the 
individual systems in a manner that will optimize the area search in order to increase the 
potential for detecting an enemy submarine that enters the OA. 
 
2.1.6.1.2 Search for Threat.  The “Search for Threat” 
function coordinates the activities of the sensors/assets of the system to “look” for the 
threat.   This function also encompasses the capabilities of each of the various sensors to 
find the threat signature.  Note that different types of sensors will be treated differently 
and that multiple methods may be utilized to support this function. 
 
2.1.6.1.3 Identify Potential Threat Signatures.  This “Identify 
Potential Threat Signatures” function covers that actual detection of the submarine.  In 
this function, the data provided by the system sensors/assets is processed to distinguish 
the actual “signature” of the platform from the clutter and other background noise 
captured by the sensor 
 
2.1.6.2 Track/ Localize 
2.1.6.2.1 Provide Periodic Detection Updates.  Once the 
potential threat has been identified, this function provides periodic updates on the threat 
characteristics.  These characteristics can include speed, bearing from battle group, and 
threat bands identified. 
2.1.6.2.2 Track Potential Threat.  This function takes 
information provided by the periodic updates and begins to track the potential threat.  
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This function allows the system to “forecast” the position of the system for a given 
timeframe. 
2.1.6.2.3 Localize to Within Engagement Criteria.  The 
“Localize to Within Engagement Criteria” function takes the potential threat track 
updates and identifies the treat location with respect to the Battle Group.  The location of 




2.1.6.3.1 Fuse Detection from Multiple Sensors.  This 
function takes the detections and track updates from the various sensors and system 
assets and fuses them together to better identify the potential threat.   
 
2.1.6.3.2 Compare against Known Threats.  Following the 
fusion of the data from multiple sensors/assets, it is necessary to compare that data 
against known data collected about specific threats.  The known data can be based on 
previous encounters with the threat or by specific intelligence collection efforts.   
 
2.1.6.3.3 Classify Threat.  Once the comparison is finished it 
is necessary to classify the potential threat.  This classification of the threat can take one 
of three values; hostile threat, unknown, friendly forces.  This function is one of the most 
important for this system as the decision to engage or not engage the potential threat will 
be based upon the classification.  If the wrong classification is made, the consequences 
can be disastrous as it would lead to either engaging a target that was not actually a threat 
or by allowing a hostile threat to get closer to the battlegroup by misidentifying it as a 
friendly. 
 
2.1.6.3.4 Provide Situational Awareness.  This function 
provides an overall accurate picture of the battlespace, allowing the command structure to 
have an overall awareness of the tactical picture.  The function would, at a minimum, 
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provide a description of the battlegroup, its performance, and the location of all contacts 
being tracked by the system.   
 
2.1.6.4 Engage 
2.1.6.4.1 Decide on Action.  This function analyzes all of the 
potential engagement options that can be applied against a specific threat.  The function 
would assess the potential for destroying the threat and/or rendering it incapable of 
completing its mission, either result increasing the survivability of the carrier strike 
group. 
 
2.1.6.4.2 Perform Action.  This function performs the 
selected engagement action, coordinating the operation of the various assets in the 
battlegroup to complete the action. 
 
2.1.6.4.3 Analyze Results.  These functions assess the 
outcome of the engagement and determine whether the target needs to be re-engaged in 
which a new engagement action must be undertaken, or whether the target can be 
determined to no longer be a threat to the battle group. 
 
2.2 VALUE SYSTEM DESIGN 
Value System Design forms the foundation of criterion through which alternatives 
are assessed and ultimately modeled for suitability and compliance with user needs.  In 
entering this phase of the analysis, the outcome of the needs analysis was the revised 
problem statement (i.e. effective need), which was stated as follows: 
“An improved ASW system is needed to protect carrier strike groups from 
enemy attack through effective, timely, and precise engagement by 
providing tactically significant detection, localization, tracking, and 
classification of quiet acoustic threat submarines in challenging 
environments” 
The newly defined effective need now serves as the starting point for the value 
hierarchy.  Research supporting the stakeholder analysis, discussed in section 2.1.2, 
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identified the capabilities the customer wanted in the system.   A top level objective for 
the system was defined to capture the effectiveness of the system.  The hierarchy for the 
performance objectives is shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25 - Performance Objectives Hierarchy 
  
Additionally, it was noted that based on stakeholder input, and common sense, 
that a suitability aspect was needed to help fully define the overall capability of the 
system.  In addition to achieving an effective operating performance, the system needs to 
be capable of being operated by the Fleet in the environment it was made for, and reliably 
throughout the mission.   The Objectives Hierarchy for Suitability is shown in Figure 26. 
As can be seen in Figure 26, Suitability covers the underlying features that can 
make or break a system, including supportability, reliability, and training.  No matter how 
well this system will be able to detect submarines, if it is not available when the threat 
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enters detection range or the operator cannot properly utilize the system to identify the 
threat, the overall effect would be the same as if the system was not there.  The factors 
that make up the suitability aspects will never be given as the reason that a system is 
good, however they are the factors most likely encountered by the operator and will be 
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Figure 26 - Suitability Objectives Hierarchy 
 
The main items to be modeled for determining the recommended alternative will 
be the top-level objectives for both performance and suitability.  The objectives were 
further decomposed to next level to provide the components that make up the top-level 
objective and to be able to give insight into the individual pieces should the need arise 
during decision making  The individual objectives and associated performance measures 
will be discussed in the following paragraphs.  Following discussion of the individual 
measures, there is a discussion on the weighting of each of the measures during the 
decision making process. 
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2.2.1 Performance Objectives Hierarchy 
As shown in Figure 25, the overall effectiveness objective was to “Increase 
Carrier Strike Group Protection”. The effectiveness portion of each system will be 
evaluated using the measure “Probability that the ASW system prevents enemy launch 
of an effective weapon against the aircraft carrier.”   This means that the success of the 
system will be directly related to the capability of the system to disrupt the threat sensor 
to shooter timeline.  It should be stated that preventing an enemy launch of a weapon 
against the carrier does not necessarily require destruction of the threat submarine.  Any 
interruption into the threat timeline that results in no shot taken against the carrier strike 
group results in a “win” for the top-level metric described above. 
The system will be assessed on its performance against the top-level metric shown 
above.  In cases where the overall performance against that metric is close, assessments 
against the lower level metrics will be undertaken as to be able to provide distinguishing 
characteristics among the alternatives.  These lower-level metrics were decomposed from 
the top-level metric and are discussed in the following paragraphs.   
 
2.2.1.1 Detection Performance Objectives 
Three performance objectives were defined for the Detection Function: 
Increased Detection of Submarines, Decrease False Alarms, and Decrease Time to 
Detect.  A description of these objectives and the associated metrics are listed below: 
• Increased Detection of Submarines – By increasing detection 
performance, there are more opportunities for the threat to be found and 
countered.  This objective will be measured by the metric, Probability of 
Detection. 
• Decreased False Alarms – Reducing the number of false alarms from the 
detection processing allows for the operator and ship decision making 
team to concentrate on resolving the status of known threats only.  This 
will be measured by the number of False alarms per unit time or False 
Alarm Rate. 
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• Increased Range at Detection – Increasing the range at which the initial 
opportunity to detect occurs allows for either more time for the remaining 
steps in the detect-to-engage sequence or for a longer range at which to 
intercept the threat.  This will be evaluated using detection range Rd. 
 
2.2.1.2 Localization/Tracking Performance Objectives 
A single performance objective was identified for this function.  The 
objective, minimize the Area of Uncertainty (AOU) to the requirement of the influencing 
systems, was defined to have the localization of the contact being tracked to be within the 
requirements of an individuals influencing systems.  The lower the AOU for a contact, 
the better chance that the influencing system will be deployed appropriately to counter 
the threat.  This objective will be measured by having the localization within 90% of the 
effective area of the influencing system. 
 
2.2.1.3 Classification Performance Objectives 
A single performance objective, Maximize Classification Capability, was 
identified for this function.  Maximizing the classification capability allows for a higher 
percentage of all contacts to be correctly identified as friendly or threat.  The criteria for 
this objective are for the Probability of Classification greater than 0.9 within the 
recommended engagement criteria.  Based on the results of the affinity diagramming 
portion of the needs analysis and utilizing the ASW-related expertise resident within the 
CAPSTONE project group, the 0.9 Probability of correct classification was deemed to be 
a reasonable measure of performance to support the overall objective of the system. 
 
2.2.1.4  Engagement Performance Objectives 
Two performance objectives, Maximize Threat Mitigation and Maximize 
Effectiveness of Mitigation Action, were identified for this function.  The first objective, 
Maximize Threat Mitigation, is a time based criteria limiting the time needed to make a 
mitigation decision from the options presented by each alternative.  It will be measured 
by the time required to make the mitigation decision. 
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The second objective, Maximize Effectiveness of Mitigation Action, is 
another time-based criterion.  Increasing the mitigation effectiveness reduces the number 
of attempts needed to eliminate the threat.  This will be measured by the amount of time 
needed to decide and execute the next course of action. 
 
2.2.1.5 Self Protect 
During our functional analysis review, members of the system engineering 
team discussed the possible incorporation of a terminal defense capability against 
incoming weapons.  This function is a natural element of the layered defense concept and 
is included in our objectives hierarchy in acknowledgement of the potential contribution 
to the overall Measure of Effectiveness.  For our problem domain, the most likely attacks 
from submarines are those conducted utilizing an anti-ship missile or those conducted 
using submarine launched torpedoes. 
The submarine launched anti-ship missile defense system is considered a 
part of the larger air defense system by our engineering team.  The ability to track 
opposing force submarines with a high degree of reliability at appropriate ranges could 
contribute to this defense by reducing the potential of a surprise missile launch.  This 
capability, however, is considered outside the scope of this engineering analysis problem 
as the Measure of Effectiveness is to reduce the likelihood of an effective torpedo launch 
against the aircraft carrier.  A solution that provides tracking and engagement capability 
at ranges beyond the effective missile launch range would be desirable to support this 
mode of self defense. 
Defense against a torpedo launch was considered but deemed outside the 
scope of our engineering analysis due to the lack of adequate tools for modeling this 
rapid time sequence of events and possible classification issues.  Analysis of the 
performance of a torpedo defense system would require the ability to perform time 
domain analysis of the following parameters: 
• Enemy submarine CVN localization accuracy capability 
• Enemy submarine torpedo launch reliability 
• Enemy torpedo target acquisition and homing capability 
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• Enemy torpedo detonation reliability 
• CVN Maneuver Tactics 
• Torpedo Detection and Tracking System capability 
• Torpedo influence, either counter measure or anti-torpedo torpedo 
performance 
Based on the limitation of available modeling and analysis tools, the 
system engineering team recommends that a follow on study be conducted in this 
functional area should the results of the submarine track and engagement capabilities not 
provide sufficient performance to meet customer needs. 
 
2.2.2 Suitability Objectives Hierarchy 
As shown in Figure 28, the key suitability performance measure for the overall 
“Increase Carrier Strike Group Protection” objective is that the system is 
“Trustworthy”.  Trustworthy means that the system will operate when needed by trained 
Fleet operators throughout the length of the mission.  It will be assessed through the 
evaluation of lower-level objectives.  These objectives will be described in the next 
paragraph. 
 
2.2.2.1 Increase Persistence 
The first suitability objective is to increase persistence, resulting in 
reliable performance throughout the mission period.  It is necessary for the system to be 
operational across a 14 day mission described in the CONOPs.  For the system to have 
maximum effectiveness, it needs to be operational with no system failures during the 
mission.  The criterion to be evaluated for this objective is the Reliability (Re) for system 
and unsupported endurance across a nominal 14 day mission. 
 
2.2.2.2 Decrease Downtime 
The second suitability objective is to decrease downtime, or to maximize 
system availability.  This metric applies when maintenance and recovery actions need to 
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be taken.  The criterion used for this objective is Operational Availability (Ao) defined as 
the uptime over total mission time. 
 
2.2.2.3 Manageable System 
The final Suitability objective is to have a manageable system.  This 
objective is centered on training, system set-up, manning requirements.  If the system 
cannot be utilized by the Fleet operators or the operator training lacks the necessary 
instruction, the system will not perform up to the required needs.  The criteria for this 
objective include number of operators needed to operate the system, number of hours of 
training need by those operators, and the amount of system setup time needed. 
 
2.2.3 Weighting 
After finalizing the objectives hierarchy for the system, the next step was to 
assign weights to each of the objectives. The weights are used to show the relative 
importance of the objectives with respect to the others.  These weights will be utilized 
when comparing the alternatives to fairly evaluate the attributes of each of the 
alternatives.  The weights are based on the stakeholders’ inputs that were discussed 
earlier in this report.  Figure 27 and Figure 28 show the relative weighting of each of the 
top-level objectives and the total weighting of all the objectives.   
The values of the weights were based on the subjective assessment by the team of 
the stakeholder preferences.  It is understood that the values of the individual weights can 
have an affect on the overall outcome of the alternative assessment.  As such, sensitivity 
analysis of the metrics will be considered. 
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Figure 28 - Suitability Objectives Weighting 
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As can be seen in the figures, a higher emphasis was placed upon performance of 
the system with respect to the suitability aspects.  As we are developing this system for 
an IOC in 2013, it is expected that the suitability of the system will meet the requirements 
needed or can be worked during the production phase.  The weighting of the lower level 
objectives are also shown.  This was done as stated above as a discriminator in the case 
where two systems exhibit similar performance.  We believe that the most important 
system objectives are first, to find the threat, and then to effectively engage the threat.  
Therefore these top level objectives are given the highest individual weights, 30% and 
25% respectively. 
For the suitability objectives, it was deemed that the reliability and 
persistence/availability of the system were more important objectives for the system at 
this juncture of the project than the training aspects provided by the alternatives. 
Through the application of systems engineering processes and tools, the team has 
produced those products associated with the Needs Analysis phase of the SEDP that are 
necessary to proceed to the Design and Analysis Phase.  The creation of the Effective 
Needs Statement and the formulation of the Objectives Hierarchy mark critical steps in 
the systems engineering process and require review and approval by decision makers.  
These products form the basis for the generation of alternatives under the Design and 
Analysis Phase.  Alternatives that satisfy the key functional needs of the system are 
synthesized and evaluated in accordance with the performance measures identified in the 
objectives hierarchy.  Systems engineering tools creative process are key to the 
generation of a range of alternatives that may show promise in the satisfaction of 
customer needs.  Screening of these candidates for feasibility and generations of metrics 
for alternatives deemed feasible during the Design and Analysis phase requires the 
generation, gathering and analysis of quantitative data during this phase.  These steps will 
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3 DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
3.1 ALTERNATIVES GENERATION 
An important step in the Design and Analysis Phase of the SEDP is the generation 
of viable system alternatives that are screened for feasibility and passed on to the 
modeling team for analysis and comparison.  Several alternatives were generated based 
on their ability to meet the effective need of the system as described in Section 2.1.2.3.  
Our team did not place any design constraints while generating alternatives. The 
following sections describe the alternatives generation process, feasibility screening, 
results, and also provide a brief description of each alternative.  The baseline and three 
alternatives were selected for modeling and analysis and are described with additional 
details.   
 
3.1.1 Alternatives Generation Process 
Alternatives Generation was conducted to arrive at candidate solutions that 
address the system objectives developed during the Problem Definition Phase.  
Alternatives Generation utilized several popular SEDP techniques to explore solution 
alternatives for the system under consideration.  The alternatives generation consisted of 
three phases.  The first phase was a group brainstorming session.  The next phase used a 
modified morphological box to derive alternatives.  The final phase was a feasibility 
screening used to narrow down the number of systems that would be modeled and 
analyzed against each other. 
The goal of our alternative generation working group was to provide several 
potential solutions in addition to the baseline ‘Do Nothing’ alternative.  The group 
consensus was to apply a screening process to reduce the candidate pool to the top three 
alternatives, along with the baseline system.  The following sections describe the process 




3.1.1.1 Organized Brainstorming 
Our system engineering design team formed an alternatives generation 
working group tasked to get together and brainstorm various alternatives for the 
improved ASW effectiveness system.  Our goal was to think outside the box and not limit 
any ideas to preconceived notions or solutions consisting of solely existing systems. We 
utilized our objectives hierarchy and our functional descriptions as the basis for coming 
up with several ideas.   We utilized information found on the internet, inputs from 
stakeholders and other systems currently employed in ASW as inputs to a modified 
morphological box (matrix of functional components utilized to organize logical 
alternatives).  Our team applied group techniques for open exploration of solution 
elements that address each critical system objective. 
 
3.1.1.2 Zwicky’s Morphological Box 
Our group decided to utilize a Zwicky’s Morphological Box (ZMB) to 
gather brainstorming results for objective-elements, and group these into ‘alternatives’ 
that address all system objective categories. [Ref 6, Sage and Armstrong, 2000]  Since 
our alternatives consisted of several grouped objects in each row that formed a system of 
systems, we were not able to employ a traditional ZMB.  The rows we created in the 
morphological box consisted of system components (various platforms, each with a 
possible combination of functional components) that could be logically grouped together 
to form our various system alternatives.  
The columns in our ZMB were chosen to represent the platforms, quantity 
and the four major functions of our ASW System (Detection, Track, Localization and 
Engagement). The result of several brainstorming sessions was the creation of the 
modified Zwicky’s Morphological Box shown in Figure 29 below.  A detailed 
description of each of these 13 alternatives is found in Section 3.1.2.  Each of the 
alternatives went through a feasibility screening process to determine which ones would 
be provided to the modeling team for performance analysis. 
 65
Alt Type Platform Quantity Detect Capability Localize/Track Classify Engage Capability
Hull Active and Passive Arrays Legacy Processing Legacy Processing Countermeasures
Towed Passive Array Complete Data Fusion Complete Data Fusion ATT/CVLWT
MFTA (MF Bi-Statics) Upgrade (on 1 combatants) Mk-46 Torpedo
RADAR (AEGIS/SPY on 3 combatants) Mk-54 Torpedo




RADAR Legacy Processing Legacy Processing Evade
ESM Complete Data Fusion Complete Data Fusion Decoy
DIFAR/DICASS Buoys Legacy Processing Legacy Processing ATT/CVLWT
APS 137 PDR Complete Data Fusion Complete Data Fusion Mk-46
Distant Thunder (Bi-Statics) Mk-54
EER Buoy Concept Decoy
Digital Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD)
DIFAR/DICASS Buoys Legacy Processing Legacy Processing ATT/CVLWT
Dipping SONAR LAMPS LAMPS Mk-46
ESM Mk-54
RADAR Decoy
ESM Legacy Processing Legacy Processing Mk48 ADCAP
Sphere Passive and Active Improved Processing Improved Processing ATT/CVLWT
LAB Array Complete Data Fusion Complete Data Fusion Evade
Hull Passive (PNB/PBB) Countermeasures




DWADS COTS/NDI Leverage Surrogate Mk-46 Torpedo
Commercial Sonar Mk-54 Torpedo
Countermeasures
MVCS COTS/NDI Leverage Surrogate
EPAS (Electro Optical)
DWADS COTS/NDI Leverage Surrogate Mk-46 Torpedo
Commercial Sonar Mk-54 Torpedo
Countermeasures
Jet Ski Commercial Towed Sonar COTS/NDI Leverage Surrogate
DIFAR/DICASS Buoys Legacy Processing Legacy Processing ATT/CVLWT
APS 137 PDR Improved Processing Improved Processing HAAWC
Distant Thunder (Bi-Statics) Complete Data Fusion Complete Data Fusion Mk-46
EER Buoy Concept Mk-54
Network Enabled ASW System (NEASW) Mk-48 ADCAP
Digital Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) Nuclear Weapon
Decoy
EPAS (Electro Optical) COTS/NDI Leverage Surrogate
HAAWC (High Altitude ASW 
Weapon - MK54)
DWADS COTS/NDI Leverage Surrogate Verticle Launch ASROC (VLA)
Commercial Sonar
LCS
LCS in Op-Area 
(not in 
formation)
NDI Sonar COTS/NDI Leverage Surrogate Evade
Deployed 
Array
Based on LCS & 
AEO Deployed / Moored Sonar Arrays (perimeter screen)
Deployed 
USV w TA
Based on LCS & 
AEO









Craft in CSG Op-
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Alt Type Platform Quantity Detect Capability Localize/Track Classify Engage Capability
Commercial 
Craft
Add Craft in 




Craft deploy USV with Forward-Look & Towed Sonar COTS/NDI Leverage Surrogate
8 Materiel (acquisition)
Legacy Processing Legacy Processing






2 LCS LCS with USV Hull Active and Passive Arrays.  UTAS.  MSOBS.  UDS.   DWADS
LCS and Legacy capability 
plus data fusion
LCS and Legacy 
capability plus data 
fusion








SURTASS LFA (i.e. improve sharing of SURTASS 
'results' from existing Shore/Surrogate to CSG)
Legacy Processing plus 
Complete Data Fusion






2 LCS LCS with USV Hull Active and Passive Arrays.  UTAS.  MSOBS.  UDS.   DWADS
LCS and Legacy capability 
plus data fusion
LCS and Legacy 
capability plus data 
fusion






Craft to CSG 
formation
Commercial Sonar and DWADS COTS/NDI Leverage Surrogate
Jet Ski Commercial Craft deploy Towed Sonar COTS/NDI Leverage Surrogate
DIFAR/DICASS Buoys Legacy Processing Legacy Processing Mk-46
APS 137 PDR Improved Processing Improved Processing Mk-54
Distant Thunder (Bi-Statics) Complete Data Fusion Complete Data Fusion Mk-48 ADCAP
EER Buoy Concept HAAWC
Network Enabled ASW System (NEASW)











Accelerate ASW Program of Record (POR) capabilities to fulfill anticipated CY2013 shortfalls (e.g. accelerate acquisition/production to meet 2013 fielding).  An example is 
acceleration of Advanced Processing Build (APB) updates to DDG Sonar.  Also see Alt
Revise doctrine for POR (2013) 'pouncer' helicopter to not only engage, but also detect SSK.  Increase helicopter procurement to accommodate mission/role expansion, plus 









SURTASS LFA (i.e. improve sharing of SURTASS 






















3.1.1.3 Feasibility Screening 
The next step in the process was to perform a feasibility screening of the 
alternatives described in Figure 29 above.  To do this seven key criteria which included 
cost, schedule, environmental impact, ability to meet 14-day mission, supported by CSG 
operations, ability to not degrade other CSG operations, and survivability.  These criteria 
were chosen based on feedback from key stakeholders and their relevance to the 
alternatives ability to meet the objective of the system.  A brief description of each 
feasibility criteria element and why they were chosen is provided below. 
Cost:  Cost in Fiscal Year 2008 dollars was chosen as an element based on the 
fact that the defense budget is not unlimited and an appropriate cap on the price of 
our system needed to be established.  A total procurement cost of less than one 
billion dollars was utilized.  [Ref 72, U.S. DoD, 2004] 
Schedule:  Our stakeholders indicated that the improved ASW System was 
required by 2013.  This was important since many technologies are not mature 
enough to be fielded as part of an integrated system within this timeframe. 
Environmental Impact:   The Navy has become increasingly aware of the potential 
impacts on the ocean environment of our systems and their components.  Since 
environmental awareness is likely to increase and the Navy’s desire to be 
compliant with current policy, our team felt this was an important element in the 
screening process.  Of primary concern were increases in active signal 
transmission levels and/or frequencies of occurrence and the potential for disposal 
of environmentally hazardous materials. 
Ability to meet 14-Day Mission:  Based on current Concept of Operations, the 
improved ASW System is expected to have reliability and availability to meet a 
minimum mission length of 14 days. 
Supported by CSG Operations:  The ability of the improved ASW System to 
support CSG Operations is important.  If the system does not have the 
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communication links or underway replenishment capabilities currently utilized by 
the CSG, it will not be considered as viable to this mission. 
Does not Degrade other CSG Operations:  The primary mission of the CSG is to 
support aircraft flight operations in a designated open-ocean area.  The ability of 
the CSG to support aircraft takeoffs, landings, logistics, maintenance, and 
communications must not be diminished by the addition of an improved ASW 
System.  Examples of unacceptable ASW system attributes would be reducing the 
available runway space, aircraft communication interference, and additional 
airspace restrictions. 
Survivability:  The system’s ability to survive in the combat environment during 
the mission is essential.  The main aspect considered by this criterion is whether 
the material making up the alternative has the potential to be easily defeated in a 
combat situation.  To the extreme perspective, an alternative would fail to provide 
improved CSG ASW capability if oriented around a single immobile platform 
operating outside the CSG operation area, without its own credible self-defense 
capability.  An alternative containing such architecture would itself require 
protection services from the CSG or require its own additional defensive 
capability.  If the prospective system could easily be detected and defeated by the 
enemy threat it would be deemed infeasible for the purposes of the alternative 
feasibility screening.   
 
We applied a simple Go/No-Go test to each element of the matrix for all 
the alternatives under consideration.  This test was based on all information currently 
available for each system.  In the case where clear evidence did not exist, the team used 
its best judgment to estimate the likelihood of meeting the particular metric. The results 
of the feasibility screening are discussed in Section 3.1.3 below. 
 
3.1.2 Individual Alternatives 
The alternative generation process detailed in section 3.1.1 resulted in thirteen 
alternatives to the baseline.  A description of each alternative concept is contained in 
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sections 3.1.2.1 through 3.1.2.13.  All but two of the proposed alternatives were additive 
to the existing baseline.  Alternatives 11 and 12 replaced two of the existing CSG 
platforms with alternative vessels.  All thirteen of these alternatives were subjected to the 
feasibility screening process described in section 3.1.3 
 
3.1.2.1 Alternative 1:  Re-assign SSN to the CGS Formation 
This alternative proposes re-assignment of a USN SSN to operate as part 
of the CSG formation within the OA.  The SSN assignment to the CSG formation would 
be drawn from the currently planned allocation of in-theater assets: an SSN normally 
operating outside of the CSG OA.  This re-tasking of an existing SSN represents a non-
materiel alternative by its reuse of planned/allocated in-theater assets, albeit operational 
doctrine and training for the entire CSG, SSN included, would require notable revision to 
facilitate effectiveness. 
This alternative seeks to exploit unique capabilities of the SSN platform as 
a means for improving the overall performance of the CSG ASW within the OA.  
Improvements would manifest by the addition of another capable ASW platform to the 
CSG, improving aggregate capabilities in SSK detection, tracking and engagement.  
Compared to the other CSG surface combatants, SSN flexibility in platform/sensor 
deployment in the water column could represent an optimal complement in effective 
search for SSK (e.g. sensor placement to overcome thermocline shadow zones).  Figure 
30 provides a notional operational context for SSN addition to the CSG formation, 
whereby the ‘forward picket’ of 3 surface combatants defined by the CSG baseline 





Figure 30 – Alternative 1 Notional Operational Context 
 
This alternative represents a major departure from existing doctrine by 
virtue SSN typically operate independent of other surface combatants, greatly exercising 
self-regulated underway authority as necessary to fulfill objectives established by Fleet 
theater-level tasking.  SSN ASW tasking routinely manifests in assignment to an area 
outside of the CSG OA, using water-space management as necessary to avert platform 
interference, freeing the SSN to conduct semi-independent ASW operations to 
detect/influence threat SSK.  In contrast to ASW in a CSG formation where surface 
combatants rely heavily upon active acoustic search, the SSN would typically conduct 
ASW search using passive acoustics while maintaining stealth for tactical advantage. 
Further exploration of this alternative would need to assess the overall 
interoperability among the CSG formation given SSN addition to the group.  Key areas to 
evaluate would be acoustic search modes of operation and performance, and overall CSG 
situational awareness necessary to ensure safe and efficient ASW collaboration among all 
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assets.  The latter facet is particularly crucial in terms of establishing safe operations 
where absolute geo-spatial knowledge of all friendly assets is paramount to diminishing 
the probability of fratricide. 
Endeavors to improve SSN external ‘communications at speed and depth’ 
represents a technology-enabler that could facilitate the necessary interoperability for this 
alternative.  Analysis of current and projected Technical Readiness Level (TRL) for 
associated capabilities would need to be further explored to establish the overall 
feasibility and suitability of this alternative. 
 
3.1.2.2 Alternative 2: Maritime Ship in CSG 
This alternative proposes addition of a surface maritime craft to operate as 
part of the CSG formation within the OA.  Addition of a surface craft to the CSG 
represents a materiel approach supplementing the existing CSG baseline; thus, an 
increase in CSG Operations & Support will be necessary to accommodate this alternative.  
The operational doctrine and training for the entire CSG, inclusive of this surface craft, 
would require notable revision to facilitate effectiveness. 
This alternative seeks to exploit a surface maritime craft with commercial 
sonar as a means for improving the overall performance of the CSG ASW within the OA, 
by improving the aggregate CSG capabilities in SSK detection, tracking and engagement.  
The surface craft would support Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) launch and recovery, 
organically deploying UAS to provide a remote over-the-horizon ASW detection 
capability for the CSG.  Figure 31 provides a notional operational context for the surface 
craft in addition to the CSG formation, whereby the ‘forward picket’ of 3 surface 
combatants defined by the CSG baseline has been augmented with the surface craft (i.e. a 




Figure 31 – Alternative 2 Notional Operational Context 
 
The surface craft would need to meet or exceed the following capabilities: 
• Sufficient speed to remain with the CSG formation 
• Endurance commensurate with CSG, with underway replenishment 
(UNREP) compatibility in rapport with CSG; 
• Support for unique acoustics sensor handling/placement; 
• Support for unique UAS launch, control and recovery capabilities; 
• Interoperability with CSG components for collaborative ASW. 
Further exploration of this alternative would need to assess availability of 
surface maritime craft capable of reliably supporting the above deep-water performance 
with tenable life-cycle cost.  The proposed platform is the Joint High Speed Vessel 
(JHSV) greatly based upon the U.S. Services leased ‘Spearhead’ Theater Support Vessel 
– 1st Experimental (TSV-1X) [Ref 42, Orme, 2003] and ‘Swift’ High Speed Vessel Two 
 73
(HSV-2) [Ref 43,Sample, 2004] shown in Figure 32.  Both platforms possess wave-
piercing catamaran hulls of modest length (e.g. ~320 feet) for deep-water high speed 
(over 40 knots), the basis for the JHSV.  A Fiscal Year 2003 RDT&E contract award 
permitted TSV-1X deployment in support of Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation 
Iraqi Freedom which demonstrated invaluable capabilities relative to TSV/HSV; [Ref 44, 
Fiscal Year 2006 President’s Budget, 2005:65-82] however, this was in the context of 
intra-theater sealift support, [Ref 45, Trauth, et all, 2005:51-56] vice a platform 
augmented for ASW (e.g. towed array handling) with sustained operation in a CSG 
formation. 
 
Figure 32 – High Speed Vessel / Theater Support Vessel Pictorial [Ref 43,Sample, 
2004] 
 
This alternative proposes use of the STANAG compliant Multi-Vehicle 
Control System (MVCS) for control and management of Tier 1 through Tier 3 UAS 
airframes.  The NAVAIR PMA-263 sponsored MVCS system provides high Technical 
Readiness Level (TRL) given its demonstration on various USN platforms and military 
ground stations.  Compliant UAS are currently used in maritime interdiction and over-
the-horizon detection and tracking. 
 
3.1.2.3 Alternative 3: Maritime Ship in Op Area 
This alternative is similar to the preceding one, in that it proposes addition 
of a surface maritime craft to operate within the CSG OA; however, this surface craft is 
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not part of the CSG formation.  Addition of a surface craft to the CSG OA represents a 
materiel approach supplementing the existing CSG baseline; thus, an increase in CSG 
Operations & Support will be necessary to accommodate this alternative.  The 
operational doctrine and training for the entire CSG, inclusive of this surface craft, would 
require notable revision to facilitate effectiveness. 
  
 
Figure 33 – Alternative 3 Notional Operational Context 
 
This alternative seeks to exploit a surface maritime craft with commercial 
sonar as a means for improving the overall performance of the CSG ASW within the OA, 
by improving the aggregate CSG capabilities in SSK detection, tracking and engagement.  
The surface craft would support deployment of Deep Water Active Distributed System 
(DWADS) for active detection of quiet diesel-electric SSK, and deployment/recovery of 
‘Jet-Ski’ vehicles with acoustic sensing.  Figure 33 provides a notional operational 
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context for the surface craft patrolling the ‘perimeter’ of the CSG OA, deploying the 
DWADS and Jet-Ski sensors. 
Similar to the preceding alternative, the surface maritime craft proposed 
for this alternative is the JHSV (see Figure 32), as this platform shows promise for 
accommodating the unique acoustic sensor handling/placement, the planned deployment 
of DWADS sensors, and the Jet-Ski launch and recovery.  Further exploration of this 
alternative would need to assess availability of the DWADS sensors (Office of Naval 
Research FY07 advanced technology program) and feasibility of Jet-Ski autonomy 
(currently of unknown TRL). 
 
3.1.2.4 Alternative 4: Maritime Patrol Aircraft ASW Sensor 
This alternative is based on the availability of a new type of surface search 
sensor to be mounted on Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and supporting the ASW 
mission of the CSG. It is anticipated that this sensor will be able to detect near or on-
surface submarine targets at significant altitude and range, thus providing wide area ASW 
search capability.  The system concept is illustrated in Figure 34. 
 
 
Figure 34 - MPA/EPAS Employment [Ref 81, Personal Computer Interactive Multi-
Sensor Trainer (PCIMAT), 2006] 
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This new sensor has been called LASH (Littoral Airborne Sensor – 
Hyperspectral) and EPAS (Electro-Optic Passive ASW System)) and now goes by the 
acronym JMMES (Joint Multi-Mission-Electro-Optic System) and is currently being 
developed under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Joint Capability 
Technology Demonstration Program. The system uses 4 non acoustic sensors – a visible, 
multi-spectral imager, a low-light spectral detector, a low-light zoomed camera, and a 
mid-wave infrared detector. [Ref 46, Military & Aerospace Electronics, Dec. 2006] [Ref 
47, Defense Technical Information Center, 2006] 
For the purposes of this study, this alternative is employed as a layer of 
defense that will provide added security from hostile submarine attack to the “Baseline” 
alternative, i.e. the program of record CSG.  As originally conceived, this alternative also 
employed the High Altitude ASW Weapon (HAAWC). Further consideration of the 
concept revealed that because of the limited range of the EPAS sensor, there was no need 
to develop or employ a standoff weapon to support this concept. [Ref 48, Federation of 
American Scientists, 1999] [Ref 49, Pike, 2007] 
 
3.1.2.5 Alternative 5: Commercial Barrier 
This alternative is similar to alternative 3, in that it proposes addition of a 
surface maritime craft to operate within the CSG OA; however, this surface craft is not 
part of the CSG formation.  Addition of a surface craft to the CSG OA represents a 
materiel approach supplementing the existing CSG baseline; thus, an increase in CSG 
Operations & Support will be necessary to accommodate this alternative.  The 
operational doctrine and training for the entire CSG, inclusive of this surface craft, would 




Figure 35 – Alternative 5 Notional Operational Context 
  
This alternative seeks to exploit a surface maritime craft with commercial 
sonar as a means for improving the overall performance of the CSG ASW within the OA, 
by improving the aggregate CSG capabilities in SSK detection, tracking and engagement.  
The surface craft would support deployment of Deep Water Active Distributed System 
(DWADS) for active detection of quiet diesel-electric SSK, deploying them within the 
CSG OA, similar to alternative 3.  A unique aspect of this option is the addition of a 
MK41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) with an ASROC load-out: the intent being 
improvement to the overall performance in CSG engagement of threat SSK within the 
OA.  Figure 35 provides a notional operational context for the surface craft patrolling the 
‘perimeter’ of the CSG OA, deploying the DWADS. 
Similar to the preceding alternatives 2 and 3, the surface maritime craft 
proposed for this alternative is the JHSV (see Section 3.1.2.3), as this platform shows 
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promise for accommodating the unique acoustic sensor handling/placement, the planned 
deployment of DWADS sensors, and a deck structure capable of accommodating the 
MK41 VLS.  Further exploration of this alternative would need to assess availability of 
the DWADS sensors (Office of Naval Research FY07 advanced technology program) 
and feasibility of integrating the MK41 VLS with the JHSV deck structure (currently of 
unknown TRL). 
 
3.1.2.6 Alternative 6: LCS Barrier 
This alternative is similar to Alternatives 2 and 3 through the use of a 
surrogate surface craft; however, this surface craft is not part of the CSG and does not 
operate exclusively within the OA.  The surface craft, in this scenario chosen to be the 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), instead acts as a support craft for deployment and 
maintenance of a barrier screen of DWADS.  The DWADS are deployed around the 30 x 
30 nautical mile OA and acts as a detection “screen” to provide advance warning of an 




Figure 36 – Alternative 6 Notional Operational Context 
 
The LCS is the US Navy’s next-generation surface combatant and is 
intended to provide the capabilities of a small assault transport with a flight deck and 
hangar large enough to base two SH-60 Seahawk helicopters, combined with sufficient 
cargo volume to deliver multi-mission payloads.  The concept behind the LCS is that it 
provides a high-speed complement to existing DD(X) and CG(X) by operating in 
environments where it is less desirable to employ larger, multi-mission ships. It will have 
the capability to deploy independently to overseas littoral regions, remain on station for 
extended periods of time either with a battle group or through a forward-basing 
arrangement and will be capable of underway replenishment. It will operate with Carrier 
Strike Groups, Surface Action Groups, in groups of other similar ships, or independently 
for diplomatic and presence missions. [Ref 50, Pike, 2007] Figure 37 shows proposed 




Figure 37 - Conceptual LCS Depictions [Ref 50, Pike, 2007] 
 
Six DWADS sensors would be placed at fixed intervals on each leg of the 
OA for a total of 24 sensors; spaced to provide the optimal coverage for that leg.  The 
LCS would initially deploy these sensors according to the deployment scheme, then 
patrol around the perimeter of the screen to ensure that the buoys have not strayed too far 
from their designated area due to currents, and replenish/replace as necessary when the 
buoy battery life is depleted.  The DWADS sensors act as a “tripwire”, informing the 
LCS and CSG via a RF communication link of an approaching SSK.  The LCS in this 
alternative also performs the prosecution of the target through the use of the SH-60 
helicopters.  Alternatively if the placement of the LCS along the boundary does not allow 
for immediate attack, the LCS can work with the CSG to place more immediate resources 
on the target. 
As with earlier alternatives, an assessment of the availability of the 
DWADS sensors (Office of Naval Research FY07 advanced technology program) and 
the production/availability of the LCS would be required. 
  
3.1.2.7 Alternative 7: Commercial Craft UUV Barrier 
The idea of a “tripwire” barrier to detect an encroaching SSK was again 
leveraged for Alternative 7, this time pairing the JHSV as the surrogate, with Unmanned 
Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) to act as the detection method.  The approach has the JHSV 
deploying a number of UUVs along the perimeter of the CSG OA which would then 
assume a set search pattern.  Detection of the SSK would be via a combination of 
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onboard sensors including passive and non-acoustic ASW sensors.  Once detection has 
been made the UUV would surface and communicate via RF link with the JHSV and/or 
CSG for prosecution. 
 
 
Figure 38 – Alternative 7 Notional Operational Context 
 
The inclusion of UUVs into ASW operations was emphasized as part of 
the US Navy’s UUV Master Plan for littoral and support operations. [Ref 51, 
ASNRD&A, Nov 2004] Four classes of vehicles are being considered for development 
based on platform interfaces, existing infrastructure, and mission requirements.  The 




Table 1 - UUV Classes 







Man-Portable 3-9 < 100 10 – 20 <0.25 
Light Weight 12.75 ~ 500 10 – 40 1 – 3 
Heavy Weight 21 < 3,000 20 – 80 4 – 6 
Large Class >36 ~ 20,000 >> 400 15 – 30 
 
The concept of a “Maritime Shield” involved clearing and maintaining a 
large Carrier or Expeditionary Strike Group operating area free of threat submarines.  
Based on the performance needed, only the Large Class of UUVs would be applicable to 
this scenario.  However, while providing an extension of off-board sensors to the CSG, 
the UUVs limited mobility and endurance make UUVs a less ideal candidate in this case.  
In addition, based on the present acquisition strategy for UUVs it is unlikely that a usable 
system would be fielded by 2013. 
 
3.1.2.8 Alternative 8: Advanced Capabilities Build (ACB) 
This alternative adds an advanced capabilities processing effort to the 
baseline system in an effort to optimize the sensors, processing, command and control 
and engagement functions of the ASW string.  This effort is based upon the Submarine 
Acoustic Rapid COTS Improvement (ARCI) Advanced Processing Build (APB) 
approach that has resulted in performance gains for the Submarine Sonar and Tactical 




Figure 39 - ARCI/APB Process 
 
The approach is to utilize the pockets of expertise scattered across the 
country to provide potential solutions for increasing the performance of the CSG sensors.  
A four step process leading to system integration and checkout as shown above in Figure 
39 will be utilized to independently evaluate the proposed technologies for feasibility and 
improved performance.  Sample gains realized by the submarine community in the 






























































































































































































































Figure 40 - Sample Processing Gains from Submarine APB Process 
 
The ACB approach would focus on two main areas:  Signal Excess and 
Decision Latency.  The focus on Signal Excess would be an effort to increase the acoustic 
processing performance of the sensors such that the target can be detected at smaller 
Signal to Noise Ratios (SNR) than the baseline system.  Techniques that would support 
this effort include:  Source level Improvements, clutter reduction and rejection, and 
improved normalization techniques.  It is expected that approximately 2 dB of signal 
excess can be gained 
Decision Latency can be improved in multiple areas within the detection-
to-engage timeline. These include “time to detect’, “time to classify given detection”, and 
“time to engage”.  The improvement in automatic detection and classification algorithms 
allow the processing to find detections and classify threat quicker than the operators.  It is 
expected that this can be done approximately 3-6 ping cycles sooner than the baseline 
system, thereby gaining back valuable time. 
This alternative also encompasses the ‘acquisition acceleration’ of ASW 
sensor, processing, command and control and engagement functions emergent in the 
2013 timeframe.  For example, the MFTA capability is an expected ASW acoustic sensor 
component for the CSG baseline; however, production will curtail its deployment to only 
one surface combatant of the CSG in this timeframe.  This alternative proposes 
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acquisition increase for such emergent ASW capabilities so as to accelerate the 
technology production for CSG deployment in 2013 (e.g. equip all four CSG DDG/CG 
surface combatants with MFTA, if optimal). 
 
3.1.2.9 Alternative 9: Surveillance Towed-Array Sensor System 
(SURTASS) 
The U.S. Navy developed the SURTASS in 1980, and the Fleet started to 
use it in 1984. The SURTASS has played a major role in ASW support to Navy’s tactical 
forces. The SURTASS operates in both passive and active mode. The passive sensors that 
have improved sensitivity and signal processing can detect targets at long range against 
the quiet submarine. The detection capability is increased, and the higher resolution 
spectrum analysis helps improve the target bearing. The SURTASS Low Frequency 
Active (LFA) is long-range low frequency sonar designed to detect the quieter 
submarine.  The LFA system consists of a large source array for active transmission and a 
separated array of receivers. The SURTASS is mounted in the T-AGOS ships as a single 
line or as twin line.  
The Navy currently has eight SURTASS ships (four LANT and four 
PAC).  The SURTASS program is operated by civilians contracted to SPAWAR. The 
operations are based in Norfolk, Virginia, with operation ports in Glasgow Scotland, Rota 
Spain, Yokohama Japan, Pearl Harbor Hawaii, Port Huneme California. [Ref 52, Pike, 
2008] 
The following figure shows how the SURTASS is employed under the 
sea. [Ref 53, Gentry, 2007] 
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Figure 41 - SURTASS Employment [Ref 53, Gentry, 2007] 
 
This alternative applies the technology of SURTASS to replace the towed-
array of the DDG in the baseline that will help improve the capability of detection. The 
LFA is modified to the mid-frequency active (MFA) will provide an effective detection 
of the quiet threats within the operation area of the BG without harming to the sea 
mammals. 
 
3.1.2.10 Alternative 10: Helicopter Searching 
This alternative proposed utilizing the SH-60 Seahawk helicopters in a 
search and detect role in additional to their existing mission of prosecuting targets 
detected by other platforms. This would be a significant expansion of the SH-60’s role 
and workload.  The helicopters would patrol the OPAREA adding their detection 
capabilities to the existing baseline systems.  The notional coverage areas for each 
helicopter are shown in red in Figure 42.  They could provide search coverage by seeding 
a field with sonobuoys or by utilizing their Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) 
systems.  Their AN/AQS-22 dipping sonar could be used to classify and track potential 




Figure 42 - Helicopter Coverage Areas 
 
In order to provide complete CSG coverage a minimum of four SH-60s 
would have to be airborne in the search and detect role at any given time.  Providing 24 
hour ASW coverage with an aircraft with a four hour airborne endurance would stress 
their capabilities.  As the existing helicopters are normally fully engaged, this would 
necessitate equipping the strike group with additional helicopters.  Assuming that each 
aircraft can conduct two missions per day this would require adding twelve SH-60s to the 
CSGs complement.  Each additional SH-60 costs $20.25 million [Ref 54, Jane’s 
Information Group, 2008], resulting in a $243 million procurement cost.  Additional 
sonobuoys and torpedoes would have to be procured to outfit these helicopters. 
The primary concern with this alternative is its impact to the CSGs other 
operations.  The twelve additional helicopters would have to be based and supported by 
the existing platforms.  The only platform with sufficient capacity to carry this many 
helicopters is the carrier.  Since even the carrier has finite space, these additional 
helicopters would have to be in lieu of other air wing assets.  This would degrade the 
carrier’s primary strike mission as helicopters are not effective strike aircraft.  The SH-



















platform to provide the computing power and personnel to process and evaluate SONAR 
and MAD data and to tactical direction and targeting commands. [Ref 55, Jane’s Fighting 
Ships, 2008] This equipment and personnel are shared with other systems and the 
increased demands on their attention would diminish their focus on their other tasks. 
  
3.1.2.11 Alternative 11: SURTASS and LCS Integration 
This alternative is a modification to Alternative 9 which utilizes 
SURTASS to help cover the CSG OA.  This option also replaces two of the Surface Ship 
DDGs with two LCS’ (described in alternative 6) loaded with the ASW Mission Module 
and a host of off-board sensors. The high sensitivity of SURTASS sensor could help 
improve the detection of threat submarine from long ranges and used in combination with 
the DDGs and LCS could form a robust multi-static active detection system to help 
protect the CSG.   
The SURTASS operates in both passive and active modes. The passive 
sensors have improved sensitivity and improved signal processing that can detect quiet 
submarines at long ranges. The detection capability is increased due to long range 
transmission of low frequencies, and the high resolution spectrum analysis helps improve 
the target bearing. The SURTASS Low Frequency Active (LFA) is long-range low 
frequency sonar designed to detect the quieter submarine.  The LFA system consists of a 
large source array for active transmission and a separate array of receivers. The 
SURTASS is mounted in the T-AGOS ships as a single line or as twin line. 
By taking advantage of the SURTASS long range detection capability and 
utilizing the versatile LCS in combination with current DDGs, the CSG would have more 
time to prepare for engagement and a greater chance of survivability. 
Further exploration of this alternative would need to assess cost tradeoffs 
of supplanting the operations cost of 2 DDG with the procurement and operations cost of 
the replacement LCS and operational costs of SURTASS.  There would also need to be 
an analysis to ensure the replacement of the DDG with these surface craft does not 
degrade other mission capabilities of the overall CSG.  For example, the LCS cannot 
likely match the AEGIS Anti-Air Warfare capabilities of the 2 DDG; thus, would the 
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AEGIS defense capabilities of the remaining DDG/CG prove sufficient for the CSG 
formation. Additionally the SURTASS platform operating outside the CSG would be 
very vulnerable to offensive enemy attack with little or no self defense mechanism. 
 
3.1.2.12 Alternative 12: LCS and Commercial Craft 
This alternative is a materiel approach that is similar to the prior 
alternative in that it explores ‘replacement’ of surface combatants that comprise the 
baseline CSG formation, as opposed to merely adding new components.  The intention is 
to render an alternative that improves the overall CSG ASW performance, while 
offsetting costs by supplanting existing surface combatants with less expensive platforms.  
This alternative proposes replacement of 2 DDG in the baseline CSG formation with 1 
LCS plus 1 commercial craft.  The CSG Operations & Support will require revisions as 
necessary to accommodate this alternative.  The operational doctrine and training for the 





Figure 43 - Alternative 12 Notional Operational Context 
 
This alternative seeks to employ commercial sonar, potentially a MFTA 
variation, for both the LCS and the commercial craft that would supplant 2 DDG forward 
of the Aircraft Carrier.  The intent is to improve the overall performance of the CSG 
ASW within the OA, by improving the aggregate CSG capabilities in SSK detection, 
tracking and engagement. 
Similar to the preceding alternative 6, the LCS (see Figure 37) was chosen 
as a capable platform for the ASW role; however, this alternative proposed the LCS will 
supplant an existing DDG in the CSG formation.  In this context, the proposal calls for an 
LCS embarked with SH-60 Seahawk helicopters, and a multi-mission payload offering an 
ASW acoustics package (e.g. MFTA or equivalent).  These capabilities will meet the 
need for a platform that can keep pace with the CSG, while offering the ASW detection 
and engagement capabilities commensurate with the DDG in the CSG. 
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Similar to the preceding alternatives 2 and 3, the surface maritime craft 
proposed for this alternative is the JHSV (Figure 32), as this platform shows promise for 
accommodating the desired ASW acoustic package (e.g. MFTA or equivalent), with a 
deck structure capable of accommodating the MK41 VLS (e.g. ASROC capability).  
These capabilities will meet the need for a platform that can keep pace with the CSG, 
while offering the ASW detection and engagement capabilities commensurate with the 
DDG in the CSG. 
Further exploration of this alternative would need to assess cost tradeoffs 
of supplanting the operations cost of 2 DDG with the procurement and operations cost of 
the replacement LCS & JHSV.  There would also need to be an analysis to ensure the 
replacement of the DDG with these surface craft does not degrade other mission 
capabilities of the overall CSG.  For example, the LCS and JHSV cannot likely match the 
AEGIS Anti-Air Warfare capabilities of the 2 DDG; thus, would the AEGIS defense 
capabilities of the remaining DDG/CG prove sufficient for the CSG formation.  Finally, 
there also will need to be an analysis whether the JHSV can be procured, modified and 
equipped with the acoustics detection upgrades within the 2013 timeframe. 
 
3.1.2.13 Alternative 13: HAMR Integration 
This alternative adds a Hybrid Airship Multi-Role (HAMR) lighter-than-
air platform to conduct ASW operations within CSG Op Area.  A picture of a prototype 
airship is shown in Figure 44. [Ref 56, Airliners.net, 2008] The alternative adds the 
HAMR platform to the baseline.  In doing so it seeks to improve CSG ASW performance 
through the employment of embarked detection and engagement capabilities.  The 




Figure 44 - Picture of Prototype HAMR [Ref 56, Airliners.net, 2008] 
 
The operational concept for this alternative entails the deployment of the 
HAMR to the CSG area of operation with an ASW mission package.  Once on station, 
the HAMR conducts deployment of sonobuoy fields to detect threat submarines to aide in 
establishment of the safe CSG operation.  A notional physical architecture is depicted in 
Figure 45.   
As currently envisioned, the HAMR with ASW package would not only 
add an independent ability to detect submerged threats, but also add an engagement 
capability through employment of MK54 light weight torpedoes and possibly the 
HAAWC weapon system originally discussed as part of alternative 4. [Ref 57, NUWC 
Keyport MSSE Cohort, 2008] With this capability the HAMR could independently 
prosecute detected threats or the engagement functions in the baseline CSG could pounce 
on detected threats.  
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Figure 45 - Physical Architecture for HAMR Alternative 
 
The unit depicted in Figure 44 is a Lockheed Martin N791LM.  This 
aircraft is a prototype of the envisioned HAMR platform.  As currently planned, the 
HAMR project expects to produce two prototype HAMR airframes for evaluation testing.  
Testing is planned though 2013 with transition to production and ultimate introduction to 
the fleet following those evolutions. [Ref 57, NUWC Keyport MSSE Cohort, 2008]  
 
3.1.3 Feasibility Screening Results 
The project team applied a feasibility study to screen the number of viable 
alternatives to be passed on for modeling and analysis based on the feasibility criteria 
described in the section 3.1.1.3 above.  Criteria were selected based upon interpretation 
of feedback received from key stakeholders.  
Each alternative, including the baseline was thoroughly investigated and 
evaluated against the above set of criteria.  An alternative was deemed not feasible if it 
failed any of the customer constraints. Only those alternatives that pass all criteria were 
chosen for modeling and analysis.  The results of the feasibility screening are shown in 
Table 2 below: 
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Table 2 - ASW System Feasibility Screening 
Customer 



















Survivability Pass or Fail Comments
Baseline Y Y Y Y Y Y Y PASS This is the CSG Baseline
Alternative 1 Y Y Y Y Y Y N FAIL Risk of Shooting at our own Sub
Alternative 2 N Y Y Y Y N Y FAIL Not available in time, and exceeds cost
Alternative 3 N Y Y Y Y N Y FAIL Not available in time, and exceeds cost
Alternative 4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y PASS Could be feasible
Alternative 5 N Y Y Y Y N Y FAIL Not available in time, and exceeds cost
Alternative 6 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y PASS Could be feasible
Alternative 7 N Y Y Y Y N Y FAIL Not available in time, and exceeds cost
Alternative 8 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y PASS Could be feasible
Alternative 9 Y Y Y Y Y Y N FAIL SURTASS lack of self defense
Alternative 10 Y Y N Y N Y Y FAIL Require additional Helos at other mission expense
Alternative 11 Y N Y Y N N N FAIL SURTASS and LCS Availability
Alternative 12 N Y Y Y N N Y FAIL Not available in time, exceeds cost, expense of AEGIS AW
Alternative 13 N Y Y Y Y Y Y FAIL Not available in time
 
The CSG baseline (Do Nothing Alternative) passed all feasibility screening by 
default.  It’s measured ASW performance in the chosen environment is the baseline that 
other alternatives were compared against by the modeling and analysis team.  Three other 
alternatives also passed all screening criteria.  They are Alternative 4, Alternative 6 and 
Alternative 8.  Details of these alternatives are provided in Section 3.1.2.  One of these 
alternatives could possibly replace the baseline in 2013.  Detailed modeling and analysis 
of these three alternatives was performed with results documented in Section 3.2.  These 
alternatives will also have to go through a final test for sensitivity, detailed cost analysis 
and risk evaluation prior to being chosen the best candidate for 2013 CSG baseline. 
The feasibility screening eliminated several alternatives based on their inability to 
pass all customer constraints.  A brief summary of the results follows:  
- Alternative 1 failed survivability due to the potential to attack our own 
submarine if situational awareness is not fully maintained.   
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-  Alternatives 2, 3, 5, 7 and 12 all failed due to two factors.  These alternatives 
are not anticipated to be achievable in the 2013 timeframe and they all exceed the $1 
Billion dollar procurement cap.  Alternative 12 further failed due to an anticipated impact 
to the CSG AEGIS air warfare capability. 
-  Alternative 9 failed survivability due to the fact that the SURTASS platform 
operates outside the protection of the other CSG assets and does not have sufficient self 
defense capabilities in the event it is attacked by enemy forces. 
-  Alternative 10 failed both the 14 day availability and impact on other CSG 
operations.  It will be difficult to maintain constant helicopter presence for prolonged 
periods for several reasons and sacrificing other aircraft for helicopter support will 
adversely impact other CSG missions. 
-  Alternative 11 failed several categories, including:  Supported by CSG, does not 
degrade other CSG operations, cost and survivability (primarily SURTASS related). 
-  Alternative 13 is not anticipated to be available in the 2013 time frame and 
therefore failed screening based on this. 
 
3.1.4 Feasible Alternatives 
The three alternatives, Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Barrier, and Advanced 
Capabilities Build were examined in terms of performance, cost, and risk.  The highest 
score will be recommended for release to the CSG baseline in 2013.  A discussion on the 
feasibility of these alternatives is provided below. 
 
3.1.4.1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Alternative 
The Maritime Patrol Aircraft ASW sensor, as discussed in section 3.1.2.4, 
is the addition of a new sensor suite on existing P-3C Orion.  The system is also slated for 
inclusion on the P-3’s planned replacement the P-8 Poseidon, scheduled for LRIP 
production beginning in 2010.  While the exact technology readiness level of this system 
is not established, the program is planning to complete multi-mission, multi-aircraft trials 
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and complete the development of a concept of operations during DoD Fiscal year 2009. 
Given its current state of development, it is expected that, assuming successful 
demonstration of the technology, that this system would be available, at least in limited 
quantities, for operational use in the 2013 timeframe.   
The P-3s are land based, requiring no support from the CSG and have the 
range and endurance to support anticipated CSG operations by rotating on station aircraft. 
The MPA squadron has ample aircraft quantities to maintain the required coverage, non-
stop, for indefinite periods. The EPAS sensor is considered to be benign to the 
environment and the existing P-3 impacts are well documented and within acceptable 
standards.  The MPA/EPAS concept will operate outside the CSG OPAREA so will not 
likely interfere with CSG operations.   
The anticipated $84.5 million procurement cost is well below the $1 
billion dollar threshold.  The survivability of the MPA/EPAS system is considered to be 
high as it has a low vulnerability to the threat submarine and is likely to be operating at 
considerable distances from other threat forces. 
 
3.1.4.2 Barrier Alternative 
The Barrier alternative as discussed in Section 3.1.2.6 is the inclusion of 
an LCS craft supporting the CSG by operating as a surrogate craft for deployment of 
DWADS sensors.  This is an additional capability being placed into the OPAREA that 
does not utilize existing CSG resources and will not impact the CSG’s other operations.  
The LCS is a purpose built, high speed, multi-mission naval platform.  As such it has 
sufficient capability to keep up with the CSG and support extended operations.  The 
advanced systems onboard make this a highly survivable platform.  The lead ship has 
already been christened and fully operational vessels will be readily available to support 
the CSG by the goal date of 2013.  The Navy intends to procure these multi-mission 
vessels, regardless of the CSG ASW applications.  Therefore the LCS procurement is a 
sunk cost and was not considered against the feasibility screening criteria.    
The DWADS sensors are the subject of an ongoing Office of Naval 
Research FY07 advanced technology program.  DWADS is a combination of and 
 97
upgrade to existing sensor and communication technologies and it is anticipated that they 
will be in full rate production by 2013.  This uncertain TRL is a source of cost and 
schedule risk for this alternative. 
 
3.1.4.3 Advanced Capabilities Build Alternative 
The Advanced Capabilities Build alternative as discussed in Section 
3.1.2.8 is the application of an advanced processing research and development process 
currently in use as a technology feeder for the AN/BQQ-10(V) Submarine Sonar system, 
applying it to existing/emergent Surface ASW technologies for the 2013 CSG (e.g. 
MFTA).  This advanced processing work in concert with planned COTS technology 
upgrades (hardware and software) have been providing performance improvements into 
the submarine fleet on an annual basis.  By applying this approach to the Surface Sonar 
baseline system, gains can be made that will, at a minimum increase detection 
performance and improve the “detect to classification” timeline.  Improvements in both 
of these areas will lead to a higher detection probability and support longer classification 
ranges. 
As this process is currently in use for the submarine force, having an 
improved performance baseline to support operations in the 2013 timeframe is 
achievable.  As the end result of this alternative is improved hardware and software that 
is built upon the system utilized in the baseline scenario, it meets the CSG operation, 
survivability, and 14 day duration feasibility requirements by default.  Current Submarine 
force funding for this effort across a similar timeframe is in the $300M - $500M range, 
including all research efforts, transition to production and installation with life-cycle 
support, well under the cost requirement.  Lastly, as it is an upgrade to the baseline 
system focused solely on the improving the ASW performance, it will not degrade other 
CSG operations and will have an acceptable environmental impact. 
 
3.2 MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
The purpose of modeling within the systems engineering development process is 
to provide a consistent, quantitative method to evaluate key measures of effectiveness 
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and measures of performance for system alternatives under consideration.  The modeling 
and analysis efforts are conducted as an integral part of the Design and Analysis phase of 
the SEDP.  The systems engineering team must use caution when selecting models to 
support this phase of analysis.  Models must be selected and/or developed which have 
sufficient fidelity that they provide credible results while proving outputs that are directly 
related to the key performance measures that have been identified through the Needs 
Analysis process.  In addition, any known shortfalls or deficiencies within the selected 
models should be identified and presented to the decision maker.  This leads to 
transparency in the alternative scoring process and will result in a more satisfied 
customer and removes any bias or prejudice on the part of the system designers related to 
specific solutions. 
In the case of this systems engineering project, key measures of operational 
effectiveness performance include metrics associated with threat submarine detection, 
threat submarine engagement and carrier survivability.  These measures require the 
selection or development of a model set which can estimate the detection capability of 
solutions under consideration, the ability of the solution to engage or attack the enemy 
submarine, and determine the output metric, (survival of the aircraft carrier) of each 
engagement.  These metrics imply the need for a discrete event time domain model that 
will model the kinematics of all platforms, acoustics detection capability of sensors at 
discrete time steps, ability of the sensor to hold and localize the contact and weapon 
employment. 
In addition to these key measures of operational effectiveness, the systems 
engineering team also evaluated the Reliability, Maintainability and Availability of 
feasible solutions to provide measures of operational suitability. 
 
3.2.1 Modeling and Analysis Approach 
The modeling and analysis effort has two parts, operational effectiveness and 
operational suitability.  Operational effectiveness corresponds to the Objectives 
Hierarchy performance measure “Probability that the ASW system prevents enemy 
launch of an effective weapon against the aircraft carrier” (see Figure 25).  The 
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Objectives Hierarchy decomposes this measure into other lower level measures 
supporting the Detection, Localization/Tracking, Classification, and Engagement.  
Analyzing operational effectiveness at the carrier survival level simplifies the modeling 
effort because results only have to be collected for one measure instead of the seven 
measures that would need to be individually modeled if the analysis were done at the 
lower level.  The probability of carrier survival implicitly includes the lower level 
measures since the lower level measures are tied to the functions required for carrier 
survival. 
Operational Suitability corresponds to the Trustworthy block of Figure 26.  Of the 
performance measures that contribute to Trustworthiness, Operational Availability (Ao) 
and Reliability (Re) are modeled.  The Number of Staff to operate and maintain the 
system was approximated by best engineering/logistics judgment, and was 
accommodated as part of the cost modeling and analysis.  The other Measures of 
Suitability were not modeled for several reasons.  One, the requirement for fourteen day 
endurance, is covered by the feasibility screening.  Man-hours of Required Training, and 
System Setup Time require more detailed alternative definition than is possible at the 
level of this project, and should be assessed at the next level of development. 
 
3.2.2 Operational Effectiveness 
The key measure of effectiveness for the ASW system is survival of the carrier at 
the center of the CSG.  Since we are developing an ASW system to protect the carrier, we 
only consider attacks on the carrier, and other CSG members, by Red Submarines.  We 
also consider the Red Submarine to behave in a “kill or be killed” manner; that is the Red 
Submarine will pursue the carrier until either it sinks the carrier or is killed itself.  The 
carrier and CSG are assumed to only address the Red submarine threat by attacking Red 
Submarines.  The CSG will not alter operations to avoid a detected submarine. 
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Figure 46 - Modeling Universe 
 
The ASW alternatives consist of combinations of sensors and weapons operating 
in the three regions depicted in Figure 46.  These regions are more important to modeling 
the detection element of the proposed solutions than the engagement.  The largest region, 
Theater, is a notional area representing and the entire area of conflict.  For the modeling 
effort, Theater is considered to be a rectangle 100 by 100 nm.  This size is based on 
making the Theater significantly larger than the CSG OA so that Red submarines will be 
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exposed to theater level ASW forces that may be part of a proposed solution.  Theater 
level operations are modeled as an area search.  
The CSG OA is a 30 by 30 nm box that the CSG is assigned to operate within.  
From a modeling stand point the CSG OA provides three elements that may be part of a 
proposed solution.  The boundary between the OA and the Theater provides an 
opportunity for a barrier search solution.  The OA region, outside of the portion occupied 
by the CSG formation, is modeled as an area search, similar to the Theater (light-blue) 
region.  The portion of the OA occupied by the CSG formation has unique modeling 
aspects that will be discussed in the Baseline section below. 
Modeling the various ASW alternatives involves analysis of detection and 
engagement probabilities in the regions shown in Figure 46, as well as the Red submarine 
migration across the boundaries between those regions.  At the highest level Red 
submarines will be randomly distributed throughout the Theater (light-blue) region in 
Figure 46, including the portion of the theater region occupied by the CSG OA and the 
CSG formation. 
The probability of carrier survival can be thought of as one minus the probability 
of the attacking red submarine’s survival.  This assumes a kill or be killed scenario; the 
red submarine will continue its attack on the carrier until either it launches a torpedo 
attack on the carrier or is destroyed by Blue forces. 
For modeling purposes we assume that the Red submarine is initially located at 
the outer boundary of the “Theater” region of Figure 46.  The Red submarine will 
traverse the theater region moving toward the CSG OA.  As the Red submarine traverses 
the theater region it provides an opportunity for Blue forces to detect and engage it.  If the 
Blue forces are successful the Red submarine is destroyed in the theater region and the 
carrier survives. 
If the Blue forces do not destroy the red submarine in the theater region it has an 
opportunity to penetrate the boundary between the theater region and CSG OA.  Once 
again this presents Blue forces an opportunity to detect and engage the red submarine.  If 
the Red submarine enters the CSG OA, it will maneuver to intercept the CSG.  The 
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formations screening ships will have an opportunity to kill the Red submarine as it 
penetrates the formation. 
The spreadsheet model will consist of three sub-models, a formation model 
representing the Baseline alternative, barrier search model outside the CSG OA 
representing the MPA alternative, and a barrier search model on the perimeter of the CSG 
OA representing the LCS alternative.  The results of these sub-models will be combined 
in a top level spreadsheet that calculates the probability of a Red submarine successfully 
attacking the carrier. 
Each sub-model calculates the probability of the Red submarine being killed by 
the associated alternative.  In addition the Baseline models determine whether the Red 
submarine was killed before it was able to launch a successful attack on the carrier.  The 
probability of Red submarine kill is a function of detection probability, reaction/decision 
time, and weapon effectiveness.  Since all the alternatives use similar weapons, the 
probability of a single weapon killing the target is 1.0.  Detection probability and 
reaction/decision time are represented as discussed in the sub-model sections. 
Each model will produce a probability of the Red submarine being killed by a 
specific alternative.  These probabilities will be combined, using an event tree approach, 
to produce the overall probability of carrier survival for the Baseline alone, the Baseline 
plus the LCS, the Baseline plus the MPA, and the Advanced Capabilities Build. 
 
3.2.2.1 Baseline 
The systems engineering team’s Modeling and Simulation IPT elected to 
utilize a readily available tool to support analysis of key operational effectiveness 
parameters related to the baseline system performance.  The M&S IPT was responsible 
for estimating expected performance measures, as identified in the objectives hierarchy of 




Figure 47 - Baseline Engagement Model Block Diagram 
 
The basic block diagram of the spread sheet model is shown in Figure 47.   
The central element of this model is the computation of the position information for the 
CSG ships and the opposing force submarine.  Using time steps that are set up in the 
geometry sheet, the model calculates the position of each platform using the speed and 
course for that time step.  These equations are implemented in the spreadsheet model to 
compute the positions for each platform at each time step. 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )* ( ( )) *X I X I V I COS I Tϕ= + Δ  Equation 1 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) * ( ( ))*Y I Y I V I SIN I Tϕ= + Δ  Equation 2 
where 
X is the X position of the platform in yards 
Y is the Y position of the platform in yards 
I is the platform index (submarine, CVN, DDG, CG) 
V is the velocity of the platform in yards per second 
ΔT is the time step in seconds 
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When the position of each platform is updated, the range between the 
opposing force submarine and each of the CSG platforms is computed and used in the 
calculation of signal excess and also in the calculation of torpedo run.  The range is 
calculated as: 
 ( ) ( )22 )()()( ss YIYXIXIR −−−=  Equation 3 
 
Where, 
I is the platform indicator for CVN, DDG or CG 
R is the Range between platform I and the opposing force submarine in 
yards 
X(I) is the X coordinate of the platform in yards 
Xs is the X coordinate of the submarine in yards 
Y(I) is the Y coordinate of the platform in yards 
Ys is the Y coordinate of the submarine in yards 
 




Following the calculation of the position of each platform in the scenario, 
the spread sheet model then computes the ability of the sensors on each platform to detect 
the opposing force submarine and also the ability of the opposing force submarine to 
detect each Carrier Strike Group platform.  As described in Section 2.1.5, the Cruiser and 
Destroyers of the CSG utilize active bow sonar to detect and track the opposing 
submarine, while the opposing submarine uses passive hull sonar to detect and track the 
Carrier Strike Group platforms.  This component of the model requires the 
implementation of the Figure of Merit (FOM) [Ref 59, Hall, 2006: 207] and the 
calculation of Signal Excess above the FOM to determine if detection was made during 
that time step.  This concept is graphically depicted in Figure 48. 
 
 ( )       –  FOMactive reverberation limited SL TS RL DT− = + −  Equation 4 
    –  2  –   –  SE SL PL RL DT=   Equation 5 
Where 
SE is the signal excess in dB 
SL is the active sonar source level in dB 
PL is the propagation loss in dB 
TS is the target strength in dB 
RL is the reverberation level in dB 
DT is the detection threshold in dB 
 
Computing the signal excess for each time step in the simulation requires 
that the model compute each of the parameters of the sonar equation, including the 
observable, the energy propagation through the environment and the ability of the sensor 
to detect the received signal.  The passive and active sonar equations were implemented 
in this spreadsheet, assuming a constant, range independent, iso-velocity sound velocity 
profile.  
The passive and active target strengths utilized by the spread sheet model 
were derived from NPS SE 3122 course material.   Figure 49 [Ref 58, Green, 2007] 
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shows the range of passive acoustic noise signatures for various classes/sizes of surface 
vessels.  Utilizing this graph values were selected for the aircraft carrier (CVN) from the 
Battleship operating curve at 15 knots and the CG/DDG values were selected for the 
Destroyer operating at 15 knots.  These parameters are inputs to the model via the 
scenario control sheet and may be modified to support sensitivity analysis.   
 
 
 Figure 49 - Surface Vessel Radiated Noise Levels [Ref 58, Green, 2007] 
  
The active target strength of the submarine was also required to support 
the spread sheet model.  Figure 50 [Ref 58, Green, 2007] shows an azimuthal estimate of 
submarine active target strength.  From these figures a value of 10dB was selected based 
on the smoothed azimuthal estimate.  This appears to be a good average value, but does 
not account for the peaks and nulls associated with the beam, bow and stern aspects.  
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Figure 50 - Submarine Active Target Strength [Ref 80, Urick, 1983: 310] 
 
The selection of an iso-velocity condition allows the spread sheet model to 
utilize spherical spreading loss approximations to estimate the effect of the environment 
on the transmission and reception of energy.  Using this method the one-way passive 
transmission loss is computed as 20Log(Range) and the two way active transmission loss 




R2/R1 = 1000/1= 1000
Log of 1000 = 3 







charts normally start at 
1000yds at 60db loss
20 log R2R1
 




Background noise levels, caused by shipping traffic, wind, rain, biologic 
activity and seismic activity creates a noise field from which passive sonar signals must 
be detected.   The contribution of each of these factors is frequency dependent, and the 
amplitude of each noise source is a function of the activity level of that parameter.  The 
Wentz curve (Figure 52, [Ref 59, Hall, 2006: 195]) is normally used to depict these 
parameters.  For the purpose of our analysis we selected 70 dB as a nominal value.  This 
value can be changed through the Environmental and Sensor Data worksheet if an 
assessment of the sensitivity to background noise level is desired. 
 
Figure 52 - Wentz Curve [Ref 59, Hall, 2006: 195] 
 
The detection thresholds selected for the modeling analysis were 20 for 
active sensors and 10dB for passive sensors.  These nominal values were chosen to 
illustrate the effect of detection threshold on detection range, and are set up parameters 
within the spread sheet model and to recognize the difficulty associated with detection of 
active targets in the presence of clutter.  In addition, signal and noise fluctuations were 
introduced into the model using a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 0dB and a sigma 
of 9dB for passive and 12dB for active.  Figure 53 [Ref 58, Green, 2007] illustrates the 
effects of these fluctuations on the detection process.  The introduction of the random 
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signal fluctuations allows the team to utilize an M of N method [ditto] to simulate the 
classification/decision process during the torpedo engagement analysis.   
 
 




Satisfying the need for quantitative value of key performance measures 
was accomplished through the implementation of an Excel WorkBook with Worksheets 
organized to support scenario setup parameters, environmental parameters, geometric 
position data and resultant sensor detection estimates, tracking and engagement analysis 
and finally a scorecard to allow for Monte Carlo replication of the results.  Figure 54 
shows the top level control for this WorkBook.  This page allows the initial scenario 
parameters, including the range and bearing of the submarine at the start of the problem 
which is randomly set for each run using the RandBetween() function for both Range and 
Bearing from the aircraft carrier at problem start.  In addition, to support sensitivity 
analysis, the user may elect to modify the CSG surface combatant screen formation 
parameters to investigate the impact of a longer range to the screen from the aircraft 
carrier or a wider search angle which the 3 DDG platforms will be distributed about as 




Figure 54 - Spread Sheet Control 
 
In addition to these scenario set-up parameters which control the initial 
starting point and motion of the carrier strike group and submarine platforms, the discrete 
time event simulation requires inputs for passive signature levels for the surface vessels, 
active target strength for the submarine and also the background noise level that 
interferes with passive detection.  Also, the fluctuation in signals and noise as seen by the 
detection process is modeled via this spread sheet.  Figure 55 provides a depiction of the 
Sensor and Environment Control Worksheet which allows the system engineering team 
to modify these simulation input parameters. 
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Figure 55 - Environmental and Target Strength Control Sheet 
 
At problem start the opposing submarine will execute maneuvers every 
two hours, changing course between 45 and 225 degrees.  The submarine maintains this 
race track pattern until its sensors can detect the CVN acoustic signature.  Upon detection 
the submarine will execute an attack tactic by assuming an intercept course with the 
CVN.  Figure 56 below is a screen capture of a single engagement analysis run using the 
spread sheet model.  Although too small for legibility, the green highlights indicate 
positive signal excess for the active sonar sensors of the Carrier Strike Group (DDG 1, 
DDG 2, DDG 3 and CG 1) against the submarine and of the passive submarine sensors 
against the CVN, DDGs and CG. 
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Figure 56 – Single Engagement Analysis Run 
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Figure 57 - Geographic Plot Example 
 
The course is updated each time step based on the signal excess 
calculation and calculation of the bearing to the CVN.  CSG course, speed and screen 
formation parameters may also be modified by the user to support sensitivity analysis.  
The base course and speed utilized for our analysis was 45 degrees and 15 knots, with 
course maneuvers every 2 hours.  This approach allowed the CSG to remain within the 
30x30 nautical mile operating area without the need for computing the proximity of the 
CSG to the edge of the operating area.  Figure 57 depicts the geometry resulting from one 
of our analysis runs as well as the signal excess versus time for the CSG against the 
submarine and the time versus range plots for each platform in the CSG to the submarine. 
 
The engagement model, used for both torpedoes and missiles, consists of 
three parts; the calculation of weapon course and run to the target, the decision to launch, 
and the determination of the result. 
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The weapon course is set to match the weapon’s speed across the line of 
sight to the target’s speed across the line of site.  Speed across the line of site is the 
velocity component perpendicular to a bearing line from the launch platform to the target.  
Matching the speeds across the line of sight, results in an intercept course.  The target’s 
speed across the line of sight is calculated using Equation 6.  The weapon course that will 
intercept the target is calculated by Equation 7. 
  
 * ( )Ty T T TV V CSE B= −   Equation 6 
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The distance the weapon travels before it hits the target is calculated by 
multiplying the Target range at Time Of Fire by fraction of total closing speed (weapon’s 
speed in the line of sight plus the target’s speed in the line of sight) generated by the 
weapon.  Equations 8 and 9 are used to calculate the target’s and weapon’s speed in the 
line of sight.  Equation 10 calculates the distance traveled by the weapon.  Inspection of 
Equation 10 will show that if the target is opening (i.e. VTx is negative) the distance 
traveled by the weapon will be greater than the range at Time of Fire. 
 ( )cosTx T T TV V B CSE= −i   Equation 8 
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      WxV Weapon Speed in the Line of Sight=  
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The decision to launch a weapon is based on the target being in range, and 
accumulating sufficient data to accurately place the weapon.  Determining if the target is 
in range is simply a matter of checking weather the distance traveled by the weapon is 
less than the maximum range of the weapon.  The determination of whether sufficient 
data has been accumulated is based on the time that the target is tracked.  The criterion is 
defined as the target being detected for X of the last Y glimpse intervals.  The X portion 
of the criterion provides a minimum time that the target must be tracked before launching 
a weapon, while the Y portion allows intermittent contact to contribute to the firing 
solution. 
The results of an engagement are determined by comparing the time the 
Red submarine is hit by a Blue weapon with the time the Red submarine launches a 
weapon against the Blue carrier.  If the Red submarine is hit before launching a weapon 
against the carrier, the carrier is scored as surviving.  If the Red submarine launches a 
weapon against the carrier before being hit by a blue weapon, then the carrier is 
considered killed. 
 
3.2.2.2 MPA Alternative Model 
Because this alternative is employed as a layer of defense, the 
performance metric investigated must be one that is readily applied to the results of the 
modeling efforts of the other alternatives. The metric selected is the probability of 
detection (Pd) of a threat submarine attempting to reach the CSG OA. It is considered 
reasonable to assume that if detected by the MPA/EPAS system, that the MPA aircraft 
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has adequate organic prosecution capability to neutralize the threat, thus increasing the 
probability of survival of the Aircraft Carrier. Another underlying assumption is that the 
rate of false detections will be low and not significantly impact the ability of the system 
to perform an effective search. 
The expected platform for deployment and use of this sensor is the P-3C 
Orion.  The P-3C is a land-based, long range, ASW patrol aircraft (Figure 58 and Table 3, 
[Ref 38, Jane’sfighting ships, 2008]). It is typically configured with submarine detection 
sensors such as sonobuoys (active, passive and multi-static systems) and magnetic 
anomaly detection (MAD) equipment. The avionics system is integrated by a general 
purpose digital computer that supports all of the tactical displays, monitors and 
automatically launches ordnance and provides flight information to the pilots. Each MPA 
squadron has nine aircraft and is deployed to sites outside the United States for 
approximately six months at a time. 
 







Table 3 - P-3C Specifications 
  Crew Composition 11 (Normal) 
   Endurance 10-13 Hours 
  Cruise Speed 330 Knots 
   Armaments 20000 lb max of: 
 (varies by mission)        2000 lb mines 
        LWT torpedoes 
        MK101 Depth Bombs 
        Sonobuoys 
 
A program of record replacement aircraft for the P-3C is the P-8 Poseidon 
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA). The P-8 is a modified Boeing 737 that will be 
equipped with modern ASW; anti-surface warfare (ASuW); and Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) sensors for broad-area, maritime and littoral 
operations. The Navy expects to buy 34 low-rate initial production (LRIP) aircraft in the 
years '10, '11 and '12, and then transition beyond that in the year '13, to hit full-rate 
production. [Ref 49, Pike, 2007] 
The technology incorporated by the EPAS sensor will be most effective 
against surfaced or near surface submarine targets. Operationally, this will correspond to 
submarines that are transiting on or near the surface either to snorkel (recharging 
batteries) or to perform communications functions. This condition is most likely to occur 
when the submarine that has not yet detected the presence of the opposing force, i.e. the 
CSG. Consequently, it makes the most sense to use this sensor at a significant distance 
from the CSG, with the MPA operating in a largely autonomous mode. The MPA’s 
response to threat detection will be to attack with torpedoes. In the event that the threat 
eludes the initial attack, reacquisition and re-attack can be performed using conventional 
sensors including MAD and sonobuoys.  
As previously discussed, this sensor is only effective against a surfaced or 
near surface target. It will be best employed when the submarine has not yet detected the 
presence of the opposing forces. Consequently, the MPA/EPAS system will execute its 
search in those areas where the threat submarine is unlikely to be alerted to the presence 
of opposing forces.  
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The general case for analysis is that the MPA will be assigned an Area of 
Responsibility (AOR) that is outside the CSG OA and within the larger theater and that 
the submarine can attack from any direction. It would be reasonable to consider other 
situations that include apriori knowledge of threat activities, but for the purposes of this 
analysis the more general case will be considered.  
Figure 59 describes the method of employment of the MPA/EPAS system 
for this analysis. It is believed that this concept of employment (COE) will provide the 










Figure 59 - MPA/EPAS Employment 
 
Because the threat submarine is attempting to get within the CSG OA, it 
will have to transit across the operational theater, which is defined as a 100 x 100 nm 
area. In the modeling of other alternatives, the submarine speed is taken to be 5 knots. In 
this case its speed is taken as 10 knots, under the assumption that it will be less concerned 
with stealth when outside the CSG OA. It can be reasonably assumed that the transiting 
submarine prior to entering the CSG OA will change its behavior to a stealthier, 
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continually submerged mode. Consequently, the MPA/EPAS system must detect the 
threat before the submarine reaches this range. The range from the CSG OA where the 
submarine makes this transition is taken to be within 5 miles of the OA perimeter.  
The submarine is modeled as transiting a straight course, beginning at a 
randomly determined position on the perimeter of the theater and heading for the center 
of the CSG OA.  Because the threat submarine is in motion, and its initial position in time 
and space is unknown, there is no benefit to performing a methodical search of the entire 
AOR. It can be demonstrated that a more effective technique is to establish a notional 
barrier that the submarine must cross in order to achieve its purpose.  
Because speed, sweep width and endurance of the search platform are 
fixed, it is desirable to maximize the number of opportunities for detection. This 
corresponds to making the Circuit length of the barrier as short as possible. The limiting 
factor is that the barrier must be maintained outside the range at which the submarine is 
likely to be alerted to the CSG and submerge. This range is taken to be 5 NMI. 
 
In determining the probability of detecting a submarine that is attempting 
to transit the theater, several factors are taken into consideration. 
• The opportunities for detection presented by the threat submarine 
• The instantaneous area coverage by EPAS (sweep width) 
• The flight characteristics of the MPA 
The threat submarine is characterized as transiting towards the center of 
the CSG OA, beginning at a random point on the periphery of the defined theater. It is 
advancing at 10 knots and coming to the surface or near surface for 1 hour out of 6 
(16.7% of the time): the time near the surface provides the submarine the opportunity to 
run diesel engines to charge its batteries or to perform communications functions.  It is 
during this period that it is vulnerable to detection by the MPA/EPAS system. This is 
considered to be a reasonable characterization of behavior for a diesel electric submarine 
transiting to an area where it expects to find opposition forces. 
The EPAS sensor is currently under development. Consequently its 
performance characteristics and concept of operation have not yet been fully established. 
For the purposes of this analysis the following values for this sensor type have been 
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determined, by best engineering judgment, as reasonable estimates of the future sensors 
performance.  
 
Table 4 - EPAS Estimated Performance Characteristics 
Nominal Operating Altitude 10000 Ft. 
Downward Looking Aperture 60° 
Probability of Detection 0.90 
 
Given the parameters for operating altitude and aperture, the sweep width 
of the sensor can be readily calculated: 
 
 60       2  10000  ~  1.5
2
Sweep width Altitude x SIN x ft NMI⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ Equation 11 
 
The typical mission duration for the MPA is 10-13 hours. If a 12 hour 
mission duration is assumed and a transit time of 2 hours from the MPA base to its AOR, 
a total on station time per aircraft mission is 8 hours. The typical cruise speed for the 
MPA is 330 knots, giving the aircraft 2640 nautical miles of search per mission. The 
previously described search track is square, 40 NMI on a side, or 160 NMI for a single 
circuit.  
 
The calculation of the probability that a submarine is detected as it transits 
across the theater to the CSG OA, which is our metric P(d), is given by the following 
relationship: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )      #EPASP d P exposure x P d x Looks=   Equation 12 
  
P(exposure) is defined as the probability that the submarine will be both 
within the width of the barrier, defined by the sweep width of the EPAS sensor, and at a 
detectable depth at any given time. 
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P(dEPAS) is defined as the probability of detection by the EPAS sensor 
system.  The value of P(dEPAS) is 0.90 as this was shown in an earlier table. 
# Looks is defined as the number of circuits of the barrier the MPA will 
make during the time required by the submarine to transit the width of the MPA barrier. 
 
P(exposure) is determined by taking the product of two other probabilities: 
the probability that the submarine is within the MPA barrier/EPAS sweep width and the 
probability that the submarine is susceptible to detection at or near the surface. 
Determining what percentage of time the submarine is within the “barrier” is simply the 
ratio of the width of the theater to the sweep width of the sensor (1.5 NMI/15 NMI = 
0.10). The probability that the sub is susceptible to detection is determined from the ratio 
of submerged time to surfaced time during its transit (6:1 or 0.167). Consequently: 
 
 ( )  0.10  0.167  .0167P exposure x= =   Equation 13 
 
# Looks is determined by determining the number of times the MPA will 
complete a circuit of the barrier during the period that the submarine will transit across 
the theater. 




=  Equation 14 
 
The submarine speed of transit is known and is 10 knots. The distance of 
the transit varies with the heading angle of the submarine relative to the geometry of the 
theater. That is, the distance is shorter for a transit perpendicular to the boundaries than 
the distance for a transit that is at an angle to the boundaries.  Since the range of angles 
that can be realized is from 0 to 45 degrees, and the submarine’s initial position on the 
theater boundary is random, the mean heading is taken as 22.5 degrees from 
perpendicular. This corresponds to an average transit time of  
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 ( )( )
15        1.623 
cos 22.5   10 
NMIAverage Transit Time Hrs
x knots
= =  Equation 15 
 
The time per circuit of the barrier is determined from the airspeed of the 
MPA (330 knots) and the circumference of the barrier (40 NMI x 4 = 160 NMI). 
 
      ~  .5 Circuit DistanceCircuit time hours
Airspeed
=  Equation 16 
 
The approximating of this value is legitimate as the aircraft will not likely 
fly a perfectly straight course nor will it execute perfectly square turns at the corners of 
the barrier. 
 
Average number of circuits per submarine transit follows: 
 




= =  Equation 17 
 
Calculation of P(d).  The Probability of Detection for a single submarine 
transit (average) is now given; 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )      #EPASP d P exposure x P d x looks=  Equation 18 
( )  .0167  .9  3.246  .0488 ~  0.05P d x x= =  
 
 
3.2.2.3 LCS Barrier Alternative Model 
The modeling of the perimeter portion of the barrier alternative is 
discussed in this section.  The barrier perimeter acts in parallel with the CSG to complete 
the barrier alternative in the form of a layered defensive and offensive system.  Both 
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components of the barrier alternative (CSG and barrier perimeter) are modeled separately 
and the effective performance of the entire alternative is shown in section 3.2.4.2. 
As described in Section 3.1.2.6, the barrier alternative is the combination 
of the CSG with the addition of a barrier perimeter detection and engagement system.  
The perimeter portion of the barrier alternative is designed to provide both detection and 
engagement of incoming threat submarines along the CSG OA boundary.  An LCS 
surface ship continuously places, replenishes, and monitors free-floating active SONAR 
buoys along the OA perimeter, creating an active acoustic submarine detection barrier.  
When detection criteria are met within a given buoy, information is communicated to the 
LCS via the communication link.  Based on engagement doctrine and information 
provided by the buoys, LCS personnel will decide whether or not to launch a helicopter 
from the LCS to the area of interest for torpedo engagement of the threat submarine.  




Figure 60 – Conceptualization of the Barrier Alternative OA Geometry 
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Based on the previously stated modeling goal, the primary model 
objective is to determine the probability that the barrier alternative perimeter successfully 
engages an incoming threat submarine as it approaches the OA boundary.  Due to the 
symmetry of the square OA, the barrier alternative perimeter model may be simplified to 
the examination of the probability of defeating the threat submarine crossing one side of 
the 30 nm OA.  A Monte Carlo spreadsheet simulation of a red submarine 
perpendicularly approaching a 30 nm line of buoys was developed to statistically 
determine this probability.  This single-line model concept is shown in Figure 61. 
 
 
Figure 61 – Single-line Barrier Alternative Model 
 
Each trial of the barrier alternative model starts at time 0t =  with the 
geometry as shown in Figure 62.  A single threat submarine is positioned at location 
( , )x y  where x  is a random number between 0 and 30 nm (~60,000 yards) and y  is set 
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equal to 20,000 yards.  Ideally, the buoys are uniformly spaced along the x-axis between 
0x =  and 60,000x =  yards.  However, due to buoy drift and varying buoy placement 
times, the model alters these ideal uniform buoy locations by adding a uniform random 
variable between +/- 3000 yards to both the x  and y  position of each buoy. 
 
 
Figure 62 – Barrier Alternative Perimeter Model Trial Geometry at Time = 0 
 
After the threat submarine and buoys are placed as described above at time 
0t = , the model increments time in one minute intervals.  As time increments, the threat 
submarine moves perpendicularly towards the x-axis (South) at a constant speed of five 
knots and the buoys each drift with independent random motion at an average speed of 
one knot.   
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At each step in time, the signal excess at each buoy is calculated using 
Equation 5.  The model parameters used in this equation are shown in Table 5.  A 
detection is defined to be whenever the signal excess calculation exceeds 0 dB.   
 
Table 5 - Barrier Signal Excess Equation Parameters 
Source Level (dB) Target Strength (dB) Recognition Threshold (dB) 
195 10 20 
 
The difference in time between detection initiation and cessation on a 
given buoy is referred to as the hold time.  If a buoy detects the threat submarine, the 
LCS is contacted in order to allow LCS personnel to consider launching an engagement 
against the threat submarine.  For this model, the LCS personnel will always decide to 
engage, and the ramifications of engaging false detections are not considered.  The total 
amount of time for the LCS to decide whether to engage, ready the helicopter personnel, 
and fly the helicopter to the detection location is referred to as the engagement time. 
Graphical representations of hold time and engagement time are shown in 
Figure 63.  The model considers the decision time and ready time to be constants of ten 
minutes and five minutes, respectively.  The flight time is modeled as a random time due 
to the random LCS location at any given time.  The worst-case distance the LCS can be 
from a buoy is considered to be the case when a buoy is at one corner of the OA and the 
LCS is located at the opposite corner of the 30 nm by 30 nm OA square.  This distance is 
~85,000 yards, and assuming a helicopter speed of 125 knots, the maximum flight time of 
the helicopter is ~20 minutes.  Therefore, the flight time is modeled as a uniform random 




Figure 63 - Timeline Displaying Hold Time and Engagement Time 
 
For any given trial, an engagement is considered to be successful if the 
engagement time is less than the hold time.  In other words, if a buoy is still detecting the 
threat submarine at the time the helicopter arrives on station to engage by dropping a 
torpedo, the engagement is modeled as being successful.  For each trial, the threat 
submarine may or may not be detected, and if it is detected, the engagement is either 
successful or it is not.  If an engagement is successful, the model calculates how far away 
from the OA boundary the threat submarine was at the time of the initial detection. 
The results of the barrier perimeter model are presented in Section 3.2.4.2. 
 
3.2.2.4 Model integration 
Since the alternatives consist of one or more alternatives added to the 
Baseline, the results of the Barrier and MPA models need to be combined with the 
Baseline model results to calculate the overall probability of carrier survival as discussed 
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in Section 3.2.2.  The Advanced Capabilities Build result is calculated by running the 
Baseline model with the input parameters changed to reflect the improved performance of 
the Advanced Capabilities Build. 
The individual model results are combined using the event tree shown in 
Figure 64.  The logic of the event tree is implemented in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  
Each circle in Figure 64 represents one of the alternative models discussed above.  The 
“Yes” branches represent the probability of the associated alternative stopping the red 
submarine.  The “No” branches represent the probability of the Red submarine getting 
through the associated alternative.  The sum of the “Yes” branch probabilities is the 















































Figure 65 - Baseline Event tree 
 
Figure 65 is the event tree for the Baseline alternative.  Only the baseline 
node is active, with a Probability of kill against the Red submarine of 0.665, which was 
























Figure 66 - Barrier Event Tree 
 
Figure 66 is the event tree for the Barrier alternative.  It has two active 
nodes, the Baseline and the Barrier.  As the tree shows, the first opportunity to kill the 
Red submarine is at the barrier.  The barrier model calculated the probability that a 
submarine would be killed passing through the barrier to be 0.572.  This leaves a 
probability of 0.428 (Pk-1) that the red submarine will enter the OA and be engaged by 
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the Baseline alternative.  Multiplying the probability of the red submarine entering the 
OA by the probability of the baseline killing the Red submarine after it enters the OA, 
gives the probability that any submarine that approaches the CSG will be killed by the 
Baseline alternative, as part of the barrier alternative.  Adding the probability of the Red 
submarine being killed by the Barrier and the probability of the Red submarine being 
killed by the baseline gives the total probability of the Red submarine being killed, which 
























Figure 67 - MPA Event Tree 
 
Figure 67 is the event tree for the MPA alternative. This is similar to the 
barrier event tree, in that two of the three nodes are active.  In this case the first 
opportunity to kill the red submarine occurs outside the OA, in the MPA’s patrol area.  In 




























Figure 68 - Advanced Capabilities Build Event Tree 
 
Figure 68 is the event tree for the Advanced Capabilities Build alternative.  
Like the baseline event tree it only has one active node.  However, it uses the improved 
























Figure 69 - Barrier Plus MPA Event Tree 
 
Figure 69 is the event tree for the Barrier plus MPA alternative.  It uses all 





3.2.2.5 NSS Model Comparison 
The Naval Simulation System (NSS) is an object oriented Monte Carlo 
modeling and simulation tool that supports multi-warfare mission area analyses.  NSS is 
unique in its capability to model C4ISR entities and organizations, and has been 
employed in FLEETEX, Fleet Battle Experiments, and in High Level Architecture 
simulations. [Ref 60, Metron Inc., 2002] The NSS version used in this project used an 
unclassified database. 
An NSS analysis was conducted on the Baseline alternative as a 
comparison to the spreadsheet models.  The initial efforts to model the alternatives with 
NSS were unsuccessful because the DDGs were 100% effective at preventing Red 
submarines from attacking the carrier, which conflicted with more credible stakeholder 
analysis results and other research conducted during the problem definition phase. 
For the comparison with the spreadsheet models the NSS unclassified 
database objects were modified to mimic the performance of corresponding objects in the 
spreadsheet model, and to account for some of the simplifications used in the spreadsheet 
model.  An important concept to note is that NSS simulates all aspects of naval warfare, 
and is aimed at producing information on the overall operations and results of a particular 
warfare scenario.  In contrast, the spreadsheet models are aimed only at determining the 
relative performance of the alternatives under analysis.  Therefore only the aspects that 
impact the differences in alternative performance are modeled, and the models are of the 
lowest fidelity that allows successful prediction of each alternative’s relative 
performance.  This low fidelity results in spreadsheet models that appear quite unrealistic 
compared to NSS, but in fact the spreadsheet models produce a more accurate prediction 
of relative system performance. 
The Baseline alternative was modeled in NSS as a formation with a CVN 
(USS Theodore Roosevelt) at the center, three DDGs (based on USS Winston Churchill) 
at 000, 315, and 045 relative from the carrier at a range of 15,000 yards and a CG (USS 
Port Royal) at 180 relative, 15,000 yards.  The CVN patrolled a 22.5 nm x 22.5 nm box at 
15 knots, with the other ships in the formation maintaining their formation positions.  
Restricting the CVN to a 22.5 nm square box prevented the other ships of the formation 
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from leaving the 30 nm square box.  The Red submarine was modeled using the SS KILO 
object in the NSS database. The Red submarine was assigned a 100 nm square box as a 
patrol area, to allow the submarine to approach the CSG from any direction. 
A number of changes were made to the NSS objects to provide more 
realistic results, and to incorporate the same simplifications that were incorporated in the 
spreadsheet model.  The NSS scenario was setup to use low resolution sensor models.  
This was done to prevent sonar performance from being modeled using the radar 
equation.  While the radar equation sonar performance model is workable, the effort 
required to derive radar parameters from sonar parameters is beyond the scope of this 
project.  The following changes were made to the NSS unclassified database to make it 
comparable to the spreadsheet model: 
• The maximum detection range of the SQS-53 sonar on the 
DDG/CG ships was reduced to 7500 yards, and the probability of 
detection for each glimpse interval was reduced to 0.5.  These 
parameters are based on the results of the sonar equation based 
spreadsheet sonar detection model. 
• The speeds of all ships in the NSS model were changed to match 
the speeds used in the spreadsheet model. 
• Changed the KILO maximum tactical response speed to five knots 
to match the speeds used in the spreadsheet model. 
 
NSS was used to run a Monte Carlo simulation of the Baseline alternative.  
The Monte Carlo simulation consisted of 999 iterations.  At the end of each iteration NSS 
recorded whether the CVN had been destroyed or damaged, and reported the percentage 
of total iterations that resulted in each condition.  These two conditions are mutually 
exclusive in NSS, so their sum gives the percentage of iterations that resulted in the CVN 
being hit by the submarine’s torpedo.  This sum is considered equivalent to the CVN 
being killed in the spreadsheet model.  Therefore, subtracting the sum of the CVN 




Table 6 - NSS Modeling results 
CVN Damaged 3% 
CVN Destroyed 0.3% 
CVN Survives 96.7% 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the NSS modeling.  The NSS model 
produced a much higher probability of carrier survival than the Baseline spreadsheet 
model (96.7% vs. 66.5%).  This disparity occurred even though the NSS model was 
adjusted to match, as much as the NSS’s architecture would allow, the assumptions and 
performance parameters of the spreadsheet model.  Prior to the adjustment the NSS 
model produced a 100% probability of carrier survival. 
The NSS results are contradicted by the results of the stakeholder analysis, 
which indicated a significant submarine threat against US aircraft carriers.  Validation of 
the ASW aspects of NSS are beyond the scope of this project, but would be a worthwhile 
research project in the future. 
 
3.2.3 Operational Suitability 
From the modeling and analysis standpoint operational suitability consists of 
Operational Availability (Ao) and Reliability (Re).  Operational Availability (Ao) is 
defined as the percent of mission time that a system is able to provide the required 
operational mission functions.  Ao is calculated as [Ref 61, Office of CNO, 2003]: 
 
 ( )     
UptimeAo
Uptime Downtime
= +  Equation 19 
 
A system is in an Upstate when the system is capable of performing all of 
the required operational mission functions.  The amount of time that a system is in an 
Upstate is called Uptime.  A system is in a Downstate when the system cannot perform 
one or more of the required operational mission functions.  Time that a system is in a 
Downstate is called Downtime.  A failure that causes system Downtime is defined as an 
operational mission failure (OMF). 
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An engagement is a specific period of time within a mission.  Engagement 
Reliability (Re) is the probability that a system can complete an engagement without an 
OMF.  The Ao and Re model is comprised of electrical components.  Electrical 
components are best modeled using an exponential distribution.  Therefore, Re is 
calculated as [Ref 61, Office of CNO, 2003]: 
 
      ( ) 
t
Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failure MTBOMFRe e
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠=  Equation 20 
 
Where t is the engagement duration 
 
     
   
Total Mission TimeMTBOMF
Total number of OMFs
=  Equation 21 
 
The ASW Operational Availability (Ao) and Engagement Reliability (Re) 
Model is a simulation model utilizing the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 
Tiger Version 8.21.42 Availability and Reliability Computer Program within the Naval 
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Readiness Based Sparing (RBS) Workstation 
Version 5.1. 
Tiger is a Monte Carlo Simulation program that calculates system Ao and 
Re using input information that consists of the system configuration, component 
reliability, maintainability and logistics constraint information and the Operational 
Mission Profile.  Component criticality is also incorporated.   
 
3.2.3.1 Process 
Components that provide the operational mission functions critical to 
support ASW Operations were identified for each system alternative.  Reliability Block 
Diagrams (RBDs) were prepared to show operational success paths among all critical 
components of the system.  The purpose of the RBD is to show the various series-parallel 
block combinations (paths) that result in system success.  Reliability and maintainability 
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information was collected for every component in the RBD and is provided in the 
following sections of this report. 
Components that do not provide operational mission functions critical to 
support ASW Operations were not included in this model.  These components were 
assumed to be reliable. 
The ASW System is required to support a 14 day mission and, within this 
14 day mission, the ASW System is required to support a 6 hour ASW engagement.  The 
14 day mission time was a stakeholder requirement.  The 6 hour engagement time was 
derived from the amount of time it would take an enemy submarine to travel across the 
30 x 30 nm OA traveling at 5 knots.  The Operational Mission Profile of each system 
alternative is different; therefore the Operational Mission Profile will be further detailed 
when discussing each system alternative RMA model.   
This information was collected for each system alternative and used as 
input into the Tiger model.  It was assumed each ASW system alternative had a full 
compliment of weapons, supplies and personnel required to perform the operational 
mission functions critical to support ASW Operations at the start of the mission. 
 
Each Tiger simulation follows this sequence 
1. Time to fail “t” is calculated for each equipment (block in the reliability bock 
diagram) using the following equations.  The equipment time to failure values 
are assumed to have an exponential distribution about the equipment mean 









   - ln  ( ) x t R MTBF=  Equation 23 
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‘R’ is a random number between zero and one selected by Tiger from a 
pseudorandom number string.  MTBF is an input parameter provided in the 
tables below for all critical equipment included in the model.  Equipment in 
the Tiger model can be placed in one of three states during a simulation phase: 
1) Off 2) ‘On but not Critical’ 3) ‘On and Critical’.  There is no effect on Re 
and Ao when equipment is turned off.  When equipment is turned off in a 
phase TIGER assumes a 0% failure rate.  This disallows a failure occurrence 
by this equipment and does not contribute toward system downtime for Ao.  
When equipment is turned ‘On but not Critical’, TIGER allows the equipment 
to fail, but a failure does not cause an OMF, therefore, no system downtime is 
added.  If the equipment is not repaired and the timeline transitions to a phase 
where that same equipment is now deemed critical, an OMF may occur at the 
start of that phase; depending on the configuration of the equipment in the 
system (see step 2).  When equipment is ‘On and Critical’, equipment can fail 
causing a system OMF; depending on the configuration of the equipment in 
the system (see step 2). 
 
2. The equipment times to fail are arranged in chronological order.  Times to fail 
beyond the mission duration are ignored.  At the first equipment time to fail 
Tiger determines whether the failure will drive the system to an Up state or a 
Downstate.  If the equipment is a single point of failure the system would then 
be in a Downstate and the failure would be classified as an OMF.  If the 
equipment is part of a redundancy, the system may be in an Up state if the 
redundant path is available.  This failure would not be classified as an OMF.  
If the equipment is repairable, and there is a spare part available to make the 
repair, the equipment is repaired.  A new equipment time to fail is calculated 
for the equipment when the repair is completed.  The total time to repair the 
system from an OMF is Downtime; this includes the mean time to repair 
(MTTR) and the mean logistics delay time (MLDT).  MLDT refers to the 
amount of time needed to acquire the spare part from storage after the part 
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was requested.  In the ASW model repair was not allowed on any outboard 
items for the duration of the 14 day mission.  For repairable inboard systems 
the MTTR is provided in the tables below.  A 2 hour MLDT time was 
assumed for all repairable systems.    
 
3. If the first failure resulted in a system Downstate, Tiger treats all of the time 
accumulated from the start of the simulated mission to the first equipment 
time to fail as system Uptime.  The time accumulated to make the equipment 
repair is system Downtime.  Upon repair and restoration of the system, the 
time accumulated to the next equipment time to fail is Uptime. 
 
4. At the next equipment time to fail Tiger determines whether the system is in 
an Up state or a Downstate.  Tiger checks whether any previous failures are 
still being repaired which could impact redundancy shown in the RBDs.  The 
equipment repair is made based on the conditions stated in step 2, and a new 
equipment time to fail is calculated for the equipment when the repair is 
completed. 
 
5. Tiger is keeping track of the Onboard Replacement Parts (OBRPs) that are 
being “consumed” as failures occur.  If there are no more repair parts 
available to make a repair and an OMF occurs, the equipment is retained in a 
Downstate for the remainder of the simulated mission.  In the ASW model a 
full compliment of OBRPs was assumed for repairable systems. 
 
6. This process is repeated at each equipment time to fail until the mission 
duration time is met. 
 
7. At the end of this simulated mission the Uptime and Downtime are calculated 
for this simulated mission. 
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8. Tiger then repeats the above simulation sequence until it has performed the 
number of simulated missions specified in the Tiger Input File.  Nine-
thousand nine-hundred and ninety nine (9999) simulated missions were 
conducted in the ASW model.  The large number of simulations is run to 
achieve a statistical sample that suitably represents the equipment failure 
occurrence within the allocated mission time.   
 
9. When all of the simulated missions are performed the Uptime from all of the 
simulated missions is added to obtain the Total Uptime, and the Downtime 
from all of the simulated missions is added to obtain the Total Downtime.  
The Ao is then calculated using Equation 19. 
 
10. The total simulated mission run time is divided by the total number of OMFs 
to calculate MTBOMF as stated in Equation 21.   Re is then calculated using 
Equation 22.  
 
The percent of the 14 day ASW mission time that each system alternative 
is able to provide the required operational mission functions, Ao, is provided in the 
following sections of the report. 
The probability that each system alternative can complete the 6 hour ASW 
engagement without an operational mission failure, Re, is provided in the following 
sections of the report.  
 
3.2.3.2 Baseline System RMA Model 
 
Components in the Baseline system that provide the operational mission 
functions critical to support ASW Operations are provided in the table below.  The 
Baseline System RBDs are provided in Figure 70. 
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Table 7 - Baseline RMA Data 
Component MTBF MTTR Source 
Hull Outboard 
Electronics 13,022 Hours*
1 Not Repairable During Mission 
[Ref 62, Moreira, 
2007] 
MFTA 8712 Hours* Not Repairable During Mission 
[Ref 63, Lomba and 
Nashold, 2007] 
SONAR (SQQ-89) 
Inboard Processing 225 Hours* 65 minutes 
[Ref 64, Silveria, 
2008] 
Command and 
Control System 216 Hours*
2 2 Hours [Ref 65, NAVSEA PMS 425, 2005] 
Missile Tube Systems 3598 Hours*3 1 Hour [Ref 66, Pettus, 2005] 
ASROC Missile 35,040 Hours Not Repairable During Mission 
[Ref 67, Theunissen 
and Holbrook, 
1998] 
*The actual MTBF values for these systems are classified.  The MTBF provided is a 
representation of the systems’ performance, however, for classification reasons, the 
actual values are not provided.  The actual values are provided in the pertinent references.  
 
Notes: 
1. The SQQ-89 Hull Outboard Electronics failure rate was not available.  The system that best resembles the SQQ-89 is the 
new VIRGINIA Class LAB Array.  While both arrays are cylindrical, the LAB array contains more elements than the 
surface ship cylindrical array, thereby having a slightly more optimistic failure rate, however it is expected that the actual 
design requirements for both will be equivalent in actual operation. 
 
2. The failure rate of the Combat Control system on the DDGs/CG Surface Combatant was not available; therefore the failure 
rate of a submarine Combat Control system was used.  The reliability of these two systems is expected to be similar 
because these systems are highly analogous, consisting of COTS hardware equipment consoles, software components 
certified to the same standards and similar weapons interface hardware.  
 
3. The failure rate of the DDG/CG Surface Combatant Missile Tube Systems was not available; therefore the failure rate of 
the SSGN Missile Tube Systems was used.    This is a conservative approach because the Missile Tube System on a SSGN 
is exposed to more extremes of pressure and temperature due to the nature of the submarine operations.  This is expected to 
lead to a higher failure rate for the SSGN tomahawk canister loaded missiles.  Thus, the reliability for the surface launch 
systems is likely to be understated. 
 
The Hull Outboard Electronics failure rate is a summation of the following 
components: Hydrophones and Bottles.  The Hull Outboard Electronics failure rate is an 
effective failure rate which takes into account allowable loses of components due to a 
permissible decibel reduction in signal loss (the amount of reduction allowable is not 
provided for classification reasons). 
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The SONAR Inboard Processing failure rate is a summation of the 
following components: Signal Conditioning, Beam Forming, Signal Processing and 
Displays. 
The Missile Tube Systems failure rate is a summation of the following 
components: Missile Tube System, Missile Tube Gas System, Missile Tube Hydraulics 
and the Canister. 
This Baseline System resides on 4 DDG/CG Surface Combatants that are 
used continuously throughout the 14 day ASW mission.  All 4 DDG/CGs are required 
continuously for the duration of the 14 day mission.  The Hull Outboard Electronics, 
MFTA, SONAR Inboard Processing, Command and Control System and the Missile 
Tube Systems are in an ‘On and Critical’ state for the duration of the 14 day mission.  
The Missile is in a low-powered ‘On but not Critical’ state for all but one hour of the 14 
day mission.  During this time the missile is still subject to failure however, the failure 
rate of the missile was significantly reduced.  The Missile is in an ‘On and Critical’ state 
for one hour of the 14 day mission. 
Maintenance was not allowed on the Hull Outboard Electronics, MTFA or 
the Missile at any point during the 14 ASW mission.  If a failure did occur, the system 
would remain in a Downstate until the end of the 14 day mission.  Maintenance was 
allowed on all other systems.  However, any maintenance activity that was conducted 
contributed to system downtime.  The DDG/CG was assumed to be equipped with a full 
compliment of spare parts and personnel required to complete maintenance actions.  
 
3.2.3.3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) System Alternative RMA 
Model 
Components in the MPA system alternative that provide the operational 
mission functions critical to support ASW Operations are provided in the table below.  








Table 8 - MPA System RMA Data 
Component MTBF MTTR Source 
EPAS 400 Hours1 
Not repairable 
during flight time 
30 minutes On 
Station 
[Ref 68, Office of 
USDAT&L, 2001] 
Command and 
Control System 216 Hours*
2 
Not repairable 
during flight time 
3 Hours in station 
[Ref 65, NAVSEA 
PMS 425, 2005] 
Torpedo 135 Hours* Not Repairable During Mission 
[Ref 69,NAVSEA 





See Baseline System 
Components  
*The actual MTBF values for these systems are classified.  The MTBF provided is a 
representation of the systems’ performance, however, for classification reasons, the 
actual values are not provided.  The actual values are provided in the pertinent references.  
 
Notes:  
1. The EPAS system is not built yet.  The ATFLIR (Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking Infrared Pod) system most closely 
resembles the EPAS system both in the functionality provided and the projected equipment to be used.  Therefore, the 
failure rate of the ATFLIR was used for the EPAS system.  
 
2. Submarine Command and Control (C2) system failure rate values were used for the C2 system on the Airframe.  This is a 
conservative estimate since the C2 system on a submarine is substantially more complex than that on the airframe. 
 
The EPAS, Command and Control System and the Torpedo reside on a 
MPA.  The endurance of the MPA is such that it can only support an 8 hour mission.  
Three MPAs are used per day to support the 14 day ASW mission.  Two MPAs will be in 
flight at the same time; the first MPA will be in the operations area and the second will be 
traveling to the operations area to relieve the first.  Therefore, two MPAs are required to 
support an 8 hour mission.  The EPAS and Command and Control Systems are in an ‘On 
and Critical’ state for the 8 hour MPA mission.  The Torpedo is in an ‘Off’ State for all 
but one hour of the 14 day mission.  Maintenance is not allowed on any system during 
flight time.  If a failure occurs on the MPA during the mission, another MPA can replace 
it, however the system will remain in a Downstate until the second MPA arrives in 
theater (a 2 hour transit time from station to the operations area was assumed).  Every 8 
hours a new MPA arrives and the component operating modes remain the same. 
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All systems are in an ‘Off’ state while on station waiting to return to 
operation.  During this time maintenance can be conducted without impacting system Ao 
and Re.  If a system has not completed maintenance before it is required to return to 
operation the system is considered in a Downstate until maintenance is complete.  
The torpedo is in an ‘On and Critical’ state for one hour during the 14 day 
ASW mission. 
The Baseline system is a redundant system in the MPA system alternative 
model.  The Baseline system is described in the ‘Baseline System RMA Model’ section 
of this report. 
 
3.2.3.4 Barrier System Alternative RMA Model 
 
Components in the Barrier system alternative that provide the operational 
mission functions critical to support ASW Operations are provided in the table below.  
The Barrier system RBDs are provided in Figure 72. 
 
 




Table 9 - Barrier System RMA Data 
Component MTBF MTTR Source 
Buoy 9,600 Hours Not Repairable 
During Mission 
[Ref 70, Lumpkin 
and Pazos, 2004] 
Communications link N/A N/A N/A 
Command and 
Control System 
720 Hours 2 hours [Ref 71, Volkert, 
2005] 
Torpedo 135 Hours* Not Repairable 
During Mission 
[Ref 69,NAVSEA 
PMS 404, 1998] 
Baseline System See Baseline 
System 
Components 
See Baseline System 
Components 
 
*The actual MTBF value for this system is classified.  The MTBF provided is a 
representation of the system’s performance, however, for classification reasons, the 
actual value is not provided.  The actual value is provided in the pertinent reference.   
 
A Satellite is assumed to be used as the communication link between the 
Buoys and the LCS.  The reliability of Satellite components is unknown.  Therefore, it is 
assumed that the Satellite is always available and that the buoys are always in a position 
to communicate with it. 
The failure rate provided for the buoy takes into account failures due to 
transmission loss, buoys that have run aground or have been picked up by fishing vessels 
etc.  The buoys in this system alternative will be replaced every two days; therefore, 
transmission loss is the only failure mode that the buoys will be subjected to.  Hence, the 
failure rate used is a conservative estimate.   
Twenty-four (24) Buoys are utilized in this system alternative.  To 
maintain adequate detection all 24 buoys are required to be operational.  Due to ocean 
activity it is necessary for the LCS to frequently repopulate the perimeter with buoys.  
Buoys are required to be replenished at a maximum rate of once every 6 hours and at a 
minimum rate of once every two days.  An RMA model was constructed to represent 
each of these operational mission profiles.  The latter represents a more demanding 
situation for the buoys.  Therefore, a conservative approach was taken which uses the 
second operational mission profile to represent the Barrier system alternative.   
Buoys are constantly replenished and never retrieved.  Therefore, 24 
buoys are required to support a two day mission and 7 sets of 24 buoys are required to 
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support the 14 day ASW mission.  The buoys are in an “On and Critical’ State for the two 
day duration.  No maintenance is allowed on the buoys.  If a buoy fails, then the system 
remains in a Downstate until the buoy is replenished.  The operational modes remain the 
same for each set of buoys in use.   
The Command and Control System resides on the LCS.  The LCS can 
support the 14 day ASW mission continuously.  Therefore, the Command and Control 
system on the LCS is in an ‘On and Critical’ state for the duration of the 14 day ASW 
mission in order to process the data sent by the buoys.  Maintenance is allowed to be 
conducted on the Command and Control system; however, any maintenance that is 
conducted contributes to system Downtime.  The LCS was assumed to be equipped with 
a full compliment of spare parts and personnel required to complete maintenance actions.  
The Torpedo is in an ‘Off’ State for all but one hour of the 14 day mission.  
The torpedo is in an ‘On and Critical’ state for one hour during the 14 day ASW mission. 
The Baseline system is a redundant system in the Barrier system 
alternative model.  The Baseline system is described in the ‘Baseline System RMA 
Model’ section of this report. 
 
3.2.3.5 ACB System Alternative RMA Model 
The ACB system alternative provides the same functionality as the 
Baseline System, thereby, utilizing similar components.  The only known difference in 
components between the Baseline System and the Advanced Capabilities Build system is 
three additional MFTAs.   
The Advanced Capabilities Build RMA model was established by 
modifying the Baseline system model with three additional MFTAs.  The Advanced 
Capabilities Build system RBDs are provided in Figure 73.  
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Figure 73 - ACB System RBDs 
 
The MFTAs are in an ‘On and Critical’ State for the duration of the 14 day 
mission.  The MFTA is an outboard component, therefore, no maintenance was allowed 
on the MFTA during the mission.  The operational mission profile, failure rates and 
operating modes of the remaining components are consistent with the Baseline System 
alternative RMA model.  
 
3.2.3.6 Barrier with Advanced Capabilities Build Alternative RMA 
Model 
The Barrier with Advanced Capabilities Build System Alternative consists 
of the Barrier System Alternative used in redundancy with the Advanced Capabilities 
Build System Alternative.   
The Barrier System Alternative RMA model consisted of the Barrier 
System Alternative used in redundancy with the Baseline System.  The Baseline System 
becomes the Advanced Capabilities Build System with the addition of three MFTAs.  
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Therefore, the Barrier with Advanced Capabilities Build System model was created by 
modifying the Baseline portion of the Barrier System Alternative RMA model with three 
additional towed arrays.  The operational mission profile, failure rates and operating 
modes are consistent with the Barrier System Alternative RMA model. 
 
3.2.4 Modeling Results 
Table 10 contains the results of the Operational Effectiveness and Operational 
Suitability Modeling.  The individual operational effectiveness models were run, and 
their results integrated using the event trees described previously.  The results of the 
Baseline and Barrier models warrant further discussion and are addressed in detail below. 
 
Table 10 - Integrated Modeling Results 
Alternative Carrier Survival Operational Availability Reliability 
Baseline 0.665 0.820 0.802 
Barrier 0.857 0.989 0.991 
MPA 0.681 0.995 0.987 
ACB 0.804 0.774 0.803 
ACB plus Barrier 0.916 0.985 0.990 
   
3.2.4.1 Baseline Modeling Results 
The spread sheet model, described above, was executed utilizing a Macro 
which created a family of Monte – Carlo replications of the Detection – Track – 
Engagement simulation.  For each iteration of the model the resulting engagement 
analysis worksheets were combined and then analyzed to determine whether the threat 
submarine was able to successfully engage the CVN prior to being hit by a surface 
launched ASROC weapon.  The ScoreCard worksheet in the WorkBook was utilized to 
capture the results of an ensemble of 25 engagement analysis, each of which exhibits 
different results due to the randomization of the starting position of the opposing force 
submarine and the random fluctuations of the active and passive signal excess 
parameters. 
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Figure 74 shows the results of one scorecard worksheet for a family of 25 
engagement scenarios.  The yellow table indicates if the threat submarine was successful 
(column = TRUE) or if the CSG surface ships were successful (column = FALSE).  Also 
indicated are time of torpedo engagement, range to the CVN at torpedo engagement and 
the torpedo run for that engagement. 
 
 
Figure 74 - ScoreCard worksheet example 
 
After verifying that the spreadsheet model performed as expected through 
numerous validation runs, conducted while varying controlled parameters (fluctuation 
standard deviation, source level, detection threshold, target strength, acoustic signature 
level, initial range and bearing of opposing submarine), the analysis team executed ten 
series of 25 engagement ensembles and evaluated the results. 
The bar chart shown in Figure 75 tabulates the results of these 10 runs.  A 
data analysis tool in Excel was then used to generate descriptive statistics for these 
results.  The results indicate, as shown in Figure 76, that the Carrier Strike Group was 
successful in defeating (hence Carrier survival) the enemy submarine in 66.5% of the 
engagements, with a standard deviation of 10.77.  These baseline results provide the key 
measure of effectiveness (Aircraft Carrier Survival) as indicated in the Objectives 

















Figure 75 - Results of 10 sets of 25 Ensemble Engagements 
 
 







3.2.4.2 Barrier Perimeter Modeling Results 
The results of the barrier perimeter model for 500 independent trials are 
shown in Table 11.  The barrier perimeter model detects the threat submarine 70.2 
percent of the time and successfully engages the threat submarine at a rate of 57.2 
percent.  When a successful engagement takes place, on average the barrier model 
initially detects the threat submarine at a distance of 5,437 yards outside of the OA 
boundary. 
 













Average Distance of 
First Engagement 
(yards)
500 351 70.2% 286 57.2% 5437  
 
 
This section of the report has documented the process and tools the system 
engineering team utilized to produce results needed to support the decision phase of the 
SEDP.  The report describes the current baseline system the Navy operates to satisfy the 
Effective Need, and identifies 13 alternative candidates that are evaluated to determine if 
any of them can contribute to more effectively satisfying this need.   
Using key feasibility measures the team identified three distinct 
alternatives having potential to contribute to a more effective solution to the protection of 
the CSG from submarine threats.  The team has used models and historic data to generate 
measures of performance for operational effectiveness and operational suitability.  The 
Decision Making phase of the systems engineering process will seek to apply utility 
scoring functions to this information and combine it with estimates of cost and risk for 
each option to support stakeholder decision making processes.  These utility functions 
will assist in determining the degree to which any of the candidate solutions 
quantitatively dominate the others in the decision space of the stakeholder. 
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4 DECISION MAKING 
In the previous chapters, four significantly different alternatives are presented in 
order to satisfy the stakeholders’ requirements for improved ASW.  In addition, the 
baseline, current Program of Record (POR) or “do nothing” alternative is presented to 
provide a frame of reference allowing a comparison to judge improvement provided by 
the alternatives.  These improvements are considered to be the Utility of the solution:  the 
most benefit afforded to the stakeholders in addition to the benefit provided by the 
current Program of Record.  
Through Alternative Scoring (including the formation of a Decision Matrix, 
conduct of a Sensitivity Analysis, comparison of System Life Cycle Costs, and 
comparison of associated Risks), the four alternatives were compared, resulting in 
identification of the best solution when compared to the remaining alternatives.   
 
4.1 ALTERNATIVE SCORING 
Alternative Scoring was used to compare the four proposed alternatives (baseline, 
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), Barrier, and Advanced Capabilities Build, as well as the 
combination of Barrier and Advanced Capabilities Build) with respect to multiple 
objectives and multiple evaluation measures, including Value and Cost Modeling.  Value 
Modeling was used as a decision theory approach to accommodate the Stakeholders’ 
preferences in terms of value or utility.  An Additive Value Model applied the 
Stakeholders’ value preferences to convert ‘raw’ performance results into a weighted 
evaluation.  Results of Cost Modeling were then considered in concert with Value 
Modeling in order to support Stakeholder consensus on alternative effectiveness. 
 
4.1.1 Decision Matrix 
Because this project was intended to examine and recommend improvements to 
Anti-Submarine Warfare effectiveness, system utility was determined by the design team 
to be improvement over the existing baseline system.  The greater the improvement to the 
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existing baseline system, the more utility and therefore more value would be realized for 
the stakeholders.  In this way, the baseline system was normalized to provide zero utility, 
and the respective value score of the alternatives were determined by calculating the delta 
or difference from this normalized value.  
The Decision Matrix was arrived at by first creating a Raw Data Matrix, 
consisting of raw data scores.  This matrix utilizes the output of the modeling and 
simulation effort, providing values in the form of percentages for the Key Metric of 
Carrier Survival.  Availability and Reliability percentages were arrived at through 
reliability modeling and are included in the Raw Data Matrix as well.  The Raw Data 
Matrix is shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 - Raw Data Matrix 
Raw Data Matrix 
Alternatives Evaluation 





ACB +  
Barrier 
Carrier Survival 
Psurv 0.665 0.804 0.857 0.681 0.916
Ao 0.820 0.774 0.995 0.989 0.985
Re 0.802 0.803 0.987 0.991 0.990
 
Considering that the utility score for the baseline system is the basis for 
improvement through application of the alternative systems, a required range of 
effectiveness was determined.  Using the baseline system Raw Data score from the 
modeling, simulation and reliability determination efforts, these scores were determined 
to be the lower limit acceptable and the upper limit of effectiveness as 100%.  Any 
alternative that achieved a value score lower than the score achieved by the baseline, 
would provide no value to the stakeholders.  The required range of effectiveness matrix is 




Table 13 - Required Ranges of Effectiveness 
Required Ranges of Effectiveness 
Carrier Survival 0.665 1.0 
Ao 0.820 1.0 
Re 0.802 1.0 
 low high 
 
Global weights as provided in the Objectives Hierarchy were then utilized for 
each of the competing systems to be evaluated, as well as the baseline system.  
Probability that the ASW system prevents enemy launch of an effective weapon against 
the aircraft carrier within the CSG was a system effectiveness measure given a global 
weight of 90%.  Protection of the high value aircraft carrier was considered to be the 
most important objective of the system and if this was not realized on a consistent basis, 
then the system would prove to be less than useful.  Contributing to the overall 
effectiveness of the system were the key metrics of detecting the enemy submarine 
outside the range of his offensive weapons, localization and tracking of the enemy 
submarine target to allow for follow on actions, and classification which would ensure 
that the target being tracked is in fact an enemy vessel thereby avoiding a friendly fire 
situation.  These key metrics are evaluated in the modeling of the alternative scenarios 
whereby the model predicts an effectiveness score based on the outcome of the modeled 
scenario. 
Secondary to the objective of protecting the Aircraft Carrier was a system 
suitability measure for a trustworthy system.  It was assigned a global weight of 10%.  It 
was considered important for the system to “perform as advertised”.  The system must 
enable increased persistence (considered to be a measure of high reliability, Re) and 
exhibit decreased downtime (Ao). A system that was extremely effective, but not 
available, would have limited value as a whole.   
The final decision matrix was determined by considering the values of the 
alternatives’ Raw Data Scores, as well as the range of effectiveness scores.  The range of 
effectiveness normalized the Raw Data Scores to zero, thereby generating a Value Score 
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that represents the total value relative to the baseline system.  It should be pointed out 
that for the Advanced Capabilities Build the availability value score is a negative number.  
This indicates this value is less than the comparative value generated by the baseline 
system.  Technically this occurred due to the increased number of towed arrays used in 
this alternative.  Failure rates are additive terms, therefore the increased number of 
components lead to an increased failure rate and therefore a lower availability value.  The 
Decision Matrix is shown in Table 14. 
 
Table 14 - Decision Matrix 
Decision Matrix 
Alternatives Evaluation 





ACB +  
Barrier 
Carrier 
Survival 0.90 0.00 41.49 57.31 4.78 74.96 
Ao 0.05 0.00 -25.56 97.22 93.89 91.67 
Re 0.05 0.00 0.51 93.43 95.45 94.95 
TOTAL VALUE SCORE 0.00 36.09 61.11 13.77 76.79 
 
Based on the importance, or weight of each system objective and the degree of 
value to which each alternative system would provide toward accomplishing that 
objective, the decision matrix indicates which system will provide the highest degree of 
Total Value.  The ACB + Barrier system received the highest Total Value Score.  This 
indicates that the ACB + Barrier system provides the most total system value. 
 
4.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
The Total Value Scores in the decision matrix were generated based on a number 
of critical assumptions in our design effort, to include various system performance 
parameters for both the proposed CSG assets and the enemy diesel sub, procurement and 
operational cost parameters of these systems, and also the global weights that our group 
assigned to the evaluation metrics.  If any of these assumptions prove to be flawed, the 
results of our research could be incorrect, so it is therefore appropriate to conduct 
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sensitivity analysis on these assumptions.  Due to time constraints we focus our 
sensitivity analysis on a single assumption, which is the global weights. 
Essentially, the values chosen for the global weights may make a difference in 
which alternative system provides the highest total system value.  If the global weights 
were to change, one alternative system may then be favored over another.  Sensitivity 
analysis considers the affects on decisions if the global weights were to change. 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted for each evaluation measure on all top system 
level objectives.  This process involves varying the weight of one evaluation measure 
while keeping the ratio of the remaining evaluation measures to the remaining weight the 
same and the sum of the global weights equal to one.  One evaluation measure was 
evaluated at a time.  Global weights were varied from 0 to 100% to determine the net 
effect on the Total Value Score.  These numerical results are provided in Table 15 
through Table 17. 
 
Table 15 - Sensitivity Matrix Global Weight 1, Carrier Survival 
Alternatives System 








Survival 1 0.00 41.49 57.31 4.78 74.96 
Ao 0 0.00 -25.56 97.22 93.89 91.67 
Re 0 0.00 0.51 93.43 95.45 94.95 
TOTAL VALUE SCORE 0.00 41.49 57.31 4.78 74.96 
 
Table 16 - Sensitivity Matrix Global Weight 1, Ao 
Alternatives System 







Carrier Survival 0 0.00 41.49 57.31 4.78 74.96 
Ao 1 0.00 -25.56 97.22 93.89 91.67 
Re 0 0.00 0.51 93.43 95.45 94.95 
TOTAL VALUE SCORE 0.00 -25.56 97.22 93.89 91.67 
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Table 17 - Sensitivity Matrix Global Weight 1, Re 
Alternatives System 







Carrier Survival 0 0.00 41.49 57.31 4.78 74.96 
Ao 0 0.00 -25.56 97.22 93.89 91.67 
Re 1 0.00 0.51 93.43 95.45 94.95 
TOTAL VALUE SCORE 0.00 0.51 93.43 95.45 94.95 
 
Graphically, the sensitivity analysis is shown in Figure 77 through Figure 79.  
These figures show the best system alternative for each evaluation measure at all possible 
global weights.  The results of sensitivity analysis conclude, that for all global weights, 
the ACB + Barrier System Alternative provides the greatest value toward accomplishing 
the carrier survival and the increased persistence system objectives.  There exists for the 
objective of decreased downtime (Ao) a point at which the Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
(MPA) is equally valuable as the ACB + Barrier System Alternative.  This occurrence is 
known as a Point Of Indifference (POI).  The POI for decreased downtime occurs at a 
global weight of 0.75.  Previous to, or ahead of the POI determines which alternative 
provides greater value, which in this instance is the Barrier System Alternative.  A 
reasonable “Rule of Thumb” indicates that if the POI is within 10% of the original global 
weight for the evaluation measure being evaluated, then it is considered sensitive.  
Therefore, by definition, this global weight is not considered to be sensitive (Global 
Weight for decreased downtime is 5.0% while the POI is 75%.  This difference is clearly 
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Figure 79 - Reliability Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Sensitivity Analysis reveals that no global weights are considered sensitive and 
reaffirms the results of the decision matrix; the ACB + Barrier System Alternative is 
recommended as the system to provide the most satisfaction to the stakeholders. 
 
4.2 COST ANALYSIS CONSIDERATION 
In support of recommendation development for the best value among the four 
alternatives, other sections documented the total value score for each alternative based on 
modeling results and weighting values from the value hierarchy.  This section of the 
report will review the cost analysis performed and present the cost modeling results.  The 
results will be discussed and presented in a graphical format.  Refer to Appendix H for 
additional material related to the cost analysis. 
For each alternative, costs are estimated for four categories over a 25-year 
lifecycle period.  The four cost categories are design, production, operation, and disposal.  
In order to provide a fair cost comparison over the 25-year period, a net present value 
(NPV) analysis will be implemented to transform the yearly costs over time into a single 
dollar value.  Note that all costs are considered to be relative to the costs for the baseline 
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CSG alternative.  In other words, the cost information shown below is referenced to the 
CSG alternative and is considered to be relative to the CSG program of record.  
The cost estimation methodology employed in determining the LCCP for each 
alternative was based on the following three techniques: 
• Researched references including a documented program plan and or 
funding profiles 
• Where specific cost references were not available, an analogous system 
was used for comparison adjusted accordingly to fit the system 
description. 
• If no analogous system existed, the team worked with subject matter 
experts to estimate costs based on previous experience. 
The concept behind NPV is that it represents the total lifecycle cost of a given 
alternative adjusted to current year dollars.  To calculate the NPV for an alternative, 
Equation 24 is used: 
 






⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦∑  Equation 24 
 
Where, FV  is the future dollar value for year n , k  is the discount rate, and N  is the 
total number of years.  The NPV is the sum of the yearly discounted cash flows over the 
timeframe of interest. 
A cost model for each alternative was constructed to identify the cost to design, 
produce, operate, and dispose each of the systems.  A common model and set of 
assumptions and constraints was used to ensure comparable cost model results.  The 
overall assumptions and constraints include: 
• 25-year lifecycle 
• Calculations assume the support of one CSG for 40 14-day missions 
• Operation costs includes personnel costs 
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• Discount rate k of six percent 
• Costs for all categories are considered to be relative to CSG baseline 
program of record 
 
Table 18 shows the NPVs for each alternative relative to the CSG baseline 
program of record.  A lifecycle cost profile (LCCP) for each alternative (excluding the 
CSG baseline alternative) was generated and are shown in Figure 80 [Ref 73, Department 
of the Navy Fiscal Year 2007, 2007] [Ref 74, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2009, 
2008] [Ref 75, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2007, 2006] through Figure 82. [Ref 
76, PEO IWS, 2005] [Ref 77, Under Secretary of Defense, 2007] [Ref 78, O’Roarke, 
2006] The LCCP profiles graphically represent the non-discounted costs each year for all 
four cost categories.   
Table 18 – NPVs for Alternatives Relative to CSG Baseline 
Alternative NPV ($M) 
CSG Baseline 0.0 




The NPVs for the ACB and MPA alternatives are of a similar magnitude, 
however the Barrier alternative is shown to have a significantly higher NPV.  The 
primary driver for this separation is attributed to the operational costs of the buoy 
replenishment segment of the Barrier alternative.  Refer to Appendix H for specific cost 






























































Figure 82 - Barrier Alternative LCCP 
  
 
4.3 RISK EVALUATION 
A risk is defined as the measure of the inability to achieve program objectives 
within cost and schedule constraints.   Risk management is as an organized, systematic 
decision-making process that effectively identifies, assesses, monitors, controls and 
documents risks that are associated with a program.  Risk Management is a cyclic process 
which is executed continuously throughout a program’s lifecycle.  The risk management 
process used by the ASW Program is an established risk management process.   
Risks that impact either the ASW Program or successful completion of the MSSE 
Capstone Project were identified.  Risks were identified using such techniques as: best 
judgment, lessons learned, negative trends, forecasting etc. 
Every risk event has both a likelihood of occurring and a potential adverse 
consequence.  These attributes were assessed and analyzed in order to quantify each risk 
identified.  The likelihood that the risk event would occur was rating on a scale from ‘A’ 
to ‘E’.  A level ‘A’ rating indicates a remote possibility that the event will occur.  A level 
‘E’ rating indicates a near certainty that the event will occur.  The consequence of the 
event occurring is rated on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘5’.  A level ‘1’ rating indicates a minimal 
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or no impact to the program.  A level ‘5’ rating indicates an unacceptable impact to the 
program.   
Risks were then plotted on a risk matrix.  A risk matrix is a pictorial 
representation of risk which clearly displays risk priority based on the likelihood and 
consequence of each risk.  The green, yellow and red sections of the risk matrix denote 




Figure 83 - Representative Risk Matrix 
 
Low priority risks may cause minimal program impact.  Minimal oversight is 
needed to ensure risk remains low.  Medium priority risks may cause some program 
disruption.  Mitigation plans are required and may need to be executed.  High priority 
risks may cause major program disruption.  Mitigation plans are required and must be 
executed.  Mitigation plans were constructed for all risks and were implemented based on 
risk priority.   
This risk management process was performed continuously throughout the MSSE 
Capstone project.  Previously identified risks were continuously tracked and evaluated for 
adequacy of mitigation plan.  Risk status was reevaluated and mitigation plans were 
changed as necessary.  New risks were identified and controlled using this same process.   
All risks were documented and are provided in the following subparagraphs.  
Project and program risks are segregated.  Project risks are related to the successful 
 166
completion of the MSSE program and therefore exist in the same capacity for all 
alternatives.  Over the course of the MSSE Capstone Project these risks have been 
mitigated and all have been retired.  Project risks are provided in Table 5, Appendix G for 
reference.  Program risks are dependent on the implementation of a specific alternative.  
Program risks will be evaluated to compare system alternatives regarding risk.   Note 
that, since the Baseline System will be used in each system alternative the Baseline Risks 
apply to all system alternatives although they are only displayed once under ‘Baseline 
System’.  Additionally the system alternative titled Barrier with Advanced Capabilities 
Build Alternative consists of the Barrier System Alternative used in conjunction with the 
Advanced Capabilities Build Alternative.  Therefore, a separate risk assessment was not 
conducted for the Barrier with Advanced Capabilities Build Alternative; the risks 
associated with this system are a compilation of the risks associated with (and 
documented under) the Barrier System Alternative and the Advanced Capabilities Build 
Alternative. 
Three risk categories were considered for each system alternative: 1) Performance 
Based Risks.  2) Cost Based Risks.  3) Schedule Based Risks.  Program risks are 
provided by category in Figure 84, Figure 85, and Figure 86 and described in Table 19, 
Table 20, and Table 21.  Table 22 provides the total number of low, medium and high 
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Table 19 - Performance Based Risks 
IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS MITIGATION PLAN 
Baseline System  
Risk 1 
  
The schedule risk of MFTA would 
cause decreased performance on 
the DDG.  
This risk was assessed at a B2.  
The MFTA is close to final 
production; therefore the likelihood 
of a schedule delay is low.  The 
consequence is low because the 
MFTA is only used on one of the 
four ships.  The MFTA provides 
minimal performance improvement 
over the legacy towed array 
system.   
Use the current Towed 
Array system on all 
ships.   
 
Baseline System  
Risk 2 
Insufficient at sea training 
opportunities could reduce overall 
system performance. 
This risk was assessed at a C3.  
This risk can easily be mitigated.   
Develop realistic 
synthetic training 
equipment.   
 
Increase at-sea training.  
Baseline System  
Risk 3 
Risk of aging/failing of transducers 
on hull.  
This risk was assessed at a C4.  
This issue is currently being seen 
on other Platforms.  This affect 
would decrease source level, effect 
directivity index, and reduce 
bearing and range measuring 
accuracy.  
Implement a more robust 
transducer monitoring 








The alternative requires that a 
MPA be deployed continuously in 
support of the ASW mission.  
There is a risk that there is a gap in 
the MPA availability for the ASW 
mission due to other in theater 
MPA requirements.  
This risk was assessed at a C4.  We 
may not be able to control the 
availability of the MPA.  If the 
MPA is not continuously available 
this alternative will experience a 
performance degradation.   
This is a consequence of 
overall theater 
commanders strategic 
planning.  Mitigation is 
outside of our scope.   
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There is a risk regarding the 
distance of CSG operating area 
from nearest MPA base.  This risk 
was assessed at a D2.  CSG 
operating area location is not 
predictable.  If the CSG operating 
area is far from the nearest base 
the MPA time on station would be 
reduced due to transit time.   
Allocate more aircraft 





Risk of weather related impacts.  
This risk was assessed at a D5.  
Weather severely impacts EPAS.  
For example the system does not 
operate well in fog, or at 
nighttime.  Under these 
conditions, performance will be 
degraded.     
Use other sensors 
available to P3 however 
reduced performance 
would result.  The only 
additional mitigation 





Risk of the detection ability of 
EPAS.   This risk was assessed at 
a E5.  EPAS cannot detect a target 
that is below a certain depth.  If 
the opposing force submarine does 
not enter the required depth 
threshold they will not be 
detected.    
This is a limitation of 






Risk that a P-8 acquisition delay 
may cause a performance 
degradation.  This risk was 
assessed at a C1.  Based on 
current DoD acquisition 
performance a delay is possible. 
Consequence low.   
The P-3 aircraft can be 
used as a mitigation 







Risk that the system does not 
perform as expected.  This risk 
was assessed at an A4.  The 
system has already gone through a 
number of years of satisfactory 
testing.   
Use traditional sensor 
types resulting in 
reduced performance. 
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IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS MITIGATION PLAN 
Barrier Alternative  
Risk 1 
 
Risk that the barrier may drift 
faster than expected.  This risk was 
assessed at a D3. There is a high 
likelihood of unknown barrier 
movement due to unknown ocean 
activity.  This would cause the 
formation to be broken and 
detection would incomplete.   
More frequent 
repositioning/relaying of 
buoys.   
Barrier Alternative  
Risk 2 
Risk that buoys planned for use do 
not meet projected performance 
values. This risk was assessed at a 
A3.  These sensors are close to 
final production therefore system 
performance should be understood 
prior to IOC.  If the buoys do not 
perform as expected either 
acoustic performance or 
intermittent communications 
would affect the early warning 
capability of the barrier and 
overall performance would be 
reduced.   
Utilize a greater number 
of buoys and robust 






The schedule risk of MFTA would 
cause decreased performance on 
the DDG.  
This risk was assessed at a B3.  
The MFTA is close to final 
production.  Therefore the 
likelihood of a schedule delay is 
low.  However, in this alternative 
the MFTA is used on all the ships.  
Therefore, the consequence of the 
MFTA unavailability is higher in 
this system alternative than the 
Baseline System.   
Use the current Towed 
Array system on all 





Risk 2  
Risk that the system does not 
perform as expected.  This risk 
was assessed at an A3.   The 
MFTA is close to final production; 
therefore, system performance 
should be fully characterized prior 
to IOC.  If the MFTA does not 
perform as expected, the detection 
performance would be impacted.  .  
Use the current Towed 
Array on all 4 DDGs in 
place of the MFTAs.  
This is the configuration 
of the Baseline System, 
therefore, performance 
would degrade but not 
below the Baseline 
System performance 
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No appreciable gain in overall 
detection performance or 
reduction in "detect to classify" 
latency.  This risk was assessed at 
a B3.   Based on results from the 
submarine ARCI program, there is 
a high potential for performance 
gains to be reached by the 2013 
timeframe.  If gains not realized 
system would be as good as 
baseline system 


































































Table 20 - Cost Based Risks 










Risk that the EPAS System may 
have development cost growth.  
This risk was assessed at a C5.  A 
new system will most likely see 
increased cost.  This may lead to 
program cancellation if 
development cost exceeds the 
Nunn-McCurdy threshold.  
Early mitigation is to 
rigorously manage cost.  
If risk is realized 
traditional sensor types 
could be used but would 






Based on current DoD acquisition 
performance a delay is possible in 
the P-8 acquisition, therefore, the 
P-3 would be used as a mitigation.  
There is a risk is that this may 
increase maintenance costs for the 
P-3.    This risk was assessed at a 
B1.  Using the P-3 for a mission 
that the P-3 does not currently 
conduct might increase P-3 
maintenance cost.  However, the 
P-3 is sufficient to conduct the 
Battle Group Operations mission, 
and therefore only a minor 
increase in maintenance cost is 
anticipated.        
If fallback onto P-3, 
increase routine 
maintenance checks and 
ensure adequate 





Risk of the cost of the buoys over 
the lifecycle.  This risk was 
assessed at a C4.  Many buoys 
will be required to continuously 
recycle the barrier over the 
mission. 
Make the buoys 
stationary. 
 
Increase the detection 
power of the buoys so 
that they do not have to 










Risk that the MFTA program is 
not funded adequately to achieve 
the required performance when it 
is needed.  This risk was assessed 
at a B3.  The MFTA is building 
upon an established successful 
process, therefore the likelihood of 
this risk occurring is low. 
Use the current Towed 





Risk that a continuous funding 
stream is not available to support 
the research and development 
needed to develop the required 
technologies.  This risk was 
assessed at a C3. This has a 
Medium probability of occurring 
as the surface ship side has been 
slow to fund a continuous R&D 
effort to support an equivalent 
Advanced Processing Build 
Structure equal to the version used 
by the submarine sonar programs. 




















































































Table 21 - Schedule Based Risks 
IDENTIFICATION ANALYSIS MITIGATION PLAN 
Baseline System  
Risk 1 
  
Risk that there is a MFTA schedule 
delay.  This risk was assessed at a 
B2.  The MFTA is close to final 
production; therefore the likelihood 
of a schedule delay is low.  The 
consequence is low because the 
MFTA is only used on one of the 
four ships.  The MFTA provides 
minimal performance capabilities 
in the Baseline System.   
Use current Towed 





Risk that the EPAS program falls 
behind schedule.  This risk was 
assessed at a B4.  Development has 
already started.   
Ensure that EPAS 
development is managed 
effectively to minimize 





Risk of a P-8 acquisition delay.  
This risk was assessed at a C1.  
Based on current DoD acquisition 
performance a delay is possible. 
Consequence low.  The P-3 
aircraft can be used as a mitigation 
without a reduction in 
performance capability or 
endurance.  






Risk that there is insufficient 
production of DWAD assets. This 
risk was assessed at a C4. 





Risk of infeasible logistics of 
carrying, deploying and underway 
replenishment of DWADS on LCS.  
This risk was assessed at an A2.   
Use fewer buoys in 





Risk that there is a MFTA 
schedule delay.  This risk was 
assessed at a B3.  The MFTA is 
close to final production.  
Therefore the likelihood of a 
schedule delay is low.  However, 
in this alternative the MFTA is 
used on all the ships.  Therefore, 
the consequence of the MFTA 
unavailability is higher in this 
system alternative than the 
Baseline System.   
Use current Towed 
Array on all ships 
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Risk the ship modernization 
availabilities cannot support 
fielding plan.  This risk was 
assessed at a C2.  Is the install 
schedule such that all required 
platforms can be updated in time 
to support Battle Group 
Operations?   
Prioritize advanced 
development installation 
for carrier strike group 





Risk that new technologies will 
not be available in time to support 
scenario timeline.  This risk was 
assessed at a C3 
Transition to partial 
capabilities that may be 
ready 
 
Table 22 - Summary of Risks by System Alternative 
 Low Priority Medium Priority High Priority 




4 3 3 









7* 6* 0* 
* Barrier with Advanced Capabilities Build Alternative risks are a compilation of the 
risks associated with the Barrier Alternative and the Advanced Capabilities Build 
Alternative. 
 
4.4 CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES 
In order to provide a recommendation to the decision maker of the alternative that 
will provide the most satisfaction to the stakeholders, the design team considered for each 
alternative the Total Value Score and the Life Cycle Cost.  This created a cost-value 
comparison for each alternative in which the system that “cost less and did more” could 
be identified, as well as alternatives that would be clearly dominated by other 
alternatives.  This weighing of Life Cycle Cost against the Total Value Score of the 
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alternatives is known as a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA).  Graphic illustration of the Life 




























Figure 87 - Cost-Benefit Analysis Plot 
 
From the Cost-Benefit analysis plot, improvement in performance (Value Score) 
over the baseline is clearly evident, as the baseline is normalized to the origin of the plot.  
Each alternative is an improvement over the baseline; however the amount of 
improvement comes with increasing cost.  The Advanced Capabilities Build alternative 
shows a performance gain of nearly 162% over the MPA/EPAS alternative for a 
relatively low cost increase of 26%.  This represents a “good trade” in which a major 
performance increase is gained through a relatively low cost increase.  In this particular 
case, the design team concluded that the MPA/EPAS alternative was dominated by the 
Advanced Capabilities Build alternative and was not considered further. 
In reviewing the effective need statement: “An improved ASW system is needed 
to protect carrier strike groups from enemy attack through effective, timely, and precise 
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engagement by providing tactically significant detection, localization, tracking, and 
classification of quiet acoustic threat submarines in challenging environments”, the 
design team considered that the system that clearly was most able to meet this need was 
the ACB + Barrier alternative.  Although other systems were less costly, such as the 
Barrier and the Advanced Capabilities Build alternatives, these systems do not provide 
the CSG Commander with all of the capabilities possible to reduce the risk of enemy 
engagement upon the carrier high value target.   Because the ACB + Barrier system Life 
Cycle Cost is under the 1 billion dollar threshold as established during the feasibility 
screening phase, this alternative was seen as providing the most capability to the fleet 
within reasonable budget constraints.  Although ultimately left to the decision maker, the 
design team does not advocate cutting costs at the expense of capability. 
Risks associated with the ACB + Barrier alternative were not considered to be in 
the high priority category, but scored low and medium priority ratings.  It is pointed out 
that because this ACB + Barrier alternative is a conglomeration of two individual 
alternatives, the total risk score is a combination of the risks of the two systems that make 
up this alternative (Barrier and ACB).  The large number of identified risk items 
contributes to a high risk rating; however this indicates that there are more risk items to 
manage vice areas of high risk within the alternative.  
The information provided during the Decision Making phase of the systems 
engineering process is utilized to allow the selection of the most satisfying solution for 
acquisition.  The effort applied during the systems engineering process has also identified 
a number of areas for further investigation.  These areas, along with known limitations of 
the process and tools utilized by the systems engineering team are discussed in the final 






The System Engineering Team has successfully applied the practices and selected 
tools of the Systems Engineering Design Process to understand and formalize the needs 
of the customer.   Thirteen (13) possible alternative solutions were developed to meet 
those needs.  Through processes of feasibility screening and decision scoring a best 
available solution was determined.  The identification of Aircraft Carrier Survival during 
an engagement with enemy submarines as the critical Measure of Effectiveness for the 
solutions space allowed our team to concentrate on evaluating candidate architectures 
that support the ASW engagement process, which included detection, decision and 
weapon engagement. 
Pursue LCS Deployed Barrier Solution; Consider Technology to Reduce Total 
Buoy Costs 
The analysis conducted by the systems engineering team has focused on the 
protection of the CVN while it is conducting aircraft launch and recovery operations as 
described in the reports scenario and concept of operations description.  As illustrated in 
Chapter 4 of this report, the Advanced Capabilities Build and the LCS deployed Barrier 
alternatives result in nearly identical operational effectiveness outcomes.  However, after 
combining additional decision criteria such as Operational Suitability metrics and cost 
through the utility function, we have demonstrated that the Advanced Capabilities Build 
alternative suffers from the impact of inadequate reliability due to the reliance on the 
towed array system component.  Therefore, the systems engineering team recommends 
that the customer pursue the development and fielding of the LCS deployed Barrier 
capability.  
 In considering this option, the customer should be aware that a significant Life 
Cycle cost driver for this solution is the production rate required for the active 
sonobuoys.  The sonobuoy inventory driver is the need to reseed the field due to buoy 
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drift from ocean current effects.  Potential mitigations for this cost driver might include 
investigation of “station keeping” technologies that would allow the buoys to remain in 
place for a significantly longer period of time. 
Consider Also Pursuing ACB Approach to Improve Operational Effectiveness 
Due to the critical nature of the CVN protection measure of effectiveness, the 
system engineering team would also recommend that the costumer consider a course of 
action that includes pursuit of both the Barrier capability and the Advance Capabilities 
Build solution.   The team makes this recommendation in recognition of the relatively 
low cost of Advanced Capabilities Build solutions made available through the ACB 
approach and the improved performance provided by these two system alternatives acting 
in parallel as a layered defense approach to providing protection against submarine 
torpedo attack on the aircraft carrier. 
 
5.2 KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The systems engineering team acknowledges that key assumptions were required 
to allow the project analysis to be completed in a timely manner.  These key assumptions 
should be considered by the decision maker when assessing the completeness of the 
recommendations, and caution should be used in accepting the conclusions of this 
academic analysis for the extremely complex mission area of ASW.  Additionally, future 
research should consider varying these assumptions to determine their significance in the 
design and analysis of an ASW system in support of carrier operations.  The key 
assumptions are outlined here for the customer. 
The Potential Performance Contribution of a Self Defense Function Was Not 
Investigated.  As discussed in Chapter 3 of this report, the Self Defense function 
represents the ability to defeat a submarine launched torpedo.  If it is possible to 
successfully design and build this capability it has the potential to contribute significantly 
to the overall probability of CVN survival during torpedo attack.  In fact, if a 100% 
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effective torpedo defense capability could be produced the CVN would be rendered 
immune from risk of submarine torpedo attacks.  
Perfect Torpedo Performance Assumed.  Due to the limitations associated with 
modeling and simulation tools available to the systems engineering team the decision was 
made to model torpedo performance as 100% effective for launches within the torpedo 
maximum range.  The systems engineering team understands that the probability of 
torpedo successfully acquiring, homing and detonating on a target is not 100%, however 
the team did not have a defendable model for threat torpedo performance nor an 
unclassified performance model or data for U.S. torpedo inventories.    Assuming that the 
probability of success for either U.S. or adversary torpedoes is roughly equivalent these 
limitations should not affect the overall effectiveness models.  The inclusion of a failure 
probability for the torpedoes would require significantly more advanced modeling tools 
that include submarine and carrier strike group behavior following torpedo launch and 
subsequent re-engagements. 
No Attack by Submarine on CVN Screen Units.  The modeling tools available 
did not support the analysis of attack by the enemy submarine on the Cruiser/Destroyer 
screening assets.  This limitation is likely to result in more successful attacks by U.S. 
forces on enemy submarines than might be realistically expected for the baseline and 
Advanced Development approaches.  A significantly more sophisticated modeling tool, 
which allows use of a successful submarine torpedo launch against a screen escort to be 
used as a localization and attack cue for the remaining ASW assets would be required to 
quantitatively assess the actual impact of allowing attack by enemy submarines on screen 
assets. 
Threat Behavior Model Limited.  The enemy submarine behavior is modeled as 
a “kill or be killed” tactic as described in section 3 of this document.  This behavior, 
where the threat submarine aggressively pursues the CVN until successfully establishing 
a torpedo launch position, is likely to result in increased opportunities for the CVN screen 
assets to detect and engage the enemy submarine.  In addition, the modeling approach did 
not allow for consideration that the enemy submarine might pursue an attack upon the 
AOE logistics support ship. 
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Contribution to Submarine Attrition by Theater Assets.  The scoping of 
scenario and CONOPS that was necessary for our problem domain analysis precluded 
consideration of the contribution that might be made by systems that support attrition of 
enemy submarines before they arrive at the designated operating area.  Further 
consideration should be given to such system solutions in the future, as they have the 
potential to significantly reduce the expected number of enemy submarine engagements 
incurred by the CVN strike group. 
Ramifications of False Alarms.  For simplification purposes, the models did not 
consider the ramifications of false alarms for either detection or classification.  
Additional work could be performed to produce detection operation curves for false 
alarm rates versus recognition threshold setting.  Also an investigation into resource 




The systems engineering team identified several limitations during the execution 
of the Systems Engineering Development Process.  Application of this methodology to an 
actual analysis and design problem would require that these limitations be overcome.  
Limitations and constraints in our process included: 
 
• Report Classification Level.  The systems engineering team elected to 
maintain this report at an unclassified level.  This was done to facilitate 
team collaboration from home, make use of the BlackBoard facilities at 
NPS and also to allow for periodic unclassified reviews with our thesis 
advisors.  While this is not seen as a major impact on the execution of the 
Systems Engineering Development Process, it will affect the actual 
outcomes that might be achieved using classified reference material for 
CONOPS, scenarios, system component performance and cost. 
• Modeling and Simulation Tools.  The Systems Engineering Team would 
have liked to have a modeling tool or frame work that would enable the 
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full-spectrum analysis of ASW operations which would support an 
analysis of fleet level movements and behaviors down through the 
application of sonar system performance in simulated environments.  This 
tool would need to support use from remote sites to support use by both 
the distance learning projects as well as potentially program support 
activities conducted by NPS staff and students.  Availability of this tool 
set would enable more emphasis on tool tailoring vice tool/model 
development. 
• Access to Actual Performance and Cost Data.  Several of the components 
utilized by the alternative solutions are still in the development stage so 
that the actual results of developmental and operational test have not yet 
been vetted or published.  In addition performance data for many of the 
mature components is classified.  These concerns apply to the cost as well 
as performance data.  For these systems the team drew upon our 
experience with analogous systems in conjunction with the limited 
published data for our analysis.  The team believes that our estimates have 
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This document details the Project Management Plan (PMP) to be utilized by the 
Newport Cohort of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Master of Science in Systems 
Engineering (MSSE) Capstone Project.  The team will apply a formal Systems 
Engineering Design Process (SEDP) to evaluate the current needs, identify potential 
capability gaps, develop requirements and assess alternatives.  Elements of the project’s 
phases, schedule, organization and methodologies are detailed herein.  
The project topic is an assessment of Improved Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
Effectiveness.  The initial problem statement is derived from the “Chief of Naval 
Operations’ Anti-Submarine Warfare Concept of Operations for the 21st Century”, which 
documents high level goals, challenges and the future environment for 21st Century 
ASW operations.  As stated in the concept of operations, the near term the goal is to, 
“maximize our undersea advantage anywhere in the world by leveraging advances in 
acoustic processing, data collection and sharing, communications, collaborative real-
time planning, reachback support, rapid maneuver, and precision engagement”.   In the 
long term the key goal is to, “build on these advances to fully leverage an integrated 
network of sensors coupled to stand-off weapons, thereby maximizing our advantages in 
persistence, speed, and precision as the conceptual framework for our future”.   
In response to the shifting strategic environment, NUWC’s Technical Director has 
announced a working vision for NUWC centered on Next Generation Undersea Warfare 
– the theater-level warfare-from-under-the-sea capabilities that effectively support and 
enable networked Joint forces to be expeditionary, adaptable, and responsive, allowing 
them to perform a broad set of missions and tasks in support of the nation’s defense 





The objectives of the Improved ASW Effectiveness program is to implement the 
techniques in a systems engineering methodology to address the overarching need to 
improve ASW effectiveness in tomorrow’s battlespace including operations near-land, 
with the need to establish area control in a congested, chaotic environment, and facing 
adversaries with every advancing levels of technological sophistication. We will 
implement the SEDP and the associated principles to refine the problem statement, 
synthesize potential solutions, evaluate them based on Measures of Effectiveness and 
Performance using analytic and simulation based tools, establishing the requirements 
necessary to produce a design baseline. The scope of the program will be to complete the 
first three phases identified in the Systems Engineering Design Process (SEDP), to 
include needs analysis, analysis of alternatives, and provide a feasible solution.    
 
3 PROGRAM  
The overall program will follow the SEDP as a systematic approach to developing 
the design framework through the program lifecycle.  A phased approach will address the 
key tenets to the SEDP methodology, Problem Definition, Design and Analysis, and 
Decision Making in a logical progression.  Coupled with this process will be a robust 
Risk Management plan acting as a continuous check and balance tool for evaluating each 
alternative.  The following sections provide details on this methodology including a 
listing of planned deliverables and their place within the overall program timeline. 
 
3.1 PROJECT PHASES 
The program will be comprised of individual project phases tailored to meet 
requisite objectives of the overall program.  The first project phase will focus upon 
problem definition necessary to establish a functional hierarchy that succinctly captures 
the stakeholder needs with measurable objectives.  The second project phase will conduct 
design and analysis necessary to explore and establish feasible alternatives, with 
sufficient modeling and sensitivity analysis to ensure optimal design alternatives.  The 
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final project phase will cultivate decision making artifacts necessary to make informed 
decisions on what constitutes a best-value solution, including both technical and cost 
considerations. 
 
3.2 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DESIGN PROCESS  
The SEDP will be implemented to provide a design framework and methodology 
for exploring candidate alternatives necessary to meet the project goal, including SEDP 
artifacts organized to clearly convey results for informed decision making.  The project 
timeline is shown as Figure 2. Detailed dates associated with the schedule are in Section 
7.1 
3.2.1 Problem Definition 
During Problem Definition the SEDP will focus upon interdisciplinary methods 
for defining a vision of what constitutes a trustworthy system, in terms of meeting the 
stakeholder needs through value system design.  Issue formulation, analysis and 
interpretation will be applied to define the problem space, employing various analytical 
methods to broaden creativity and reduce predisposition and bias.  Problem definition is 
crucial as it greatly establishes the basis for all subsequent SEDP analysis and evaluation: 
the ‘foundation’ of the project.  Iteration and periodic Stakeholder reviews will be used to 
ensure an effective problem definition. 
3.2.1.1 Needs Analysis 
 
A Needs Analysis will be conducted to establish an Effective Needs Statement for 
the project, utilizing many of the following SEDP techniques: 
• Stakeholder Analysis – to collate expressed system needs, wants and desires.  
Analysis may include Affinity Diagramming to organize language information, 
goals and constraints. 
• Input-Output Model Analysis – to scope and bound the problem by defining 
boundaries of the system and boundary conditions. 
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• Needs and Constraints Analysis – to garner stakeholder perspective of the ‘need’ 
in the context of current conditions, future environment, resources to bring to 
bear, etc. 
• Concept of Operations – to define a stakeholder vision for what the system ‘is’, a 
statement of mission requirements, and a description of ‘how’ the system will be 
used. 
• Functional Analysis – to determine ‘what’ the system must do, not ‘how’ the 
system will function.  The functional analysis provides a basis for developing 
innovative alternatives in follow-on phases.  It encompasses system functional 
composition, and flows among functional components. 
3.2.1.2 Value System Design 
 
Value System Design forms the foundation of criterion through which alternatives 
are assessed and ultimately modeled for suitability and compliance with user needs.  The 
Value System Design will utilize the following SEDP techniques: 
• Objectives Hierarchy – to expand the Stakeholder’s effective need into a 
qualitative Value Tree of system functions and objectives, for which evaluation 
consideration may be applied, and which is defensible and practical. 
• Evaluation Measures – to develop specific measures to evaluate how well each 
bottom-level objective will be met. 
• Weighting – to establish Stakeholder preferred weighting among objectives of a 
Value Tree, resulting in a complete Value Model for comparison of different 
alternatives.  
3.2.2 Design and Analysis 
During Design and Analysis the SEDP will employ various analytical, modeling, 
and simulation methods to expand the design space to allow for a wide range of potential 
solutions.  Iteration and periodic Stakeholder reviews will be used to ensure effective 
design and analysis. 
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3.2.2.1 Alternatives Generation 
 
Alternatives Generation will be conducted to arrive at candidate solutions that 
address the system objectives developed during the Problem Definition Phase.  
Alternatives Generation will utilize the following SEDP techniques to explore solution 
alternatives for the system under consideration: 
• Organized Brainstorming – to apply group techniques for open exploration of 
solution elements that address each critical system objective. 
• Zwicky’s Morphological Box (ZMB) – to gather brainstorming results for 
objective-elements, and group these into ‘alternatives’ that address all system 
objective categories. 
• Feasibility Screening – to identify alternatives that meet all system constraints, 
and hence are feasible, with feasibility criteria based on system objectives and 
Stakeholder feedback. 
• Quality Functional Deployment – to ensure customer objectives are matched with 
technical performance measures and design dependent parameters. 
3.2.2.2 Modeling and Analysis 
 
Modeling and Analysis will be performed to approximate performance attributes 
of alternatives under consideration.  Modeling will be used to represent or describe an 
important property of a system to be brought into being, or to analyze a system already in 
existence.  The purpose for Modeling is to provide insight relative to the specified 
alternatives, better understand system relationships and required data, and ultimately 
assist in making informed decisions.  Economic Modeling may be developed as well, to 
support follow-on Decision Making (e.g., life cycle cost profile). 
Optimization can be applied to systematically determine the ‘best’ result for an 
objective that satisfies all constraints, while Sensitivity Analysis determines the 
robustness of the results. 
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3.2.3 Decision Making 
During the Decision Making Phase the SEDP not only considers objective results, 
but also subjective attributes relative to the alternatives under consideration.  In terms of 
subjective qualities, attribute-scales will be developed in concert with Stakeholder 
preference to provide clear and meaningful methods for ranking. 
3.2.3.1 Alternative Scoring 
 
Alternative Scoring compares alternatives with respect to multiple objectives 
(often competing) and multiple evaluation measures, including Value and Cost Modeling.  
Value Modeling is a decision theory approach that can accommodate a Stakeholder’s 
preferences in terms of value and risk.  An Additive Value Model applies Stakeholder 
value preferences to convert ‘raw’ performance results into a weighted evaluation.  
Results of Cost Modeling can then be considered in concert with Value Modeling to 
support a Stakeholder consensus on alternative effectiveness. 
 
3.2.3.2 Presentation for Decision Makers 
 
Decision Making can employ various techniques to characterize alternatives in a 
manner that facilitates informed decisions.  Provided deliverables should clearly convey 
alternative performance, risk, and cost, including all key attributes required by the 
Stakeholders.  The SEDP will capture all preceding decisions leading up to any major 
event on the project. 
 
3.3 RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 
A Risk Management plan will be established and maintained throughout the 
program lifecycle identifying, analyzing, managing, and mitigating both program and 
project risks and their status as they change with time.  Program risks are defined as those 
risks associated with the Improved Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Effectiveness 
Program, for example a change in system requirements.  Project risks are defined as those 
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risks associated with the successful completion of the Newport cohort NPS MSSE 
Capstone Project, for example a schedule slip caused by unexpected travel.   
  Risks will be assigned and described in two dimensions: likelihood of 
occurrence and program consequence.   Numerical assessment methods may be used to 
characterize program attributes, for example system reliability.  Any risk determined to 
have either a medium or high impact will be assigned appropriate risk mitigation.  




Several deliverables will be provided to the capstone project advisors.  These 
deliverables include this PMP, the project proposal, the in-progress review presentation 
materials, the final report and associated presentation, and any models developed during 
the course.  These deliverable products will be provided via Blackboard®.  
 
4 ORGANIZATION 
The Newport cohort will be organized into Working Integrated Product Teams 
(WIPTs) that are headed by a WIPT lead.  Each WIPT lead is a member of the 
Overarching-Level Integrated Product Team (OIPT) that is headed by the Program 
Manager (PM).   
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PM
WIPT Leader WIPT leader WIPT leader WIPT leader
WIPT Members WIPT Members WIPT Members WIPT Members
OIPT
 
Figure 1 - IPT Structure 
 
WIPTs will be established as necessary to meet program objectives within each 
program phase.  As an WIPT completes its assigned tasking the WIPT lead will report to 
the OIPT and members will be reassigned as necessary.  The OIPT is responsible for 
identifying the WIPT requirements throughout each project phase.   
 
5 POLICY 
5.1 DECISION MAKING POLICY 
All decision making will be performed by Integrated Product Teams (IPT) either 
at the Overarching-Level (OIPT) or the Working-Level (WIPT).  Therefore, issues will 
be discussed in a small group environment, and final decisions will be made and 
promulgated by the appropriate IPT.  This policy will circumvent the inefficiency related 
to large group dynamics.  The general decision making procedure will be as follows:  
1. Strive for consensus as the first option.  The PM or IPT Lead will determine 
whether or not consensus can be reached.  While the WIPT focus upon issues 
  199
within their purview, they also support the OIPT for overarching and policy 
issues. 
2. If no consensus can be reached, then the IPT decides by group vote; the IPT 
leader will hold tiebreaker privileges. 
3. For OIPT decisions each WIPT Lead representative and the PM must be present 
for majority decision: in case of a split decision the OIPT Lead or PM holds 
overall decision authority. 
 
5.2 INDIVIDUAL POLICY 
 
Program Manager   Steven Wright 
The Program Manager is responsible for overall project coordination.  He 
acts as the final decision arbiter and assigns tasking.  He is the primary point of 
contact with NPS faculty and staff, as well as the OIPT Lead.  
 
Deputy Program Manager  Patrick Kelley 
The Deputy Program Manager assists the program manager in his assigned 
tasking.  He assumes the full responsibility and authority of the PM when absent 
due to work or travel commitments. 
 
Lead Systems Engineer/Architect Scott Santos 
The Lead Systems Engineer (LSE) is responsible for project integration, 
ensuring that the outputs of the individual IPTs are compatible with each other 
and address overall system requirements.  The LSE is responsible for ensuring 
that team efforts adhere to SEDP principles. The LSE’s architecture responsibility 
is to ensure that the overarching architecture directly addresses all of the system 
requirements. 
 
Information Management Lead Pat Roach 
The Information Management Lead is the primary person responsible for 
establishing and maintaining Blackboard® folders and content to facilitate 
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information sharing among team members. The Information Manager is 
responsible for maintaining version control of all products.   
 
Information Management Deputy Kirk Volk  
The Information Management Deputy is responsible for assisting the 
Information Management Lead in maintaining the file sharing system and 
providing alternate access to the system in the leads absence. 
 
WIPT Leads     
WIPT Leads are responsible for overall coordination of their IPT tasking 
and reporting progress to the PM and LSE.   WIPT Leads serve as standing 
members of the OIPT. 
 
Individual Team Members 
All team members are responsible for executing assigned tasking in a 
complete and timely manner.  Full participation at team meetings is expected. 
 
5.3 OPERATIONAL POLICES 
 
• IPTs will set up a meeting location and schedule. Routine weekly meetings are 
expected. 
• The PM will call for full team meetings as required.   
• Minutes will be taken documenting all IPT and full team, meetings and posted on 
the file sharing site.  Recording responsibilities will rotate among team members. 
• Artifacts will be produced with a standard set of software tools to be accessible by 
all team members.  
 
5.4 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT POLICY 
SEDP artifacts will be maintained in the Newport Project Files section of the 
SI0810 Blackboard®.  The Blackboard® site will contain three main folders: 
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• Deliverables – Items that are required to be delivered to NPS as noted in Section 
3.4 
• Controlled – SE products that are produced and used throughout the life of the 
project. 
• Reference – contains raw data and reference material that will not change over the 
life of the project. 
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Controlled items are produced by the appropriate WIPT and submitted for 
approval by the OIPT. Once approved the items are moved to the Controlled folder by the 
Information Manager.   
Changes to items in the Controlled folder will be processed through the same path 
as an original product. 
 
Controlled Items 
• Input/Output Models 
• External System Diagram 
• Concept of Operation 
• Objectives Hierarchy 
• Functional Hierarchy 
• Functional Flow Diagram 
• N2 Diagram 
• Statement of Effective Need 
• Alternative Architecture Diagrams 
• Models 
• Model input and output data 
• Lifecycle Planning 
• Lifecycle cost estimates 
• PMP 
• Proposal 
• Final Report 
• Presentations 
• Sensitivity Analysis 
• Alternative Scores 
 
Reference/Items 
• Stakeholder Inputs 
• Affinity Diagrams 
• Brainstorming Results 








Individuals are expected to arrive to each team meeting prepared to discuss the 
topic at hand. This requires prior research and planning at the individual level.  
Individuals who cannot attend a team meeting are expected to review the meeting 
discussions, major decisions and/or actions assigned prior to the following meeting.   
Individuals will be required to support their appropriate WIPT.  Each WIPT will 
decide how the work will be divided within their group.  Each individual is expected to 
provide their assigned tasking. The WIPT lead responsibility will be rotated among 
cohort members. 
Noncompliance with these expectations will be deemed as unacceptable 
performance.  As a class, we will conduct periodic anonymous evaluations of each other 




Figure 2 - Project Timeline 
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7.1 MILESTONE SCHEDULE 
Start/Finish 
Stakeholder Requirements:------------------------------------------------ 5 Oct / 26 Oct 
CONOPS:------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 Oct / 26 Oct 
Scenarios:--------------------------------------------------------------------19 Oct / 2 Nov 
Finalize Problem Statement: ----------------------------------------------26 Oct / 2 Nov 
Functional Analysis: ------------------------------------------------------2 Nov / 30 Nov 
Functional Flow Diagrams: ---------------------------------------------- 9 Nov / 16 Dec 
System Decomposition:--------------------------------------------------- 16 Nov / 7 Dec 
Value Systems Design: --------------------------------------------------16 Nov / 21 Dec 
1st In Process Review:-------------------------------------------------------------- 30 Nov 
Measures of Effectiveness: ----------------------------------------------- 7 Dec / 21 Dec 
Alternative Generation: ---------------------------------------------------14 Dec / 18 Jan 
Modeling and Analysis: --------------------------------------------------11 Jan / 28 Mar 
2nd In Process Review: ----------------------------------------------------------------1 Feb 
Decision Making and Scoring:-------------------------------------------- 29 Feb / 4 Apr 
Finalize/ Revise: ------------------------------------------------------------4 Apr / 25 Apr 
Final Out briefing:------------------------------------------------------------------ 16 May 
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APPENDIX B  




NUWC, Div NPT 
NPS MSSE Team Professional Background 
Jim Broadmeadow 
A mechanical engineer for 13 years at NUWC in the Payload 
Integration and Launcher Systems Department.  Primary focus 
was on the development and integration of Unmanned Undersea 
Vehicles onto submarines, now coordinating technical efforts 
associated with Launcher systems on the new VIRGINIA Class 
submarines. 
Frank Dziekan 
Electrical Engineer with19 years at NUWC in various positions 
for Surface Ship and Submarine Sonar programs including 
current position as Lead Systems Engineer for the AN/BQQ-
10(V). Have also served  as ASW Technical Advisor for the 
CNO (Surface Warfare N863)  as part of NUWC Field Team 
Jim Frantz 
An Electrical Engineer with 22 years experience at NUWC 
working in the Combat Systems Department for various 
Submarine Acquisition Programs.  Prior assignment with the 
Submarine Program Management office for Submarine Combat 
Systems, PMS425 has lead to the current assignment as Combat 
Control System, AN/BYG-1 System Engineer. 
Rodney Gudz 
A Mechanical Engineer with 14 years experience in mechanical 
design and analysis, currently supporting the Submarine Imaging 
Technical Design Agent primarily Virginia Class Photonics 
Mast. 
Patrick Kelley 
Patrick Kelley is currently assigned as the System Command's 
Technical Warrant Holder for Integrated Undersea Warfare.  
Mr. Kelley's duty station is NUWC Division Newport, where he 
is a member of the Undersea Warfare Combat Systems 
Department staff.  Previous assignments have included 
Commander, Submarine Pacific Fleet and NAVSEA Advanced 
Systems Technology Office. 
Shawn Kennedy 
An electrical engineer with 12 years experience at NUWC 
providing digital signal processing and algorithm development 
support for undersea ranges.   
Also five years in private industry developing real-time multi-
threaded software to control CD and DVD replication 
equipment.   
Christine Moreira Mathematician with 4 years experience at NUWC in the USW Combat Systems Department.   Currently performing Reliability, 
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Maintainability and Availability predictions for VIRGINIA 
Class Systems. 
Nguyen Nguyen 
An Electrical Engineer graduated from UTEP in 1988. 
Employed by Naval Undersea System Center in 1991. 
Experience at NUWC included Acoustic Device 
Countermeasure testing and Advanced Countermeasure 
Development. Currently responsible for building target models 
for Weapon Analysis Facility at Torpedo Systems Department. 
Pat Roach 
5 years US Navy service in submarines.  20 years contractor and 
government systems engineering experience in submarine and 
surface ship launchers, torpedoes, missiles, and combat control 
systems. 
Jeff Sammis 
21 Years as government contractor and employee, involved in 
all facets of surface ASW combat system development. 
Currently working as Lead Systems Engineer for a Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) variant of the SQQ-89 ASW Combat 
System. 
Scott Santos 
A Mechanical Engineer with 22 years experience in submarine 
weapons systems, mainly as a member of the Fleet Failure 
Analysis Team.  Currently responsible for coordinating the 
efforts of Failure Analysis and In-Service Engineering onsite 
representatives at the Intermediate Maintenance Activities.  
Kenny Silveria 
18 years at NUWC.  Currently (last 2.5 years) the AN/SQQ-
89(V) Lead System Engineer (LSE) working in support of PEO 
IWS5B.  8 years prior was the ARCI Lead External Interface 
Engineer. 
Cullen Smith 
A Mechanical Engineer with 9 years of experience in Submarine 
imaging and communications systems. Currently working on the 
Common Submarine Radio Room on Trident and VIRGINIA 
Class Submarines and also the development of a new non-
penetrating periscope for the VIRGINIA Class. 
Kirk Volk 
An electrical engineer with 19 years experience at NUWC as 
systems engineer in support of acquisition and development of 
RF communications systems, optical sensors, and ATE. 
Steve Wright 
Electrical Engineer With 22 years at NUWC Working in the 
Combat System Department, Performing System Engineering 







Our design team developed a stakeholder questionnaire in order to establish a 
standard set of interview elements for query of each stakeholder.  The questionnaire was 
composed of questions intended to facilitate discourse that could help characterize the 
stakeholder needs, while encouraging stakeholder creativity.  The questionnaire also 
facilitated interview of stakeholders who proved difficult to reach in terms of their remote 
proximity or schedule, allowing timely initial query when stakeholder audience was a 
premium, and increasing productivity for subsequent interview with these respondents.  
After some early trial and iteration on survey questions, the following became the basis 
of our stakeholder questionnaire: 
 
¾ What are some of the major limitations the US Navy is currently facing in 
defeating SSK, e.g. Functional, Logistical, etc.? 
 
¾ What types of technologies are currently needed to more effectively keep an SSK 
from impeding US Aircraft carrier operations? 
 
¾ From a system standpoint, what are some challenges facing our ability to detect, 
identify and defeat SSK?   
 
¾ What would be some important features of a system devised to protect US Aircraft 
carriers from SSK? 
 
¾ What are some systems or processes (current or future) that are (may prove to be) 
effective in detecting / deterring SSK? 
 




¾ What are the main areas (ports, choke points, channels, open water, etc.) of 
concern for defeating SSK?  
 
¾ What improvements can be made in the decision making process (Automation, 
operator training, etc.)? 
 
¾ What do you see as the greatest challenge in modern ASW? 
 
¾ Without any consideration of current limitations (technologies, political, cost, etc.), 
define your vision of a “perfect” ASW system 
 
Early stakeholder feedback indicated quest for improvement in undersea warfare equated 
to a desire for ASW improvement, and the questionnaire was designed to further explore 
the spectrum of stakeholder ASW needs. 
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APPENDIX D 
STAKEHOLDER RECOMMENDED RESEARCH 
 
In addition to stakeholder interviews, the design team also conducted significant 
research so as to better characterize the problem space and facilitate stakeholder needs 
concurrence.  Various source materials were consulted as part of this research, including 
those references suggested by stakeholders as germane subject-matter.  Below is an 
example of materials that were consulted as part of the initial needs analysis research: 
 
¾ Undersea Distributed Networked Systems (UDNS), Jun 2007 – Unclassified 
NUWC brief on a systems engineering based framework for developing UDNS.  
The UDNS concept is to support geographically dispersed sensor, command & 
control, and influencer systems that are networked to generate an aware, flexible 
and agile system focused on the operational mission of the group or force of 
systems.  Included an epitome of Fleet needs in an ASW context. 
¾ CNO ASW CONOPS, May 2007 – Unclassified Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
point paper providing a high level CONOPS of ASW in the 21st century.  Provides 
an overview of the operating environment, near and far-term ASW initiatives, 
force attributes, development priorities, and way-ahead ASW principles and 
associated capabilities. 
¾ Next-Generation Undersea Warfare and UDNS, Jan 2007 – Unclassified NUWC 
technical report that presents the rationale, implications, and perceived advantages 
for next-generation USW, whereby distributed networked systems is deemed a key 
enabler.  Challenges in engineering a distributed networked system, co-evolved 
with war fighter CONOPS, is also addressed. 
¾ Cooperative Strategy for 21st century Sea Power, Oct 2007 – Unclassified CNO 
paper describing significance (what & why) of the maritime strategy, the strategic 
imperatives, the core capabilities for strategy implementation, associated priorities 
and opportunities, and recognition of undersea warfare as an essential contributor. 
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¾ Global ASW CONOPS – Secret CONOPS identifying a framework for Full 
Spectrum ASW (FSASW), comprised of operational/tactical layers, tailored per 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) and environment.  Applied to illustrative scenarios, 
the framework is a guide for both DOTMLPF & Technical development initiatives 
(e.g. across Planning, RDT&E and Acquisition Lifecycles). 
¾ Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-21, Feb 2007 – Secret publication addressing 
Fleet Antisubmarine Warfare (e.g. doctrine, Tactics/Technique/Procedures). 
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APPENDIX E 
NEEDS RESEARCH DOCUMENTATION 
All resulting Needs Analysis language information from both stakeholder 
interviews and materials research were captured in an electronic worksheet format (i.e. 
Microsoft Excel) to ensure the information was suitably recorded and documented for 
traceability.  Figure 3 denotes the worksheet format utilized to record stakeholder 
questionnaire results, whereby any compound stakeholder reply was broken down into 
individual needs elements which are identified as original needs.  Figure 4 denotes the 
worksheet format utilized to record research data acquired from each specific information 
source, whereby “yellow sticky” references were documented as original needs. 
# Question Stakeholder #1 Stakeholder #2
What are some of the major limitations 
the US Navy is currently facing in 
defeating SSK, e.g. Functional, 
Logistical, etc.? 
Understanding Red capability and tactics.  
Understanding what additional Red 
capability does to US and allies plans.  
Taking advantage of non US assets.
Training/operator proficiency in applicable 
environments
Understanding Red capability and tactics. Training/operator proficiency in applicable 
environments
Understanding what additional Red 
capability does to US and allies plans.
Taking advantage of non US assets.
2 What types of technologies are 
currently needed to more effectively 
keep an SSK from impeding US 
Aircraft carrier operations?
Shallow water track and trail upon leaving 
port.  ISR tools to say when departure is 
happening
Any technology that will support active or 
passive detection at tactically significant 
ranges. 
Shallow water track and trail upon leaving 
port.
Any technology that will support active or 
passive detection at tactically significant 
ranges. 
ISR tools to say when departure is 
happening.
1
Breakdown of stakeholder answers into 
Original Needs :
Breakdown of stakeholder answers into 
Original Needs :
 
Figure 3: Needs Analysis Questionnaire Data (sample) 
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Document: System Engineering Based Framework For Developing Undersea Distributed networked Systems (UDNS)
Reference: Presented by UDNS Tech Lead
Document Type: PowerPoint Presentation
Document 
Classification: Unclassified
Synopsis: Summary of NUWC efforts in this arena
Requirement No. Status Document Reference Data Element (Stakeholder Input) "Yellow Sticky"
1 OK
UDNS Brief
Provide Enhanced Situational 
Awareness Provide Enhanced Situational Awareness 
2 OK
UDNS Brief
ProvideFaster Engagement Chain 
Timeline (Time) 




Provide Increased Engagement 
Effectiveness (Probability) 




Need to Relieve Platforms to Conduct 
Other Tasking 
Need to enable ASW capable Platforms to 
concurrently Conduct non-ASW Tasking.
5 OK
UDNS Brief Need to Reduce Risk to Forces 




Need to make all sensor data available 
to all warfighters. (Data not currently 
currently shared among users. Sources 
must forward data to known recipients.)
ASW information and data needs to be available 
to all ASW nodes  




































MSSE Capstone Project Risks 
ASW project and program risks were identified using the risk management 
process.  Project risks are related to the successful completion of the MSSE Capstone 
Project.  Over the course of the MSSE Capstone Project these risks have been mitigated 
and all have been retired.  Project risks are provided below for reference purposes.  ASW 
program risks are described in section XX of this report. 
     







Classification – Risk 
that our report is 
classified 
I. This risk was assessed at an A5.   
There is a low likelihood that 
classified material will be included in this 
report.  Classification levels are clearly 
defined and everyone working this project 
has been made aware of the importance of 
not including classified material.  However, 
if this report is classified our NPS Capstone 
advisors will not be able to read it which is 
an unacceptable consequence.   
II. Our final report is not classified. 
Therefore, this risk is retired.  There is no 
need to further mitigate.  
 
I. Our mitigation will be to 
take steps to insure no 
classified material is included 
in this project. 
Mitigation Plan has 
been Implemented and is 
Ongoing.   
 
2.  Scope- 
We are at risk 
of selecting too large a 
scope and making it 
impossible to finish the 
project in the allotted 
time or forcing us to 
address it to shallowly.  
I. This risk was assessed at a C3.   
There is a moderate chance of our 
project scope being too large, however we 
will still be able to apply the Systems 
Engineering principles that we have been 
taught thus completing our ultimate 
objective.   
II. Project scope was narrowed, however, 
remained at level that we did not have to 
address the topic too shallow.  We longer 
feel that project scope is a risk.  Risk 
reassessed and retired.  
 
I. Take a realistic look at the 
time we have available and 
what we can accomplish with 
our resources.  Begin 
immediate down scope. 
Mitigation Plan is 
being executed currently.  
After the down scope is 
complete this risk will be 







3.  Product 
Direction- 
Risk that a 
single stakeholder may 
drive the direction of 
the project 
I. This risk was assessed at a B4.   
There is a low likelihood that 
interference will occur, however, if this 
event does occur it may cause our project to 
not meet graduation requirements or not 
satisfy the needs of all stakeholders  
I. Risk has not appeared during alternative 
generation and preceding efforts.  Risk 
reassessed and retired.  
 
I. All stakeholder input will 
be considered, however, we 
will use our own judgment to 
decide how to proceed.    
Execution not yet 
needed.  
 




modeling tools and the 
NPS remote lab is a 
potential risk due to 
lack of experience.   
 
I. This risk was assessed at a B2.   
There is a fairly low likelihood that 
we will not be able to familiarize ourselves 
with these new tools.  If this does occur, 
there are existing modeling tools that we are 
familiar with that can be used.     
II.  This risk was realized during the 
modeling phase of the System’s 
Engineering Process.  The consequence 
however was reduced due to 
implementation of the mitigation plan 
which is use of other sufficient modeling 
tools.   This risk was reassessed at a C1. 
III.Mitigation Plan was continuously 
followed.  Following this mitigation plan 
allowed modeling to be completed.  This 
risk has been retired. 
  
I. A team has been assigned to 
begin familiarizing 
themselves with the NPS 
remote lab and the associated 
new tools.   
Mitigation Plan has 
been Implemented and is 
Ongoing.  
II. Continue using alternate 
modeling tools, while 








risk represents the 
situation where the 
amount of responses 
received from the 
stakeholder 
questionnaire is not 
adequate to proceed.  
Additionally there 
exists the risk of 
misinterpreting the 
stakeholder responses 
that were received.   
 
I. This risk was assessed at a D4.   
There is a fairly high likelihood that 
all stakeholder requirements have not been 
incorporated. The consequence of this is that 
the system would not perform as required by 
users/stakeholders and this would be a high 
severity issue.    
II. Mitigation Plan was followed and the 
team feels confident that relevant 
stakeholder inputs are being addressed 
appropriately.  This risk was reassessed at 
an A4. 
III.Mitigation Plan was continuously 
implemented throughout the MSSE 
Program.  Stakeholder requirements were 
successfully interpreted and stakeholders are 
satisfied.  This risk has been retired. 
 
I. Mitigation is to make 
another round of stakeholder 
follow-up calls/emails.  
Gather constant stakeholder 
feedback 
Mitigation Plan has 
been Implemented and is 
Ongoing. 









6.  Schedule to 
Complete –  
There is a risk 
that insufficient time 
remains to complete all 
required tasking and 
deliverables prior to 
need date. 
 
I.  This risk was assessed at D5.    
There is a high risk that the amount 
of work remaining will result in a shortfall 
of deliverables by the provided need dates.    
II.This risk will retired with the completion of 
MSSE Program.    
  
 
I.Additional time/effort being 
implemented by team 
members, including 
assistance covering areas that 
are currently lagging behind 
the schedule pace.  More 
frequent IPT meetings and 






Detailed Cost Information 
 
 As previously discussed, costs are estimated for the alternatives for four 
categories over a 25-year lifecycle period.  The four cost categories are design, 
production, operation, and disposal.  All cost components are presented below and key 
cost assumptions and elements are discussed.  All costs are relative to a single baseline 
CSG and assume two 14-day missions per year during the 20-year in-service timeframe.  
Also, one fundamental cost assumption is all cost estimates are for a production quantity 
of one alternative over the twenty-five year timeframe.     
 Figures H-1 through H-3 display the cost data in a matrix format.  The yellow 
columns of data correspond to cost estimate inputs generated by the systems engineering 
team.  The two orange columns are calculated spreadsheet values based on the four input 
data columns and correspond to the total undiscounted yearly costs and present values, 
respectively.  The numbers in the green spreadsheet cells represents the single NPV for 
each alternative using a discount rate of six percent. 
 The accelerated development cost numbers (Figure H-1) are scaled appropriately 
to support one CSG.  The design costs in year number five include testing.  The relatively 
low operational costs are due to the fact that new personnel are not required and the 
systems are very similar in operation as compared to the CSG baseline. 
 The cost numbers for the MPA alternative are shown in Figure H-2.  Key 
assumptions and values are listed below: 
• A quantity of 10 units are procured to support one CSG and this quantity is 
reflected in both the production, disposal, and operation costs. 
• Aircraft, aircraft operational costs, and related personnel are assumed to be 
part of a standard CSG and are not included in the MPA costs. 
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• Yearly operational costs during the 20-year in-service lifecycle includes 
$1.5M for logistics, maintenance and repair of $50K per unit, and personnel 
training at $700K. 
• Disposal costs start after the 15-year service life. 
 Figure H-3 contains the barrier alternative cost information.  These numbers are 
based on the following: 
• LCS design and production is assumed to be paid for by a different program 
of record and are not included in the barrier alternative costs.  However the 
barrier alternative does include LCS operational costs ($5M/year) and 
associated LCS mission package personnel (12 workyears/year at a rate of 
$125K/workyear) in support of the two 14-day missions per year. 
• The cost per buoy is $20K. 
• Assuming two 14-day missions per year and a six hour buoy replenishment 
rate, approximately 3,000 buoys are used each year in operation.  This 
accounts for $60M of the $66.5M yearly operational costs and greatly 
influences the overall operational cost. 
• Due to the expendable nature of the buoys, the cost to produce the buoys 
which are used during missions is shown under the operation category as 
opposed to the production category.  The $4M yearly production costs 
indicate fixed costs which are required to manufacture the buoys as opposed 












1 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 14.2
2 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 13.3
3 15.0 3.0 0.5 0.0 18.5 15.5
4 15.0 3.0 1.0 0.0 19.0 15.0
5 7.5 3.0 1.5 0.0 12.0 9.0
6 0.0 3.0 1.5 0.0 4.5 3.2
7 0.0 3.0 1.5 0.0 4.5 3.0
8 0.0 3.0 1.5 0.0 4.5 2.8
9 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 3.3
10 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 3.1
11 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 2.9
12 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 2.7
13 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 2.6
14 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 2.4
15 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 2.3
16 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 2.2
17 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 2.0
18 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 1.9
19 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 1.8
20 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 1.7
21 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 1.6
22 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 1.5
23 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 1.4
24 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 1.4
25 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 5.5 1.3
NPV 112.2  












1 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.3
2 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.4
3 5.1 1.0 0.5 0.0 6.6 5.5
4 7.0 6.0 1.0 0.0 14.0 11.1
5 4.0 15.0 2.7 0.0 21.7 16.2
6 0.0 14.0 2.7 0.0 16.7 11.8
7 0.0 9.0 2.7 0.0 11.7 7.8
8 0.0 8.0 2.7 0.0 10.7 6.7
9 0.0 8.0 2.7 0.0 10.7 6.3
10 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.7 1.5
11 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.7 1.4
12 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.7 1.3
13 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.7 1.3
14 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.7 1.2
15 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.7 1.1
16 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.7 1.1
17 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 2.7 1.0
18 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.2 2.9 1.0
19 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.4 3.1 1.0
20 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.5 3.2 1.0
21 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.5 3.2 0.9
22 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.5 3.2 0.9
23 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.5 3.2 0.8
24 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.5 3.2 0.8
25 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.5 3.2 0.7
NPV 89.3  










1 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.7
2 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.4
3 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.2
4 5.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 5.5
5 3.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 75.5 56.4
6 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 51.1
7 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 48.2
8 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 45.5
9 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 42.9
10 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 40.5
11 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 38.2
12 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 36.0
13 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 34.0
14 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 32.1
15 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 30.3
16 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 28.5
17 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 26.9
18 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 25.4
19 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 24.0
20 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 22.6
21 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 21.3
22 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 20.1
23 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 19.0
24 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 17.9
25 0.0 4.0 66.5 2.0 72.5 16.9
NPV 696.7  
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